Abyss: The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
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- Author：Max Hastings
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Summary
From the #1 bestselling historian Max Hastings
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was the most perilous event in history， when mankind faced a looming nuclear collision between the United States and Soviet Union。 During those weeks， the world gazed into the abyss of potential annihilation。
One of its most terrifying moments came on 18 October， when President John F。 Kennedy and his advisers discussed the prospect that， if US forces invaded Cuba to remove the missiles secretly deployed there， the Soviets would seize West Berlin。 Robert Kennedy asked: ‘Then what do we do？’。 General Maxwell Taylor， chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff， said: ‘Go to general war， if it’s in the interests of ours’。 The President asked disbelievingly: ‘You mean nuclear exchange？’。 Taylor shrugged: ‘Guess you have to’。 His words highlight the madness that overtook some key players on both sides。 Mercifully， JFK recoiled from the soldier’s view saying: ‘Now the question really is to what action we take which lessens the chances of a nuclear exchange， which obviously is the final failure’。
Max Hastings’s graphic and brilliant new history tells the story from the viewpoints of national leaders， Russian officers， Cuban peasants， American pilots and British disarmers。 Max Hastings deploys his accustomed blend of eye-witness interviews， archive documents and diaries， White House tape recordings， top-down analysis， first to paint word-portraits of the Cold War experiences of Fidel Castro’s Cuba， Nikita Khrushchev’s Russia and Kennedy’s America; then to describe the nail-biting Thirteen Days in which Armageddon beckoned。
Hastings began researching this book believing that he was exploring a past event from twentieth century history。 He is as shocked as are millions of us around the world， to discover that the rape of Ukraine gives this narrative a hitherto unimaginable twenty-first century immediacy。 We may be witnessing the onset of a new Cold War between nuclear-armed superpowers。 To contend with today’s threat， which Hastings fears will prove enduring， it is critical to understand how， sixty years ago， the world survived its last glimpse into the abyss。 Only by fearing the worst， he argues， can our leaders hope to secure the survival of the planet。
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was the most perilous event in history， when mankind faced a looming nuclear collision between the United States and Soviet Union。 During those weeks， the world gazed into the abyss of potential annihilation。
One of its most terrifying moments came on 18 October， when President John F。 Kennedy and his advisers discussed the prospect that， if US forces invaded Cuba to remove the missiles secretly deployed there， the Soviets would seize West Berlin。 Robert Kennedy asked: ‘Then what do we do？’。 General Maxwell Taylor， chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff， said: ‘Go to general war， if it’s in the interests of ours’。 The President asked disbelievingly: ‘You mean nuclear exchange？’。 Taylor shrugged: ‘Guess you have to’。 His words highlight the madness that overtook some key players on both sides。 Mercifully， JFK recoiled from the soldier’s view saying: ‘Now the question really is to what action we take which lessens the chances of a nuclear exchange， which obviously is the final failure’。
Max Hastings’s graphic and brilliant new history tells the story from the viewpoints of national leaders， Russian officers， Cuban peasants， American pilots and British disarmers。 Max Hastings deploys his accustomed blend of eye-witness interviews， archive documents and diaries， White House tape recordings， top-down analysis， first to paint word-portraits of the Cold War experiences of Fidel Castro’s Cuba， Nikita Khrushchev’s Russia and Kennedy’s America; then to describe the nail-biting Thirteen Days in which Armageddon beckoned。
Hastings began researching this book believing that he was exploring a past event from twentieth century history。 He is as shocked as are millions of us around the world， to discover that the rape of Ukraine gives this narrative a hitherto unimaginable twenty-first century immediacy。 We may be witnessing the onset of a new Cold War between nuclear-armed superpowers。 To contend with today’s threat， which Hastings fears will prove enduring， it is critical to understand how， sixty years ago， the world survived its last glimpse into the abyss。 Only by fearing the worst， he argues， can our leaders hope to secure the survival of the planet。
Reviews
Brent
，
THAT was some stuff。 And that was just before Vietnam。 Hastings， a masterful British military historian， researched this during the COVID pandemic and published just after Russia invaded Ukraine， leading him to useful comparisons of then and now， of Kruschev and Putin。Hastings begins with an important summary of Cuban American history leading to the failed US invasion at the Bay of Pigs。 His judgements on the ensuing missile crisis the next year are keenly felt， especially judging the well-repor THAT was some stuff。 And that was just before Vietnam。 Hastings， a masterful British military historian， researched this during the COVID pandemic and published just after Russia invaded Ukraine， leading him to useful comparisons of then and now， of Kruschev and Putin。Hastings begins with an important summary of Cuban American history leading to the failed US invasion at the Bay of Pigs。 His judgements on the ensuing missile crisis the next year are keenly felt， especially judging the well-reported circle around JFK known in the crisis as ExCom， in which hawks and （by comparison） doves met daily。 Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara gets points for favoring a blockade rather than the bombing and invasion that the Joint Chiefs and armed services wanted， points he would lose soon in Vietnam。 And this is the relevance to modern nuclear scenarios: who can create time to think？Highest recommendation。 Thanks to Fulton County Public Library for the loan。 。。。more
Luis Brudna
，
O livro é muito bom， mas perde um pouco daquela tensão e drama do evento por ser um livro bastante longo。 Como sempre， Max Hastings escreve muito bem。
Matthias Noch
，
Of course， a lot of books have been written about this topic。 Some like to revisit the events back then and compare them to today。 But it is my impression that Hastings was more interested in reviewing JFK's crisis management and how he handled the conflicting influences。 So， the focus is more or less limited to the discussions and events inside the White House， giving the military events around Cuba and the political issues in Cuba and Moskow the background role。 In this， it is an informative b Of course， a lot of books have been written about this topic。 Some like to revisit the events back then and compare them to today。 But it is my impression that Hastings was more interested in reviewing JFK's crisis management and how he handled the conflicting influences。 So， the focus is more or less limited to the discussions and events inside the White House， giving the military events around Cuba and the political issues in Cuba and Moskow the background role。 In this， it is an informative book， but not my first choice to get an overview of the events or the military perspective。 I would recommend it more to readers who have already read a couple of books about this topic to get a non-American view。 。。。more
Tanner Nelson
，
Adding this book to my library earlier this month felt like finding $20 previously unaccounted-for bucks in my jeans pocket。 Max Hastings might be my favorite author， and The Abyss' publication in October （to memorialize the 60 years since the Cuban Missile Crisis） somehow flew under my radar。 I snatched it up and devoured it as fast as I could。 Oh， boy was this a good book。The Cuban Missile Crisis has attained a near-mythical status in American history。 Many Americans see it as the climax of th Adding this book to my library earlier this month felt like finding $20 previously unaccounted-for bucks in my jeans pocket。 Max Hastings might be my favorite author， and The Abyss' publication in October （to memorialize the 60 years since the Cuban Missile Crisis） somehow flew under my radar。 I snatched it up and devoured it as fast as I could。 Oh， boy was this a good book。The Cuban Missile Crisis has attained a near-mythical status in American history。 Many Americans see it as the climax of the Cold War。 America humiliated the Reds in their own backyard！ Discerning historians--or avid Wikipedia readers--probably understand the shades of gray that surround the Crisis。 But The Abyss goes beyond shades of gray and context。 Sir Max Hastings begins this history by setting up the context for a completely different crisis: The Bay of Pigs Invasion。 He outlines the rise of Fidel Castro， the decline of American influence in Cuba， and the absolute ineptitude of the CIA all in the first chapter。 Not only does the infamous covert CIA operation make for some seriously good reading， but it also lays essential groundwork for understanding John F。 Kennedy and his absolute hatred of Fidel Castro。Sir Hastings leans heavily into Great Man Theory （the idea that history is changed by great and powerful leaders like Kennedy， Khruschev， and Castro） throughout The Abyss。 I don't wholly buy into Great Man Theory， but this is one of the more convincing arguments I've ever read for it。 It is hard to imagine the Cuban Missile Crisis ever happening without Nikita Khruschev or Fidel Castro。 For this， I give Sir Hastings a pass （he obviously reads my reviews and I like the idea of a Knight owing me one）。This book gets better the farther the reader gets into it。 At certain moments （during the U-2 shoot down or the hounding of B-59）， I genuinely wondered how the world avoided nuclear catastrophe。 As flawed as they were， Khruschev and Kennedy understood that nuclear war was the brink from which they could not return。 If certain hawks within the Executive Committee of the National Security Council （EXCOMM） had their way， however， we might not have avoided that brink。 As Sir Hastings points out toward the end， the sum of America and Russia's diplomacy was greater than that of its parts。 At this moment， when the earth came closest to immolation， the world's two superpowers were governed by level heads who sought to avoid nuclear war at almost any cost。 I can't help but wonder how modern leaders might react （Sir Hastings wonders， too）。 The American distaste for compromise and diplomacy existed back then， but it wasn't as virulent as it is now。 It might have led us headlong into an avoidable nuclear war if it were applied in 1962。A common theme throughout The Abyss is the weakness of empowered soldiers。 At one point， a submariner responsible for a Russian sub's nuclear torpedo was hounded by the sub's captain to use it。 The fate of the world rested on the shoulders of that sober submariner and other similar men during the Crisis。 It is hard to imagine how different things might have been if that submariner hadn't had a spine。The Abyss provided me with lots of time to reflect on my own red lines。 What are our red lines？ What is America absolutely unwilling to tolerate？ Am I comfortable with it？ What about those nations whose survival depends on our willingness to enforce such lines？ Are we willing to immolate our planet over geographic disputes in the Caribbean？ What about Europe？ Fortunately， I can formulate my thoughts leisurely。 There are no Russian vessels approaching an arbitrary quarantine line to pressure me。 I am grateful that those of my grandparent's generation let wisdom prevail so that I and my peers might live to argue about it。 。。。more
Emm Dee
，
Very good， well researched and written; perhaps overly thorough and heavy in detail。
John
，
This was an eminently readable book， that paints a vivid picture of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962。 I， not a fast reader at the best of times， got through this book in 3 days （a 16-hour airplane trip also helped）。While I enjoyed the book， I was also conscious that it was written by a journalist， who emphasizes readability over research。 I came across several factual errors， which smacks of a hasty research job。 To be fair to Hastings， he acknowledges that he wrote this book on the basis of sec This was an eminently readable book， that paints a vivid picture of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962。 I， not a fast reader at the best of times， got through this book in 3 days （a 16-hour airplane trip also helped）。While I enjoyed the book， I was also conscious that it was written by a journalist， who emphasizes readability over research。 I came across several factual errors， which smacks of a hasty research job。 To be fair to Hastings， he acknowledges that he wrote this book on the basis of secondary sources during the pandemic period， and was unable to do any firsthand research in the various relevant archives。For all that， I gave this book four stars simply because it was a gripping fast-paced read about an event that almost resulted in our extinction。 。。。more
Sembray
，
I genuinely don't understand how Max Hastings can produce on average one book every year and yet maintain such a high quality。 Even with a back catalogue filled with classics， I would rate Abyss as possibly his finest creation so far。This is a thoroughly researched， compellingly retold and frequently gripping account of probably the closest humanity has come to extinction yet。 The story is also leant extra urgency by the ongoing tragedy in Ukraine and the returning spectre of global nuclear conf I genuinely don't understand how Max Hastings can produce on average one book every year and yet maintain such a high quality。 Even with a back catalogue filled with classics， I would rate Abyss as possibly his finest creation so far。This is a thoroughly researched， compellingly retold and frequently gripping account of probably the closest humanity has come to extinction yet。 The story is also leant extra urgency by the ongoing tragedy in Ukraine and the returning spectre of global nuclear conflict。 Hastings's ability to combine the decisions made by key players and their possibly earth-shattering results with well-selected examples to illuminate the experiences of ordinary people across the US，USSR and Cuba is unparalleled。 Combine this with his eloquent， incisive and readable writing style and you have what I can only describe as a masterpiece of history writing。 。。。more
Craig Fiebig
，
The most aptly titled book in some time， The Abyss reminds us of the importance of avoiding dogmatic responses in tense situations。 As the author addresses in the summary， the world is more dangerous than it was and our leaders less capable。
Mike Glaser
，
A good book in that it reminds us of how close the world came to seeing a wide spread use of nuclear weapons in 1962。 The parts of the book that focus on each sides misconceptions and parallel thinking are what the book captures best。 The author tends to give President Kennedy too much credit and despite mentioning his many flaws， he tends to gloss over them。 This is especially true when discussing the EXCOM meetings where the Kennedy’s are the only individuals who know that they are being recor A good book in that it reminds us of how close the world came to seeing a wide spread use of nuclear weapons in 1962。 The parts of the book that focus on each sides misconceptions and parallel thinking are what the book captures best。 The author tends to give President Kennedy too much credit and despite mentioning his many flaws， he tends to gloss over them。 This is especially true when discussing the EXCOM meetings where the Kennedy’s are the only individuals who know that they are being recorded。 It almost seems， although he never says so， that the author sees Kennedy as his kind of person。 This is especially apparent in his derision of many of Kennedy’s successors although he makes sure that he doesn’t specifically name any of them。 The author also does not mention how some of the strategies that worked or seemed to work， failed miserably when applied to the Vietnam war。 A worthwhile read but one that requires a critical eye。 。。。more
Robert Muller
，
This effort shows a lack of focus， zooming around at a high level through the Cuban revolution， the evolution of the Kennedy-Khruschev relationship， and a jumbled mass of facts thrown together into an impressionistic but unsatisfying picture of the "thirteen days。" The tone is in a way too judgmental but not judgmental enough （"remember， the UN was far more important in those days，" constant comments about irresponsibility and lack of forethought but nowhere near enough actual international lega This effort shows a lack of focus， zooming around at a high level through the Cuban revolution， the evolution of the Kennedy-Khruschev relationship， and a jumbled mass of facts thrown together into an impressionistic but unsatisfying picture of the "thirteen days。" The tone is in a way too judgmental but not judgmental enough （"remember， the UN was far more important in those days，" constant comments about irresponsibility and lack of forethought but nowhere near enough actual international legal analysis）。 We know （from maps） where the SAMs were， but somehow he missed where the actual nuclear warheads were。 He had access to tapes of most of the Excom meetings but rarely quoted anyone。 I just found it all quite vague compared to more direct accounts like Plokhy's "Nuclear Folly。" 。。。more
Bill Kupersmith
，
Despite our occasional disagreements about politics and defence policy， I continue to place Sir Max Hastings in the very first rank of current military historians。 Fortunately， the confrontation between John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev never crossed the threshold that divides military from diplomatic history， though those of us who followed it at the time were unaware of how close it came。 And had Kennedy heeded the advice of his military advisors， it surely would。 The crisis coincided with my Despite our occasional disagreements about politics and defence policy， I continue to place Sir Max Hastings in the very first rank of current military historians。 Fortunately， the confrontation between John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev never crossed the threshold that divides military from diplomatic history， though those of us who followed it at the time were unaware of how close it came。 And had Kennedy heeded the advice of his military advisors， it surely would。 The crisis coincided with my 21st birthday， when I was an undergraduate at Georgetown University。 Personally， I shared the view of most Europeans – perhaps because I’d spent the previous summer in England – that the American response to Russian missiles in Cuba was both hysterical and hypocritical。 Yet in hindsight one cannot admire enough the sanity and level-headedness of John Kennedy that saved the world from nuclear war。 Only later were we aware of just how ready the Russian weapons were and how enthusiastically Fidel Castro welcomed the prospect of a war between Russia and America over Cuba。 And yet he long outlived the other principal actors in the drama。 It is very hard for an observer of whatever political persuasion to wonder how the current or recent residents of the White House would respond to a similar crisis。 Fortunately， for all his personal flaws， John Kennedy was a sophisticated and literate person who studied history – that Barbara Tuchman’s study of the outbreak of the First World War had been a recent bestseller was a most happy coincidence。 。。。more
Steven Z。
，
Vladimir Putin’s ill-advised invasion of Ukraine last February has not produced the results that he expected。 As the battlefield situation has degenerated for Russian army due to the commitment of the Ukrainian people and its armed forces， along with western assistance the Kremlin has resorted to bombastic statements from the Russian autocrat concerning the use of nuclear weapons。 At this time there is no evidence by American intelligence that Moscow is preparing for that eventuality， however， w Vladimir Putin’s ill-advised invasion of Ukraine last February has not produced the results that he expected。 As the battlefield situation has degenerated for Russian army due to the commitment of the Ukrainian people and its armed forces， along with western assistance the Kremlin has resorted to bombastic statements from the Russian autocrat concerning the use of nuclear weapons。 At this time there is no evidence by American intelligence that Moscow is preparing for that eventuality， however， we have learned the last few days that Russian commanders have discussed the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons。 The conflict seems to produce new enhanced rhetoric on a daily basis， and the world finds itself facing a situation not seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 amidst the Cold War。Since the possibility of nuclear war seems unfathomable the fears of many have put western intelligence agencies on high alert。 To understand how we might solve the current impasse it might be useful to turn to Max Hastings latest book， ABYSS: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS， but one must remember Vladimir Putin is no Nikita Khrushchev。 The author of thirty books， most of which focus on topics related to World War II， the Korean War， and Vietnam， Hastings is one of the most experienced and knowledgeable historians to tackle the confrontation that ended peacefully in 1962。Hastings recounts the history of the crisis from the viewpoints of national leaders， Soviet officers， Cuban peasants， American pilots and British peacemakers。 Hastings， success as an author has always rested upon eyewitness interviews， archival work， tape recordings， and insightful analysis – his current work is no exception。 The positions， comments， and actions of President John F。 Kennedy， Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev， and Fidel Castro among many other important personalities are on full display。Hastings offers a very thoughtful approach to the study of history while applying his immense analytical skills。 A major theme that Hastings carries throughout the narrative is that the American response to Soviet actions was based more on political considerations rather than threats to American national security。 America was not more vulnerable with missiles in Cuba because “both sides submarine-launched ballistic missiles were becoming ubiquitous realities in the oceans of the world。” JFK is a controversial actor in the crisis according to historians。 Did he act to reassure his reelection in 1964 and burnish his anti-communist credentials or was he the bulwark against an American military led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with members such as General Curtis LeMay。 Hastings’ conclusion is clear， JFK was a towering and inspirational figure during the crisis contributing some of its most memorable rhetoric。The author introduces his topic by immediately delving into the Bay of Pigs fiasco which earned JFK the enmity of the Pentagon by calling off any air strikes to support the invaders。 History has shown that the decision was correct and did not allow a possible crisis to spiral out of control。 The problem that emerged is that Khrushchev could not understand the president’s lack of action。 For the Soviet Premier， the president’s indecision and indecisiveness during the invasion confirmed that JFK was weak and rife for bullying as events a year later would reflect。Hastings correctly argues that the Kennedy brothers became Castro haters due to the Bay of Pigs， an emotion they did not feel previously。 They felt humiliated and became obsessed with Cuba as they sought revenge – hence Operation Mongoose to get rid of Castro which Robert Kennedy was put in charge of。 As the narrative unfolds a true portrait of Castro emerges。 He was considered a beloved politician in Cuba at the time but a poor administrator。 He had overthrown Cuban President Fulgencio Batista and at the outset was a hero for his countrymen。 However， the crisis highlighted a delusional individual who at times believed his own heightened rhetoric and whose actions scared Khrushchev。Once the background historical events are pursued Hastings settles in presenting an almost daily account of the crisis。 The American response is presented through the actions of the Kennedy brothers， a series of advisors， the most important of which was Defense Secretary Robert McNamara， described as the “wizard of odds;” Chief of Staff， McGeorge Bundy; CIA head， John McCone; former ambassador to Moscow， Llewellyn Thompson; Maxwell Taylor， head of the Joint Chiefs; other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff， and a host of others。 The only foreign leader who demands a great deal of coverage in the narrative is British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan who comes across as an appeaser who believed in diplomacy， an approach much different from his Suez Crisis days， and held the view that England and Europe had lived for years under the threat of Russian nuclear attack and could not accept that missiles in Cuba was a menace for the United States。 At times it appeared that JFK humored his British counterpart， but his respect for the man evaporated quickly。In the Soviet Union， the crisis was caused， driven， and finally resolved because of the actions of Nikita Khrushchev， a man who survived Stalin’s purges and worked his way up the Kremlin bureaucracy。 Khrushchev was an opportunist who launched the crisis without considering what would happen if his plan faltered。 In foreign policy， it is quite clear that if you start something without a clear exit strategy it probably will result in disaster。 The Soviet leader’s major errors were confusing two objectives: the defense of Cuba， and his plan to project Soviet power and threaten the United States by extending the Kremlin’s reach into the American backyard。 Further， Khrushchev believed that the missiles could be hidden from American U2 flights and once the American election was over he would spring his surprise on Washington。 When things began to unravel， Khrushchev resorted to bullying and threats dealing with nuclear war or at least a move on West Berlin。 Khrushchev engaged in unbridled adventurism， and willingly took a risk that had little or no chance of success。Hastings’ account is balanced as he also examines the role of important Soviet officials including Defense Minister， Rodion Malinovsky who prepared the strategy to place missiles in Cuba; Anastas Mikoyan， the First Deputy of the Soviet Council of Ministers; Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin; Alexandr Alekseev， the KGB station chief in Havana who had a close relationship with Castro; Andrei Gromyko， Minister of Foreign Affairs， and a number of others。What sets Hastings’ account apart from other historians is his integration of the views of everyday individuals in the United States， the Soviet Union， and Cuba。 Cuban peasants， Russian workers， and American college students are all quoted as to their reactions and emotional state during the crisis。 The result is a perspective that is missing from other accounts and educates the reader as to the mindset of ordinary citizens who would pay the ultimate price if the crisis had gone sideways。The diplomatic and military dance presented places the reader inside the ExCom Committee in Washington， the Presidium in Russia， and the seat of the Cuban government in Havana， and interactions with NATO allies。 We witness the strain on all participants， less so perhaps for Castro who seemed to seek martyrdom， and the delicate negotiations that led to a settlement。 All the tools were used to reach a settlement。 Backchannel talks， bringing in “the Wise Men” such as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson， individual conversations between ordinary citizens who had influence on their governments， the role of U Thant and the United Nations， the bombastic approach advocated by the US military， and the strategic analysis of each communication are all included。 Within this context， Hastings effectively delves into a number of controversial areas including the Kennedy brothers’ distrust of the Pentagon and at times fearing they would disobey his orders， and JFK’s role in combating Pentagon pressure to launch air strikes followed by an invasion to remove the missiles and overthrow Castro。According to Hastings JFK’s major error was expecting Khrushchev to think and act like himself。 “He assumed that the Kremlin would be deterred from shipping offensive nuclear weapons by the strength of his own public and private warnings…。and its own consciousness of the USSR’s nuclear weakness。” The debate at the heart of the crisis was JFK’s need to convince the Russian leader that his actions in fact risked nuclear war， something Khrushchev was against。 He wanted to test American resolve， not cause a nuclear conflagration。Hastings corrects a number of myths associated with the crisis。 One of the most famous was the idea that on October 24， 1962， as Soviet ships approached the quarantine line the White House held its breath as to whether they could stay the course。 In reality no merchant ship carrying weapons or troops approached anywhere near the invisible line。 Soviet ships had reversed course the previous day， only one of which was closer than 500 miles。 This was due in large part because of the weakness American naval communications。 Another area that historians have overlooked was events in the Atlantic Ocean – particularly concerning were four Soviet submarines， one carrying a nuclear warhead。 Hastings explores this aspect of the crisis， and the reader can only cringe as to what Washington did not know and the slow communication process that existed throughout the crisis。 JFK had ample opportunity to resort to military action， but staid his hand despite pressure from members of the Joint Chiefs and others。 The president was the driver of debate and became more of an “analyst-in-chief。” He pressed his colleagues to probe the implications of any actions the United States would take and offer reasonable solutions to end the crisis。 For JFK it seemed as if he was in a chess match with Khrushchev countering each of his moves and trying to offer him a way out of the crisis he precipitated。JS Tennant in his review of ABYSS in The Guardian， October 16， 2022 points out that “In January this year， Russia’s deputy foreign minister threatened to deploy “military assets” to Cuba if the US continued to support Ukrainian sovereignty。 As has become all too apparent in the past weeks， tactical nuclear missiles are still a threat， along with chemical weapons and supersonic missiles。 It’s as if Russia’s desperate scramble to maintain influence will stop at nothing and， as Hastings points out， ‘the scope for a catastrophic miscalculation is as great now as it was in 1914 Europe or in the 1962 Caribbean。’ Abyss provides chastening lessons on how easily things can spiral out of control but also how catastrophe can be averted。”The book has arrived at a propitious moment in history as once again there is a nuclear threat from the Kremlin。 One can only hope that our current crop of leaders will strive to avoid the worst with the same fervor of JFK and Khrushchev in October 1962。 。。。more
James S。
，
Not a terrible book， but not a great one。 Like most books on this topic， the author includes so much detail that the larger picture gets lost。 Sometimes it's not clear what the connection is between paragraphs。 Finally， the book is full of awkwardly phrased sentences like this one: That island， slightly smaller than Pennsylvania， provided the stage for Theodore Roosevelt to secure one of the fastest-earned military reputations in history， leading his volunteer 'Rough Riders' up San Juan Hill on Not a terrible book， but not a great one。 Like most books on this topic， the author includes so much detail that the larger picture gets lost。 Sometimes it's not clear what the connection is between paragraphs。 Finally， the book is full of awkwardly phrased sentences like this one: That island， slightly smaller than Pennsylvania， provided the stage for Theodore Roosevelt to secure one of the fastest-earned military reputations in history， leading his volunteer 'Rough Riders' up San Juan Hill on 1 July 1898 against Spanish colonialists， who in 1902 were compelled to cede Cuba's independence from themselves， though not from the United States。 。。。more
J TC
，
Max Hastings – O Abismo。 A crise dos mísseis de CubaMil novecentos e sessenta e dois， tinha seis anos。 O mundo a abrir-se para mim。 Tudo era novo e desafiante。 Em Samora Correia， município de Benavente， terra humilde sem gente ilustre， iniciava nesses idos de Outubro a minha aprendizagem e fazia os primeiros amigos。 Aprendi por esses tempos o significado de cumplicidade e partilha。 Aprendi os limites e as regras que me permitiram desde então viver no meio de uns e exigir o respeito de outros。 Ap Max Hastings – O Abismo。 A crise dos mísseis de CubaMil novecentos e sessenta e dois， tinha seis anos。 O mundo a abrir-se para mim。 Tudo era novo e desafiante。 Em Samora Correia， município de Benavente， terra humilde sem gente ilustre， iniciava nesses idos de Outubro a minha aprendizagem e fazia os primeiros amigos。 Aprendi por esses tempos o significado de cumplicidade e partilha。 Aprendi os limites e as regras que me permitiram desde então viver no meio de uns e exigir o respeito de outros。 Aprendi a importância da pertença a um grupo e a uma comunidade。 A aprendizagem e as escolhas nem sempre foram fáceis。 Nem tudo era claro e havia momentos em que se impunha fazer escolhas。 Umas eram fáceis e obvias， outras， as mais difíceis， eram sempre complexas e implicavam perdas e ganhos。 As escolhas desses tempos ledos recordo-as com doçura e nostalgia。 E de algumas lembro-me bem！ Estava na escola， numa sala toda ela dominada pela figura austera da D。 Urraca。 Ainda hoje estremeço ao recordar o seu nome e aquela personagem。 Recordo-a sempre de negro， esguia， alta， tão alta que dos meus olhos parecia roçar o teto。 Recordo-a a questionar-nos， a perscrutar-nos por cima dos seus aros metálicos， sempre atenta， sempre lesta e austera com a mais pequena ruga no nosso comportamento。A meio da manhã saíamos para o recreio。 Não me lembro se havia toque， se o sinal era dado pela linha do sol que vertia pela janela virada a este。 Talvez não fosse por nada disso e estivesse farta de nos aturar， ou que o corpo lhe pedisse uma pausa。 Fosse porque fosse， o recreio era sempre a melhor parte do dia。 Se me perguntarem se nesses tempos de escola me destacava na leitura ou nas “contas”， eu diria que era no recreio que me sublinhava， era aí que era feliz。E foi nesse recreio， nesse quadrado mágico de poucas dezenas de metros de lado que fundei os meus alicerces。 Fiz amigos， corri， brinquei， saltei e fiz escolhas。 Recordo de nos jogos haver sempre duas equipas， os nossos e os outros （uns de tronco nu， outros não）。 Foi aí que， conscientemente e sem tutela， que escolhi entre uns e outros。 Inicialmente fui de uns， acho porque aí tinha mais amigos， mas não fiquei por lá muito tempo。 Rapidamente passei para os de “tronco coberto”。 Ainda hoje me pergunto o que me levou a tal traição。 Creio que foi o fascínio de pertencer a um grupo que tinha como ídolo “o pantera negra”， Eusébio， um ícone。 Creio que foi isso que me pendeu o coração。 Esse era o meu mundo e essas eram as minhas preocupações。Longe estava eu de imaginar que a mais de cinco mil quilómetros de distância havia quem também fizesse escolhas。 Alguém cujas decisões determinavam o futuro da humanidade。 Como num jogo a duas mãos， uns e outros determinavam o destino。 Uns por se verem farol da liberdade， da sua liberdade， e por isso entenderem que a autodeterminação e a soberania eram atributos defensáveis se não desafiassem o seu próprio modo de vida。 Um modo de vida assente na liberdade， mas num conceito de liberdade que sempre se sobrepôs à liberdade dos outros。 E os outros， autocráticos que já tinham abandonado o romantismo da revolução de outubro agora pautavam as suas escolhas por conceitos mais simples de uns contra os outros。Uns e outros ditaram os dias， mas não sem a velada intervenção dos “jovens revolucionários barbudos” que com um romantismo de revolucionários adolescentes interpretaram os anseios de uma população pobre， explorada e esmagada pelo opulência e autoritarismo do poder instalado。Como qualquer povo que se liberta da opressão era inevitável que na enxurrada revolucionária tudo fosse questionado e reescrito。 E claro que o povo tinha esse direito， e com igual clareza os “os revolucionários barbudos” souberam interpretar esse desejo。Do outro lado da ilha， na outra “ilha” mais a norte， exilados， expropriados e gente recomendável como a representada no filme de Francis Ford Coppola de 1974， “O Padrinho Parte II”， ainda na presidência de Dwight D。 Eisenhower， desenharam o desastre de Abril de 1961， o golpe que para a história ficou conhecido como a “baia dos porcos”。 O assalto à “Playa Girón” foi um vexame para os estado-unidenses e em particular para os falcões que com o orgulho ferido desde logo ficaram com urgência em lamber e cicatrizar as feridas。O cenário para o abismo estava montado。 Só faltava alguém que fizesse as escolhas erradas。 E muitos foram os protagonistas que lideraram as más escolhas e tomaram opções erradas。 Desde logo os derrotados da baía dos porcos， a que se acresce todos aqueles que culparam a administração americana por ter perdido a China para o campo comunista e todos os que achavam que no final da contenda， entre os sobreviventes， não importa quantos， os americanos somassem mais um que os russos， isso seria uma vitória。 Para esses que sempre tiveram o dedo no gatilho e a mira focada em Cuba， qualquer pretexto seria bom para dar um passo em frente ao abismo – um abismo satirizado no filme de 1974 “Doutor Estranho-Amor” de Stanley Kubrick。Do outro lado do tabuleiro， o outro jogador sentia-se acossado pela superioridade militar americana， e pela desproporção de arsenal nuclear de então 1/30。 Os falcões desse lado do tabuleiro viam-se ainda mais acossados quando o seu líder Nikita Khrushchov depois de satanizar o seu antecessor， enveredou pela desvalorização das estruturas militares clássicas em favor da segurança que o armamento nuclear lhe parecia garantir。 E claro， armas nucleares são sempre defensivas desde que sejamos nós， e não os outros a ter o dedo no gatilho。Nesta liderança não contestada abertamente， Nikita Khrushchov sentia que qualquer passo em falso seria aproveitado por aqueles que na sombra aguardavam a melhor oportunidade para o abocanhar。 Precisava assim o líder soviético de uma acção que com espetacularidade equilibrasse o potencial de armas que à altura pendia claramente para o lado americano。Essa oportunidade de equilíbrio surgiu com a disponibilidade dos “barbudos revolucionários” em receber essas armas táticas。 Esse passe mágico iria equilibrar as coisas pela proximidade das ogivas americanas em solo europeu apontadas ao coração soviético。Este era o enquadramento de então， mas pouco importa para o que pretendo sublinhar， e que é o direito de um povo， uma nação em fazer as suas escolhas。 Não importa se boas， se más， são prorrogativa sua。 E isso， em 1962 foi negado a Cuba com soberba e pesporrência。Mas esta não foi a imagem que passou no mundo ocidental。 Na maioria dos registos históricos， a crise dos misseis de cuba é vista como um desafio que a união soviética lançou ao mundo ocidental que se não tivesse sido combatido na origem， talvez tivesse pervertido de modo irremediável o “equilíbrio pacífico” entre nações。Talvez！ Mas curiosamente， sessenta anos depois， o confronto tende a repetir-se， mas agora com papeis e posições invertidas em espelho。 Se na década de sessenta os EUA eram a potência que ameaçava invadir， sessenta anos depois os invasores são os herdeiros da União Soviética e os EUA a passaram a assumir o papel de defesa dos valores da soberania， autodeterminação e integridade territorial。Não deixa também de ser curioso que as vítimas， tanto as de há sessenta anos como as actuais são os adeptos mais aguerridos da resolução pelas armas。 Em ambos os casos os líderes são fortes， vestem igual， são carismáticos e têm inequivocamente as populações consigo。 Em ambas as ocasiões ouvimos as sentidas palavras de ordem “patria o muerte” ou “Україна завжди”。Não importa os motivos pelos quais os russos em 2022 invadiram a Ucrânia e colocaram de novo o abismo na ordem do dia。 Pode ter sido para esconder dificuldades internas de afirmação da liderança， para camuflarem fracassos anteriores （leia-se perda do império soviético）， porque os falcões passaram a ter maior visibilidade e o Ur-fascismo resultou das suas escolhas， ou por nunca terem deixado de ser uma autocracia， porque podiam， ou tal como os EUA em 1962 por se sentirem ameaçados pelas escolhas dos outros。Foram dois abismos em que os interlocutores trocaram as posições。 De ambos os lados havia falcões ainda que em maior número sempre do lado dos agressores。 Haviam e há igualmente pombas e falcões。 Quem há sessenta anos evocava a “Doutrina Monroe de 1823” é recordado como estadista com genialidade， inteligência e argúcia。 Para os do outro lado do espelho estes adjectivos não têm equivalente。 Muitos aliados dos EUA em 1962 não acompanharam as escolhas dos falcões americanos。 Mas com esta posição não pretenderam mostrar respeito pela autodeterminação e soberania dos povos。 Mais não era que um olhar para um umbigo que dava pelo nome de Berlin， ou resultava das memórias ainda recentes quando pequenos acontecimentos aparentemente inofensivos tomaram conta do destino de 20 milhões de mortos e outros tantos feridos e estropiados。 Não， não houve nem há respeito pelos outros。 Aquilo que aos 6 anos aprendi， mais não é do que uma visão romântica da realidade。 O mundo não é de duas cores e entre os decisores haverá sempre pombas e falcões。Dir-me-ão que o mundo está diferente！ É certo que sim。 Em especial o da europa ocidental onde se vê um comportamento diferente talvez tenha resultado de uma maior prevalência do “gene” do altruísmo ou da tolerância à lactose。Sessenta anos depois do meu “quest” vejo o mundo de outra forma。 Um mundo onde em gabinetes há quem trace o destino e o futuro。 Um mundo onde espero que alguém daqui a sessenta anos recorde os seus idos de Outubro de 2022， altura em que num qualquer recreio o mundo se resumia a ter de optar fosse pelo que fosse， mas o fosse enquanto menino capaz de recordar esses tempos com carinho e doçura。 Oxalá tenhamos esse futuro。 。。。more
Mervyn Whyte
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A typical Max Hastings book - strong narrative， informative， well-researched and displaying his usual pro-Western bias。 Unlike some other reviewers， I don't have a problem with the bias。 Although， some of his comments on Castro and Cuba stray occasionally from the cool， calm analysis that makes up most of the book and border on the downright rude。 Personally， they made me chuckle。 But it's bound to annoy some。 Anyway， like with his other books， this is an excellent starting point for the subject A typical Max Hastings book - strong narrative， informative， well-researched and displaying his usual pro-Western bias。 Unlike some other reviewers， I don't have a problem with the bias。 Although， some of his comments on Castro and Cuba stray occasionally from the cool， calm analysis that makes up most of the book and border on the downright rude。 Personally， they made me chuckle。 But it's bound to annoy some。 Anyway， like with his other books， this is an excellent starting point for the subject at hand。 Let's hope the Crisis remains the closest we've come to nuclear armageddon。 With all the miscalculations Putin is making in the Ukraine， that is no longer a given。 。。。more
Boudewijn
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A definite account of the Cuban missile crisis， with some chilling lessons for todayIf you are familiar with the books of Max Hastings， you know that every book he writes is of outstanding quality。 This book is no exception to that rule and again， if you are familiar with Max Hastings， this book hardly needs further explanation。Between July and September 1962， Khrushchev secretly deployed a range of nuclear missiles in Cuba。 Together with those missiles， came the deployment of tens of thousands A definite account of the Cuban missile crisis， with some chilling lessons for todayIf you are familiar with the books of Max Hastings， you know that every book he writes is of outstanding quality。 This book is no exception to that rule and again， if you are familiar with Max Hastings， this book hardly needs further explanation。Between July and September 1962， Khrushchev secretly deployed a range of nuclear missiles in Cuba。 Together with those missiles， came the deployment of tens of thousands of troops and bombers， SAM missiles and bombers。 Khrushchev mistakenly and naively thought that the US would be facing a fait accompli once they were there and thought that Kennedy， in his eyes a green and inexperienced president， would back down。 After all， didn’t he mismanage the Bay of Pigs invasion just a year before？Hastings shows the dangerousness of the Cuba crisis。 After all， no side wanted nuclear war， so what was there to worry about？ Hastings shows nonetheless how close the world came to a nuclear disaster。 It shows how the hawks in the US government wanted to bomb Cuba right away， it showed how a trigger-happy Russian submarine commander could have started nuclear war， after he was attacked with practice depth charges by a US destroyer。Kennedy comes out as the one man who was able to talk sense in the matter， holding back his US armed forces’ chiefs of staff who were all too happy to teach the Soviets a lesson。 Khrushchev on the other hand， as an impulsive leader who didn’t think things through。 He realization of the many perils he created， that should have been apparent in the Kremlin from the first moment they started the operation。 Castro managed to even surprise the Soviets with his obsession to maintain his own power and glory and his absence of fear of nuclear war unworthy of any human being， let alone the leader of 7 million CubansFor me， born well after the events， I couldn’t comprehend the gravity of the events that hung over the world。 I remember my father telling me， after I told him I listened to this audiobook， that he remembered being in school， being taught on his lesson for the day， and was told by his schoolmaster at the end of that day that what they had learned perhaps was all for nothing， because the world could end within 12 days。 Experiencing the events， without the knowledge of what happened after， must have been a gruelling experience， even for my father， who was 16 at that time。Yet， this book has some chilling lessons 60 years later， with the crisis in Ukraine。 Relations between China， Russia and the US are as fractious as ever: the scope for an irreversible error or even a deliberate act remains。Fast forward to today， even I perhaps will tell my son one day that the events in Ukraine brought the world nearly to nuclear armageddon。 Let’s hope my son will never have to tell his son the same about some other future crisis。 。。。more
David Lowther
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I was at school when the Cuban missile crisis blew up in 1962。 At the time it seemed simple。 The bad guys， Cuban and Russian， were arming Cuba with nuclear weapons。 The good guys， the USA， were trying to stop them。 Eventually， the US navy blockaded Cuba and Russian ships carrying nuclear weapons were sent packing。 Crisis over。 The world breathed a collective sigh of relief。But， of course， it wasn’t and Max Hastings enthralling book tells how the world almost ended sixty years ago。Hastings is one I was at school when the Cuban missile crisis blew up in 1962。 At the time it seemed simple。 The bad guys， Cuban and Russian， were arming Cuba with nuclear weapons。 The good guys， the USA， were trying to stop them。 Eventually， the US navy blockaded Cuba and Russian ships carrying nuclear weapons were sent packing。 Crisis over。 The world breathed a collective sigh of relief。But， of course， it wasn’t and Max Hastings enthralling book tells how the world almost ended sixty years ago。Hastings is one of the world’s leading military historians and in THE ABYSS he gives a blow by blow account of those dreadful days。 Hampered by being unable to visit important sites during the pandemic， the author has still created a diary of events which clearly demonstrated just how close the earth came to self-destruction in October 1962。 Had there been a pandemic just after the crisis in 1962， it would have been impossible to recreate the events a accurately because， of course， there was no internet。 But today there is and this has enabled Sir Max Hastings to write an account of those events from which governments the world over can learn a lesson so that’s those times when the world came close to incineration can never be repeated。David Lowther。 Author of The Blue Pencil， Liberating Belsen， Two Families at War and The Summer of ‘39， all published by Sacristy Press。 。。。more
Chad Manske
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Eminent historian Max Hastings published this excellent re-look at the hottest era of the ~45 years of the Cold War during the 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis。 In this 528-page tome we see in-depth discussions and behind the scenes discussions of what President Kennedy， Soviet Secretary Nikita Khrushchev， Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and their advisors。 Contextually， Hastings builds each major storyline’s historical timeline in building up to the crisis to include the Cuban Rev Eminent historian Max Hastings published this excellent re-look at the hottest era of the ~45 years of the Cold War during the 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis。 In this 528-page tome we see in-depth discussions and behind the scenes discussions of what President Kennedy， Soviet Secretary Nikita Khrushchev， Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and their advisors。 Contextually， Hastings builds each major storyline’s historical timeline in building up to the crisis to include the Cuban Revolution （great history！）; race relations/missile gap and the tussle between the the politicos and military brass in the US; and in the USSR， the paranoia and deception of trying to match US capability but falling short。 The tensions and heightened fears manifest as the U。S。 shipping quarantine is established， culminating when the Soviets ‘blinked。’ The timing of this volume is perfect and the application and lessons of a current day Cold War should be studied closely。 A great read！ 。。。more
Scott Martin
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（Audiobook） A solid overview of the Cuban Missile Crisis from a British author， so not someone with a vested interest in keeping either America， Russia or Cuba happy。 He seeks to keep it so that the regular person can read it， but being a Hastings work， it is long and detailed。 Still， there is much to learn and gleam from this work。 Perhaps so many things could have changed， from Castro getting his way to publicize the Soviet deployment of missiles for defense， forcing America to have to accept （Audiobook） A solid overview of the Cuban Missile Crisis from a British author， so not someone with a vested interest in keeping either America， Russia or Cuba happy。 He seeks to keep it so that the regular person can read it， but being a Hastings work， it is long and detailed。 Still， there is much to learn and gleam from this work。 Perhaps so many things could have changed， from Castro getting his way to publicize the Soviet deployment of missiles for defense， forcing America to have to accept the deployment， to major miscalculations between the USSR and USA that might have lead to the nightmare scenario。 Given the events in Ukraine in 2022， Hastings manages to tie in the events of now to highlight the lessons of 60 years prior。 Do we learn from it？ Given the worst case， one would hope so。 。。。more
Chris Kovacs
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Unfortunate book by Sir Max HastingsUsually a real fan of his workThere is nothing new or nuanced in his narrative or analysisSlobbering infatuation with Jack KennedyUS military are nothing but blood thirsty killersCastro and the cubans are just freedom loving revolutionariesSoviets are blundering idiotsAll would be well if we would just follow the British approach to diplomacy This really seemed like a book put out to make money off the anniversary If want to read something with some solid anal Unfortunate book by Sir Max HastingsUsually a real fan of his workThere is nothing new or nuanced in his narrative or analysisSlobbering infatuation with Jack KennedyUS military are nothing but blood thirsty killersCastro and the cubans are just freedom loving revolutionariesSoviets are blundering idiotsAll would be well if we would just follow the British approach to diplomacy This really seemed like a book put out to make money off the anniversary If want to read something with some solid analysis and a fresher prospective would recommend Nuclear Folly published this yearAs I said， usually a big fan， but this was definitely not his best work 。。。more
Nick Harriss
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I loved this book。 I am a fan of the author， but found his recent book on the Vietnam War a bit meandering; this however Hastings back to his best。 Just the right balance between detail and pace， background， context and first-hand accounts。 While I had a good understanding on the subject already， including reading other books on the era recently， this brought a much greater level of understanding。 Well recommended。
Colin
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This is an excellent narrative account of the Cuban Missile Crisis。 It is written in Max Hastings' usual style， with a clear， comprehensive account of events， using sources from all angles， and with shrewd judgments。 I especially like the way in which Hastings considers the Cuban perspective， and how out-of-sync Castro was with both the USSR and the USA in the resolution of the crisis。 The book concludes with some well-made points about the parallels with today's multiple global crises， especial This is an excellent narrative account of the Cuban Missile Crisis。 It is written in Max Hastings' usual style， with a clear， comprehensive account of events， using sources from all angles， and with shrewd judgments。 I especially like the way in which Hastings considers the Cuban perspective， and how out-of-sync Castro was with both the USSR and the USA in the resolution of the crisis。 The book concludes with some well-made points about the parallels with today's multiple global crises， especially the conduct of the current leader of the Russian Federation。 I highly recommend this book。 。。。more
Paul Gelman
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A brilliant book about the most dangerous period of time in the Cold War， written by a master historian and storyteller， encompassing almost all the possible points of view regarding these unfortunate and dark times。 This is a must read for anyone who would like to see how vulnerable our existence on this planet can be， especially when the fate of hundreds of millions of people depends on the sanity or insanity of some leaders。 Highly recommended and relevant these days ，when a madman called Put A brilliant book about the most dangerous period of time in the Cold War， written by a master historian and storyteller， encompassing almost all the possible points of view regarding these unfortunate and dark times。 This is a must read for anyone who would like to see how vulnerable our existence on this planet can be， especially when the fate of hundreds of millions of people depends on the sanity or insanity of some leaders。 Highly recommended and relevant these days ，when a madman called Putin can unleash the most horrible weapons mankind knows:the atomic bomb。 。。。more
Robert Webber
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