Economics

The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War

The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War

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  • Create Date：2022-03-11 09:51:53
  • Update Date：2025-09-07
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  • Author：Nicholas Mulder
  • ISBN：0300259360
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Summary

The first international history of the emergence of economic sanctions during the interwar period and the legacy of this development
 
“Valuable 。 。 。 offers many lessons for Western policy makers today。”—Paul Kennedy， Wall Street Journal
 
"The lessons are sobering。”—The Economist
 
“Original and persuasive。 。 。 。 For those who see economic sanctions as a relatively mild way of expressing displeasure at a country’s behavior， this book 。 。 。 will come as something of a revelation。”—Lawrence D。 Freedman， Foreign Affairs
 
Economic sanctions dominate the landscape of world politics today。 First developed in the early twentieth century as a way of exploiting the flows of globalization to defend liberal internationalism， their appeal is that they function as an alternative to war。 This view， however， ignores the dark paradox at their core: designed to prevent war， economic sanctions are modeled on devastating techniques of warfare。  
 
Tracing the use of economic sanctions from the blockades of World War I to the policing of colonial empires and the interwar confrontation with fascism， Nicholas Mulder uses extensive archival research in a political， economic， legal， and military history that reveals how a coercive wartime tool was adopted as an instrument of peacekeeping by the League of Nations。 This timely study casts an overdue light on why sanctions are widely considered a form of war， and why their unintended consequences are so tremendous。

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Reviews

Iel ，

Given how unbelievably relevant and important the topic is， the book was a bit meh。 The author knows a lot about pre-1930s sanctions but struggles to link the lessons to wider history of sanctions， let alone the present。 Even so， there are many interesting and relevant lessons about sanctions discipline and the potential for countries to defect for business reasons。 Many of which are playing out in the news as we speak。

KT ，

A breezy yet informative read on the history of how and why sanctions emerged as a tool of modern war after initially being framed as an antidote to war itselfCovering mainly the period from WWI to the end of WWII， I would have appreciated a further discussion on their use now， especially in the context of the modern neoliberal capitalist hegemonyThe book ends on the historical fact that most economic sanctions have not worked （depending on the objective）， despite the use of sanctions increasing A breezy yet informative read on the history of how and why sanctions emerged as a tool of modern war after initially being framed as an antidote to war itselfCovering mainly the period from WWI to the end of WWII， I would have appreciated a further discussion on their use now， especially in the context of the modern neoliberal capitalist hegemonyThe book ends on the historical fact that most economic sanctions have not worked （depending on the objective）， despite the use of sanctions increasing throughout the 20th and 21st century， their odds of success have fallen， so despite their tremendous effects on the world's political and economic history， sanctions have little efficacy in achieving their goalsParticular highlights of the book included:How sanctions allowed the British Empire to rethink hows it could use its material power against potential opponents and the actual similarities between British liberal internationalism and imperialist unilateralism in their attitudes to its useHow sanctions contradict neturality， the thinking being that in a world where economic globalisation had interwoven production chains and money flows， the moral implications of trade were undeniable， thus it's nonsensical to afford private commerce any cover if it facilitated resources flowing to an enemyHow synthetic fibre （e。g。 rayon， nylon） production during WWII was an important defensive bulwark in the face of British/League of Nations sanctions as raw wool came predominately from the British imperial dominionsReferencing Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter's criticism of American sanctionist for failing to think about alternative forms of global order that addressed the root causes of the conflicts that sanctions were "supposed to stop" 。。。more

Erik Wirfs-Brock ，

I would desperately love another book about how sanctions reached their modern state of unilateral US actions that are mostly unjust， because the story feels incomplete。 but a fascinating book。 In it you will get a story about how economic sanctions arose out of World War I and the desire to find a preemptive weapon against aggressive war， how that weapon blurred the line between war and peace， what various diplomats thought and argued about what they were doing， the successes and failures of sa I would desperately love another book about how sanctions reached their modern state of unilateral US actions that are mostly unjust， because the story feels incomplete。 but a fascinating book。 In it you will get a story about how economic sanctions arose out of World War I and the desire to find a preemptive weapon against aggressive war， how that weapon blurred the line between war and peace， what various diplomats thought and argued about what they were doing， the successes and failures of sanctions in the interwar period， and the unintended consequence the threat of sanctions caused in fascist state behavior。 Ultimately， it's a story of unintended consequences where I found myself sympathetic to the liberal internationalists， because while starving a civilian population is unjust， creating a coalition of states strong enough to stop interstate war without having to fire a shot seems like a worthy if slightly utopian goal。 Went well with a book I read a few months ago， Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction。 。。。more

Austin Barselau ，

In “The Economic Weapon，” Nicholas Mulder illuminates the genesis of diplomatic sanctions during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s through the second world war， as well as the tortuous erection of a liberal world order which gave those sanctions significance。 Mulder， an assistant professor of modern European history at Cornell University， argues that the modern conception of sanctions – which seeks to remediate the internal ambitions or conditions of a country （e。g。， “to address human r In “The Economic Weapon，” Nicholas Mulder illuminates the genesis of diplomatic sanctions during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s through the second world war， as well as the tortuous erection of a liberal world order which gave those sanctions significance。 Mulder， an assistant professor of modern European history at Cornell University， argues that the modern conception of sanctions – which seeks to remediate the internal ambitions or conditions of a country （e。g。， “to address human rights violations， convince dictatorships to give way to democracy， smother nuclear programs， punish criminals， press for the release of political prisoners， or obtain other concessions”） – has evolved from its original external purpose of halting interstate war and preserving territorial order。 Mulder posits that sanctions have become a creeping form of statecraft by other means， enacted by a thicket of detached technocrats and experts and often without due consideration of their unintended consequences。 Many of these consequences， such as the concomitant rise of nationalism and autarky in the post-Versailles era as nations hostile reacted to their exclusion from global commerce， have contributed to what the author calls sanctions’ “history of disappointment。” Sanctions， now an overused instrument of diplomatic and economic coercion， have largely been rendered inefficacious by their limited potential to enact pressure in absence of total war。 Mulder traces the history of sanctions， first in its prototype as commercial blockades （the “permanent potentiality” that could be used even in peacetime） and then increasingly as a financial instrument of excluding wayward nations from the global trading system。 This “new form of liberalism，” he writes， expanded the scope of conflict， and did not necessarily require the large deployment of troops or manufacture of armaments。 Rather， it now could be mobilized by “a technical and administrative apparatus of lawyers， diplomats， military experts， and economists” from their own desks。 For the first time in history， civilian bureaucrats could control matters of international statecraft。 The triumph of the Foreign Office over the Admiralty， writes Mulder， became a new， and potentially destabilizing， method of exclusionary warfare。 In doing so， sanctionists broached a new form of politics that blurred distinctions between soldiers and citizens， state and private property， and hostile and neutral nations under the banner of preserving territorial order and spurring democratization。 While economic provocations were used successfully against Yugoslavia in 1921 and Greece in 1925， Mulder exposes their limited reach， as well as how they may have backfired in the run up to World War II。 Sanctions against Mussolini’s Italy in the wake of its invasion of Ethiopia and Hitler’s Germany during its accelerating territorial conquests on the European continent， as well as resource embargos against Japan， may have only fueled aggressive territorial expansion and autarky rather than curtail it。 For example， sanctions were unable to prevent Italy from following through on its war in Africa， largely through its own successful national resistance campaign of stockpiling， national saving， and metal collection drives that were motivated by Mussolini’s call to bind the country into a “fortress of resistance” against the overbearing Allied powers。 Mussolini was able to sublimate this campaign of resistance into a policy of autarchia – an anti-sanctions endeavor to achieve resource independence， which led to adventures to secure iron ore from Spain and oil from Albania。 Likewise， Germany’s “defensive autarky” aimed to develop blockade resistance （Blockadefestigkeit） through increased domestic resource production， solidification of relations with Central and East European countries， and expansions into resource-rich territory including support for Franco’s Spanish Nationalists in 1936， as well as the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939， respectively。 U。S。 oil and metal embargoes on Japan also increased its ambition for an “autarkic East Asian economic zone based on a yen block covering Japan， Manchukuo， Korea， north China， and Taiwan，” only to be thwarted by sustained conflict with Chiang’s Nationalist forces on the Asian continent。While describing the history of sanctions as a largely one of disappointment， Mulder also calls attention to the “stabilizing power of provision” that was first sorely missed during the interwar period under the post-Versailles League of Nations era。 Such coordination was more successful at building alliances and planting the seeds of a postwar international order that generated peace and productivity。 Mulder points to the U。S。’ Lend-Lease agreement， which provided weapons and materials to nations withstanding Axis invasion， as “the most significant economic scheme against aggression ever created。” Such positive economic mobilization， he argues， was the salve to the chronic ill that plagued the ineffectual and ill-fated League。 Mulder’s examination and assessment of this history is clear: positive aid provision， rather than destabilizing resource deprivation， is most integral to the health of liberal internationalism and the containment of hostile actors。 While Mulder criticizes sanctions applied in the interwar context， his book does not examine the efficacy of more recent examples of sanctioning。 While many scholars agree that leveraging sanctions and embargos on adversaries has been unfruitful （e。g。， in the case of North Korean and Iranian nuclearization， Cuba’s communist rule， Russia’s territorial adventurism and domestic repression， Venezuela’s totalitarianism）， there are limited cases where sanctions have worked where the subject is dependent on positive relations with the sanction applier。 For example， the threat of sanctions convinced the Dutch to agree to Indonesian independence in 1949， Britain to deescalate from the Suez Crisis in 1957， and South Korea and Taiwan to abandon their nuclear programs in 1975 and 1976。 In each of these contexts， sanctions threatened to exclude target countries from vital channels of support and induced them to change course。 Sanctions may have limited range， and thus work only in specific circumstances， but their efficacy appears to be largely contingent on the context of relations between the applier and target countries。 Despite these caveats， Mulder does a superb job illuminating how sanctions can fray the fabric work of international stability， rather than actively working to promote its preservation。 。。。more

Reference

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