The Logic of Scientific Discovery
- Downloads：3271
- Type：Epub+TxT+PDF+Mobi
- Create Date：2021-08-29 09:54:10
- Update Date：2025-09-06
- Status：finish
- Author：Karl Popper
- ISBN：0415278449
- Environment：PC/Android/iPhone/iPad/Kindle
- Download
Summary
When first published in 1959， this book revolutionized contemporary thinking about science and knowledge。 It remains the one of the most widely read books about science to come out of the twentieth century。
（Note: the book was first published in 1934， in German， with the title Logik der Forschung。 It was "reformulated" into English in 1959。 See Wikipedia for details。）
（Note: the book was first published in 1934， in German， with the title Logik der Forschung。 It was "reformulated" into English in 1959。 See Wikipedia for details。）
Reviews
Mikhail Filatov
，
This book is really not for "casual" readers。 Instead of rewriting in later editions Popper added footnotes - and footnotes on footnotes- which are very often contradicts the original text。But the main problem that there is no "scientific discovery" in this book， only the discussion on whether you should verify （as positivists and inductivists think） or "falsify" it （as Popper suggests）。 Falsification is quite an accepted idea， but the way he introduces it - that you just need one example to fal This book is really not for "casual" readers。 Instead of rewriting in later editions Popper added footnotes - and footnotes on footnotes- which are very often contradicts the original text。But the main problem that there is no "scientific discovery" in this book， only the discussion on whether you should verify （as positivists and inductivists think） or "falsify" it （as Popper suggests）。 Falsification is quite an accepted idea， but the way he introduces it - that you just need one example to falsify - is definitely not the way science work。Another issue with the book itself is that the main idea is discussed in 1/3 of it（mostly in the beginning and a bit of the end）。 Other pages are covered by a very weird polemics about the nature of probability and strange （following Einstein but without Einstein understanding of physics） on Heisenberg' "uncertainty principle" 。。。more
Themis Panagiotopoulou
，
A book made by the absolute democrat philosopher， Karl Popper， who invented the notion of falsifiability， as a means to ensure how real science should be approached。
William Bies
，
This reviewer finally got around to reading Karl Popper’s Logic of Scientific Discovery and Conjectures and Refutations。 In taking up Popper， he is conscious of venturing into the alien territory of twentieth-century analytic philosophy。 Although not a logical positivist， he shares the Vienna Circle’s dry and unimaginative picture of the world。 Nevertheless， one ought to be willing to humor him seeing as science is， after all， such an important part of life。 After considering his argument， thoug This reviewer finally got around to reading Karl Popper’s Logic of Scientific Discovery and Conjectures and Refutations。 In taking up Popper， he is conscious of venturing into the alien territory of twentieth-century analytic philosophy。 Although not a logical positivist， he shares the Vienna Circle’s dry and unimaginative picture of the world。 Nevertheless， one ought to be willing to humor him seeing as science is， after all， such an important part of life。 After considering his argument， though， not that willing to resign myself to his falsificationism。 No doubt， falsifiability is an important mark of scientific theories and helps to demarcate them from other disciplines such as metaphysics （which Popper himself does not regard as meaningless）， but one must object to saying that the only thing we can do with a scientific theory is to attempt to falsify it; i。e。， that we can never confirm it。 This reviewer has always opposed Kant’s dismal conclusion in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft that pure reason is not capable of knowing anything and that its sole office is to guard against transcendental illusion （Schein）， viz。， the supposition that we can know something。 For Kant， God gave us the faculty of reason， which is what is highest in us and bears his image， to no avail， to no real purpose as it has no positive function。 In a trivial sense， it is not possible to verify universal statements—so far one must agree with Popper。 For instance， it is not possible to examine every piece of copper in the universe to determine whether it is an electrical conductor [Thomas Kuhn’s illustration]。 But in practice it is possible to be reasonably confident of many universal statements we can make， because the world obeys laws of nature and is fairly regular in its operations， so if we understand why something happens in one case it is likely to recur in similar cases， ceteris paribus。 Hence， verification in many instances （although still few in comparison to the number possible） is sufficient。 Popper’s method of conjecture and refutation （which is to say， critical analysis of proposed ideas） may be an adequate phenomenological description of how the advance of knowledge occurs。 He is probably right that it is pointless to search for an ultimate source of knowledge or philosophical principle which， if only we could discover it， would enable us to derive everything we wish to know。 The only objection to his epistemology is that Popper apparently thinks that at the origin of new hypotheses lurks something completely blind and irrational。 He follows Reichenbach’s distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification， holding that the philosophy of science is concerned only with the latter。 This is not true。 Through induction， the understanding abstracts the universal principle from a number of known concrete cases。 Unlike deductive reasoning， inductive reasoning is not apodictic but only probable， which is why its inferences have to be confirmed by experiment。 Popper’s anti-inductivism fails to impress， nor is the so-called problem of induction insoluble。 If the world is intelligible and the mind capable of arriving at knowledge， the success of induction is to be expected。 It is a problem of a higher order why the world should be intelligible and why man should be capable of reason （ultimately， theology is what grounds these things）。 Thus natural science leads to positive knowledge of the reasons behind observed phenomena in the world and not just negative knowledge that some explanations are incorrect。 A scientific theory that has been corroborated to some degree must contain some truth about the way things are。 One ought not be naïve in the sense that he thinks we know the true natures of things， though。 Rather， it is better to hold a version of structural realism， to the effect that a corroborated scientific theory tells us something about the structure of reality， even if it not be the final truth。 That is， the phenomena we understand by means of it will be recovered in any more complete theory as far as their structure is concerned。 The actual entities whose existence is postulated by theory will change， but they will continue to display the same pattern of behavior in the relevant limit。 Bohr and Pauli’s explanation of the periodic table in the early 1920’s by means of the Aufbauprinzip continued to be valid in quantum mechanics and will remain so in quantum field theory or in any deeper theory of physics yet to be discovered。Popper does make some remarks about the nature of probability that strike me as interesting。 He embarks on a somewhat crazy attempt to derive probability theory from a set of axioms about conditional probabilities rather than to derive the conditional probabilities from absolute probabilities， as is normally done。 This reviewer’s interests are more speculative than confined to the question of what the axioms themselves should be （Kolmogorov’s are good enough for most everyone）。 What catches attention is his suggestion that the validity of the law of large numbers is an empirical question。 In every experiment conducted so far in the laboratory， it seems to hold up， but this does not mean that it has to be true。 One could even go to the extent of claiming that it very probably is not true of our world， for good reasons。 Let me try to explain。 The laboratory setting is special in that the physicist can strive to isolate the system under investigation from outside influences， as far as possible。 Certainly， we understand that the effect measured is only as good as the confidence we can have that it stands out from the noise。 Here， particularly when it stands up after repeated trials， we can be justified in supposing it to tell us about the generic behavior of systems prepared under identical， or sufficiently comparable， conditions。 The real word is altogether different。 In natural environments， subsystems are decoupled from one another only approximately。 If we were to be stubborn and follow the time-evolution of one given subsystem which we have singled out， and ignore everything else， we would still have to introduce terms into the equations of motion for its degrees of freedom that represent all outside influences。 But we have no reason now to expect that they always will be negligible， as far as the susbsystem’s behavior considered by itself is concerned。 Rather， there might well be correlations built in， whether pronounced or subtle。 At this juncture， this conditionality entirely defeats the law of large numbers when applied to subsystems in interaction with a real environment， or to the world as a whole。 That is why， to be strictly correct， an experimenter must regard the statistical assumptions that pertain to his object of study as something to be empirically ascertained。 The following interesting paper on the arXiv under quantitative biology a while back， if you read the abstract， suggests that people might now be thinking in such terms; see Grebenov et al。， Towards a full quantitative description of single-molecule reaction kinetics in biological cells [arXiv:q-bio。SC， 1811。11612]。The reviewer draws a rather disturbing consequence from all this: it is far from clear that there could be a reliable concept of a random number， in the world of our everyday experience in any case。 Not speaking of so-called pseudorandom numbers of the kind often employed in computer code。 There， one still has to choose a seed to start the sequence。 But then， how could one ever factor out the element of luck one， in principle， might enjoy when deciding on what seed to select—whether or not one wishes to depend on such luck （it is wrong to entrust oneself to luck， also known as Lady Fortuna， who is infamous for her fickleness）！ The expedient of resorting to a physical process to generate a random sequence， such as radioactive decays or cosmic rays， which people sometimes will do despite the cumbrousness of the procedure， does nothing to help matters in the end。 For the world itself may very well be constructed in such a devilish way that， even then， the sequence so obtained will not truly be random。 Indeed， from this reviewer’s own experience， it is so constructed， although he cannot recount here the experiences—excruciating and awe-inspiring， respectively—that led him to this startling conclusion in the still recent past。 A word to the wise！ 。。。more
Dakota Murray
，
A really impressive work by Popper。 The sheer amount of argumentation and effort going into this is astounding。 However， it is also quite dense， containing a lot of logical statements and more technical philosophical language。 Popper also has a sometimes-rambling writing style which is endearing and nice to read， but also lengthens the text beyond what it strictly needs to be。 If you are interested in getting to know about Popper's work， I advise reading the first few chapters only。 A really impressive work by Popper。 The sheer amount of argumentation and effort going into this is astounding。 However， it is also quite dense， containing a lot of logical statements and more technical philosophical language。 Popper also has a sometimes-rambling writing style which is endearing and nice to read， but also lengthens the text beyond what it strictly needs to be。 If you are interested in getting to know about Popper's work， I advise reading the first few chapters only。 。。。more
Trystan W
，
This is undeniably a very important and influential book: it is， in my opinion， what saved science-oriented philosophy from the dreaded Logical Positivists。 He did this by replacing the greatly flawed verification principle with the significantly more justified and prudent falsification principle， and for this Popper deserves much praise。 Although I don’t follow his Falsification principle myself as I find it still a little too simple and wrought with assumptions （I am a follower of Deleuze’s di This is undeniably a very important and influential book: it is， in my opinion， what saved science-oriented philosophy from the dreaded Logical Positivists。 He did this by replacing the greatly flawed verification principle with the significantly more justified and prudent falsification principle， and for this Popper deserves much praise。 Although I don’t follow his Falsification principle myself as I find it still a little too simple and wrought with assumptions （I am a follower of Deleuze’s difference principle）， his work nevertheless constitutes likely the biggest advance in Epistemology in the 20th Century， and can thus be classified as a great work。 。。。more
Vivek Ramachandran
，
Popper carefully dismantles multiple pseudoscientific notions。 He challenges the notion that knowledge can always increase with incremental information- pretty much shaking my assumptions on statistical inference or mathematical induction。 There's no permanence in truth， indeed。Worth a couple of re-reads。 Popper carefully dismantles multiple pseudoscientific notions。 He challenges the notion that knowledge can always increase with incremental information- pretty much shaking my assumptions on statistical inference or mathematical induction。 There's no permanence in truth， indeed。Worth a couple of re-reads。 。。。more
Kim A
，
Viktig bok i sammenheng vitenskapshistorie og metode。 Citerion of demarcation， falsifiability osv。 At du ikke kan anta eller bevise at du har 100% rett， men at noe er feil。 Vitenskapelige teorier kommer ikke fra å observere naturen， men fra å gjette （ut ifra kreativititet， intuisjon。。。）， for så å utsette teorien for testing/kritikk for å prøve å motbevise den。 Hvis du klarer å motbevise， må teorien byttes ut med en ny teori， lagd på samme måte。 Deretter test igjen。 Hvis du ikke klarer å motbevis Viktig bok i sammenheng vitenskapshistorie og metode。 Citerion of demarcation， falsifiability osv。 At du ikke kan anta eller bevise at du har 100% rett， men at noe er feil。 Vitenskapelige teorier kommer ikke fra å observere naturen， men fra å gjette （ut ifra kreativititet， intuisjon。。。）， for så å utsette teorien for testing/kritikk for å prøve å motbevise den。 Hvis du klarer å motbevise， må teorien byttes ut med en ny teori， lagd på samme måte。 Deretter test igjen。 Hvis du ikke klarer å motbevise， har har teorien overlevd for denne gang。。。 。。。more
Benjamín J。
，
Beautiful！
Paige McLoughlin
，
I read this and other Popper works many times。 Popper for me is important in his critique of Plato and Hegel and through him Marx。 He also is crucial with his idea of Falsifiability as a criterion for a scientific theory。 Anyone who has dealt with a flat earther or conspiracy theory understands that a theory must be vulnerable to empirical data and be falsified。 If it isn't then it is literary or an ideology with epicycles to fortify it but never open to question or investigation and you will l I read this and other Popper works many times。 Popper for me is important in his critique of Plato and Hegel and through him Marx。 He also is crucial with his idea of Falsifiability as a criterion for a scientific theory。 Anyone who has dealt with a flat earther or conspiracy theory understands that a theory must be vulnerable to empirical data and be falsified。 If it isn't then it is literary or an ideology with epicycles to fortify it but never open to question or investigation and you will learn nothing。 Coming up with ideas is great but if you aren't willing to let them stand or fall in the face of new evidence you go nowhere that is why falsifiability with its vulnerability is the heart of science。 Of course， Popper at times needs updating and revision （we all do） but this contribution made him an important philosopher of science。 。。。more
Naufalriady
，
“satu triliun angsa putih tidak membuat pernyataan semua angsa putih benar，sedangkan satu angsa hitam cukup membuat pernyataan semua angsa putih salah”Karl Popper sebagai seorang filsuf epistemologi mendobrak dunia ilmiah，dengan teori Falsifikasi （pembuktian bahwa suatu pernyataan itu salah） di bukunya ini。 Pertama kali aku tau Logika Ilmiah ini saat aku SMA。 Saat SMA aku sedang bingung-binggung nya mencari apakah bumi ini bulat atau datar？ Apakah manusia pernah pergi ke bulan atau tidak？ Dari d “satu triliun angsa putih tidak membuat pernyataan semua angsa putih benar，sedangkan satu angsa hitam cukup membuat pernyataan semua angsa putih salah”Karl Popper sebagai seorang filsuf epistemologi mendobrak dunia ilmiah，dengan teori Falsifikasi （pembuktian bahwa suatu pernyataan itu salah） di bukunya ini。 Pertama kali aku tau Logika Ilmiah ini saat aku SMA。 Saat SMA aku sedang bingung-binggung nya mencari apakah bumi ini bulat atau datar？ Apakah manusia pernah pergi ke bulan atau tidak？ Dari dua sisi yang berlawanan itu aku liat dan aku baca。 Bukannya aku tambah tau aku malah tambah pusing。 Sampai akhirnya di internet aku bertemu dengan metode dan cara pikir penemuan ilmiah。 Dengan menggunakan metode ini aku lebih mudah menyeleksi informasi yang masuk。 Tak peduli seberapa banyak buku yang kamu baca，jika logika penalaran mu masih berantakan maka kesimpulan yang kamu ambil dari berjuta buku yang kamu baca juga berantakan。Ketika saya memiliki argumen biasanya saya sering mencari yang setuju dan yang hanya mendukung argumen saya。 Sudah lama saya terjebak ke dalam bias konfirmasi。 Nah ini lah yang membuat saya tidak kritis dan tidak bisa menerima kritik。 Sejuta angsa putih tidak membenarkan pernyataan bahwa semua angsa itu putih tetapi satu angsa hitam sudah cukup untuk membuktikan bahwa pernyataan semua angsa putih itu salah。 Dengan metode ini saya selalu menguji argumen saya，jika saya memiliki argumen yang saya cari bukan lah yang mendukung argumen sayatetapi argumen yang membuktikan saya salah，pada fase ini saya menggunakan metode falsifikasi milik Karl Popper。Argumen -> Falsifikasi-> Argumen baru -> Falsifikasi -> Argumen baru -> ？Tanda tanya disitu adalah momen dimana saya tidak menemukan ada yang bisa menyalahkan argumen saya lagi，tetapi saya membuka kemungkinan jika suatu saat ada argumen/tesis yang membuktikan argumen/tesis saya salah。 。。。more
F B
，
Anti-scientific bullshit only read by pseudoscientists
Eugene Kernes
，
This is an epistemological approach to science。 Explaining the methodology of empirical science。 What matters is the testability of the claims and hypothesis， or rather， the ability to falsify them。 The tests need not be done， but they must have the capacity of being tested。 The method of exposing to falsification the systems to be tested， the ideas to be refuted。 Statements made via falsifications cannot be verified or justified， as more tests can be done。 Testing ends when the researcher decid This is an epistemological approach to science。 Explaining the methodology of empirical science。 What matters is the testability of the claims and hypothesis， or rather， the ability to falsify them。 The tests need not be done， but they must have the capacity of being tested。 The method of exposing to falsification the systems to be tested， the ideas to be refuted。 Statements made via falsifications cannot be verified or justified， as more tests can be done。 Testing ends when the researcher decides to end them， preventing an infinite regression of tests。 It is a decision that researcher make to end the testing when satisfied with the result， albeit a temporary end。 In order to have a rational discussion in science， the researchers need feedback from each other ideas and those who came before。 The search is for feedback not to support the conclusions， but to refute them。 Many researchers use the inductive method of making inferences， but the problem with the inductive method is that no matter the amount of data gathered， inferences are subject to being altered to potential additional data。 Theories try to explain the world， with the aim to refine the theories further。 Theories fate depend on decision being made whether to accept or reject them。 The empirical information within a theory depends on the degree with which it is falsifiable。 A big portion of the book deal with proving that probability is not scientific as the frequency results cannot be verified no matter how numerous and favorable。 The book becomes progressively more difficult to read。 After the explanation of basic ideas， the author uses logical and mathematical proofs to showcase examples about the ideas。 But to understand them requires having a lot of background knowledge in those areas。 Some parts may be difficult to read as this is a translated book。 At times， Popper uses reflections to make comment on a topic， reflections on what other people thought about certain ideas。 The problem is that sometimes it is difficult to know what Popper is reflecting on， as the ideas from others are given too short of a synopsis。 。。。more
Nurhadi
，
This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers。 To view it， click here。 The concept of "falsification" is truly a game-changer。 We all have these assumptions but what's important in research is not about your assumptions but rather its all about trying to proof your assumptions are wrong。 These insights helps me in navigating a vast sea of research。 The concept of "falsification" is truly a game-changer。 We all have these assumptions but what's important in research is not about your assumptions but rather its all about trying to proof your assumptions are wrong。 These insights helps me in navigating a vast sea of research。 。。。more
Kuszma
，
Mágikus erővel bír ez a könyv: bármilyen fitten is kezdtem bele， három mondat után azon kaptam magam， hogy ásítok。 A hátsó borítóra ugyan ráírta valaki， hogy "a művelt nagyközönségnek is izgalmas és élvezhető olvasmány"， de vagy nagyon el akarta adni a kötetet， vagy végzetesen máshogy definiáljuk a "nagyközönség" kifejezést。 Szerény véleményem szerint ugyanis Popper egyszerűen tesz a laikusokra - laikus alatt értve mindenkit， akinek nem a Bernoulli-tétel volt a jele az óvodában。 Ő csak és kizáró Mágikus erővel bír ez a könyv: bármilyen fitten is kezdtem bele， három mondat után azon kaptam magam， hogy ásítok。 A hátsó borítóra ugyan ráírta valaki， hogy "a művelt nagyközönségnek is izgalmas és élvezhető olvasmány"， de vagy nagyon el akarta adni a kötetet， vagy végzetesen máshogy definiáljuk a "nagyközönség" kifejezést。 Szerény véleményem szerint ugyanis Popper egyszerűen tesz a laikusokra - laikus alatt értve mindenkit， akinek nem a Bernoulli-tétel volt a jele az óvodában。 Ő csak és kizárólag balhitben tévelygő kollégáihoz beszél， azokhoz， akiket meg akar győzni arról， rosszul értik a tudománytörténet egyik legégetőbb problémáját， a "valószínűtlenségi logika" meg az "induktív módszerek" híveihez intézi szavait， azokhoz， akiknek eddig a létezéséről sem tudtam， de Popper megjelenéséig vélhetően uralták a tudományfilozófiát。 Ennek következtében teljesen természetes， hogy olyan a szövegben haladni， mintha sós mocsáron lábalnék át （szembeszélben！）， hisz a szerzőnek folyvást és kétséget kizáróan bizonyítania kell， amit állít， következésképpen olyan szavakat， mint az "egyszerű"， a "valószínű" vagy a "véletlen" megpróbál matematikai képletekre lefordítani， és úgy általában， minden marginálisnak tűnő logikai problémát tíz oldalon keresztül fejteget， pedig én simán elhinném becsszóra is。 Ja， és arról nem is beszéltem még， hogy lépten-nyomon olyan lábjegyzetekbe ütközünk， amelyek felhívják a figyelmünket， hogy Popper azóta kibővítette vagy elvetette a fenn taglalt gondolatmenetet， de ha erről többet akarunk tudni， akkor fordíttassuk le a Postscript c。 munkáját， mert az sajna nincs meg magyarul。 Na， hát így。Mivel az eddigiekkel nyilván elvettem mindenki kedvét a könyv elolvasásától， kötelességemnek érzem， hogy legalább összefoglaljam， miről szól。 Annál is inkább， mert közben meg ménkű fontos könyv， olyan szöveg， ami alapvetően forradalmasította a tudományos gondolkodást。 Popper tézise ugyanis az， hogy a tudományos állítások mércéje nem a verifikálhatóság （kb。 bebizonyíthatóság）， hanem a falszifikálhatóság （cáfolhatóság）。 Leegyszerűsített példával illusztrálva: ha én azt állítom， hogy minden egész szám háromszorosa páros szám lesz， akkor végtelen számú esetet tudok mondani， ami engem támaszt alá， de ez nem jelent semmit， mert ettől még az állítás nem lesz igaz。 Viszont elég egy olyan esetet mondani， amikor a végösszeg páratlan， és háhá， máris falszifikáltuk az állítást。 No most ennek számos következménye van， leginkább az， hogy Popper értelmezésében csak azok az állítások tekinthetőek tudományosnak， amelyek - legalább elméletben - cáfolhatóak。 Az "Isten szeret téged" megállapítás például lehet， hogy igaz， lehet， hogy nem， sem megerősíteni， sem megcáfolni nem tudjuk， tehát nem tekinthető tudományos hipotézisnek*。 A másik， tán még ennél is fontosabb hozadék， hogy Popper szemében a tudomány nem kész， megállapodott valami， saját metaforája szerint inkább olyan házra emlékeztet， amit felhúztunk ugyan， mert lakni csak kell valahol， de legyünk felkészülve rá， hogy ha úgy alakul， bármikor lebonthatjuk vagy áthelyezhetjük máshová。 Nincs tehát végérvényes tudás， csak egyfajta ideiglenes állapot， állításaink addig érvényesek， amíg valaki nem jön a cáfolattal。 De ez nem a tudomány relativizálása， dehogy， sőt: a tudomány fejlődésének záloga。 Túl sok okos töltötte azzal egész szakmai pályafutását， hogy saját， egyszer kicsiszolt elméletét védte foggal-körömmel ahelyett， hogy maga próbálta volna megcáfolni azt - holott Popper szerint ez lenne a tisztességes eljárás， ettől haladunk előre。 Vagy ahogy a szerző mondja: "a tudós ugyanis nem azért tudós， mert tudás， cáfolhatatlan igazság van a birtokában， hanem azért， mert állhatatosan és vakmerően kritikusan keresi az igazságot。"Újszerű és termékeny elmélet ez， amit az is jelez， hogy a társadalomtudományba is átszivárgott。 Hogy mást ne mondjak， a nyílt társadalom egyik alapvető hivatkozási pontja lett belőle: “Az adott társadalmi szituációk résztvevőiként mindannyiunknak rendelkeznünk kell bizonyos nézetekkel， amelyek alapján cselekszünk。 De milyen alapon cselekedjünk， amennyiben elfogadjuk， hogy nézeteink nagy valószínűséggel tévesek， de legalábbis a valóság hiányos vetületei。 A válasz ugyanaz， mint amit Popper adott a tudományos módszerre: nézeteinket átmeneti igazságokként kell kezelni， és közben biztosítani kell az állandó felülvizsgálatot。 Ez a nyílt társadalom alaptétele。” （Meg se mondom， ki mondta。 A miniszterelnök úr szokta gyakran emlegetni， ha ideges。） Nyugodtan állíthatjuk hát， hogy Popper elvei egyfajta forradalmat eredményeztek a gondolkodásban。 Kár， hogy olyan kínszenvedés volt olvasni。 Mindegy， túl vagyok rajta。 Majdnem olyan büszke vagyok erre， mintha kockákat növesztettem volna a hasamra。* Ez a kritérium kifejezetten fontos， ha meg akarjuk különböztetni az áltudományokat a tudományoktól。 Hisz az áltudománynak pont az a lényege， hogy nem ad lehetőséget a cáfolatra。 Gondoljunk a laposföldesekre。 Bármilyen ellenük szóló bizonyítékot laza csuklómozdulattal hamisítványnak， egy ellenséges környezet manipulációjának bélyegeznek。 Ezzel abszurd szituációt teremtenek: világképükben a mellettük szóló "érvek" verifikálják állításaikat， de az ellenérvek is， mert minden ellenérv csak annak bizonyítéka， hogy létezik egy hatalmas ellenség， aki minden erejével el akarja leplezni az ő igazságukat。 。。。more
C。H。 Chong
，
Hard to read but very enlightening read on the probability theory and interpretation。 The epistemology arguments are lost to me but I believe I can conquer it some day。
/d。
，
This book is so essential to the Western Philosophy of Science today that the value and uniqueness of its content can hardly be overstated。 Much of what Popper says comes across as common-sensical if read today and that is perhaps the general plight of works that have reached the status of a "classic" （much the same way as Tolkien comes across as clichéd today because it hs been an inspiration for so much fantasy written since then）。The general point of the book is a critique of inductivism and This book is so essential to the Western Philosophy of Science today that the value and uniqueness of its content can hardly be overstated。 Much of what Popper says comes across as common-sensical if read today and that is perhaps the general plight of works that have reached the status of a "classic" （much the same way as Tolkien comes across as clichéd today because it hs been an inspiration for so much fantasy written since then）。The general point of the book is a critique of inductivism and an argument in favour of the merits of the hypothetical-deductive method and an anti-dogmatic approach to science。 Popper argues strongly in favor of falsifiability and testability and while he conceeds that even falsifiability can never be established with ultimate certainty， it nevertheless is the best yardstick we have to establish the soundness of science。 Despite its ridigity， toward the end even Popper himself admits certain limitations of falsificationism。 For one， science - to a certain extent - relies on a certain exceptionalism when it comes to the practice of falsification: certain scientific progress would have never been made had the relevant theories been immeidately discarded upon hitting the first "falsifiers。" But also， inductivism and metaphysics do in fact play a role in the creative progress that underlays the primary weakness of the hypothetical-deductive model， namely， that it proceeds from a given hypothesis through premisses to a conclusion。 But where the hypothesis comes from in the first place is left open。Despite its revolutionary character， Popper suffers most from an （at times） almost impenetrable language。 There are entire sub-chapters that suffer rom such overly technical language that his point becomes almost incomprehensible。 Then， once in a while though， he treats us with a simple example or an summary in less abstract terms， and suddenly one is left wondering whether it was really necessary to make the reader work through dozens of tedious pages。 Some might argue that Popper's attention to detail - expressed in that technical language - is what makes him stand out from the rest， but I would nevertheless argue that there are more accessible and concise ways of making his （arguably） few important points。 。。。more
Ben Chugg
，
An appetizer to his more wide-ranging and substantial works， The Logic of Scientific Discovery illuminates Popper’s early thinking on knowledge， progress， and truth。 While many of the core ideas in this work were later expanded and clarified， Popper’s clear and decisive thinking are still on display。 Side-stepping useless arguments about the meaning of words， the “essence” of concepts， or whether there exists an ultimate logical foundation for everything， Popper argues that progress entails maki An appetizer to his more wide-ranging and substantial works， The Logic of Scientific Discovery illuminates Popper’s early thinking on knowledge， progress， and truth。 While many of the core ideas in this work were later expanded and clarified， Popper’s clear and decisive thinking are still on display。 Side-stepping useless arguments about the meaning of words， the “essence” of concepts， or whether there exists an ultimate logical foundation for everything， Popper argues that progress entails making bold conjectures and criticizing them as harshly as possible。 In this way， only the best explanations are left standing。 The most exciting contributions of the book are not actually the ideas he generates， but those he dismantles。 Popper delivers mortal wounds to verificationism and inductivism—-the view that knowledge is generated by generalizing from past experience。 Or at least， what should be recognized by everyone as mortal wounds … unfortunately， the inductivists have made a resurgence， largely in the form of Bayesianism。 We get an introduction to Popper’s idea of content: the set of logical consequences of a statement。 He demonstrates that theories with high content are the most valuable， which translates （counter-intuitively） to theories with low probability。 If what we cared about was generating the most probable theories， we would go as little beyond the evidence as possible—-indeed， science would be reduced to uttering tautologies。 Instead， of course， we want novel theories。 We want explanations which posit different realities， the corroboration of refutation of which tells us ever more about the structure of the world。 While I would not suggest that The Logic of Scientific Discovery be someone’s first introduction to Popper， it should certainly be read by everyone who has an interest in his work， and in the production of knowledge more generally。 。。。more
Guy
，
Interesting but out of date。。。
Rene Stein
，
Po pár letech jsem znovu přečetl jednu z knih， které mě v životě nejvíc ovlivnily。 Znovu jsem se přesvědčil， že zaručené zprávy o vyvrácení názorů K。 R。 Poppera jsou předčasné。 I Popperovi věhlasný kritici， třeba Kuhn， polemizují často s názory， které K。 R。 Popper nezastával。 Stačí si pečlivě přečíst poslední kapitolu a dodatky， a ne jen prvních 50 stran。 Knihu jsem si užil mnohem víc než v roce 1997， protože tato kniha a několik dalších mě přesvědčily， že bez dokonalé znalosti moderní formální Po pár letech jsem znovu přečetl jednu z knih， které mě v životě nejvíc ovlivnily。 Znovu jsem se přesvědčil， že zaručené zprávy o vyvrácení názorů K。 R。 Poppera jsou předčasné。 I Popperovi věhlasný kritici， třeba Kuhn， polemizují často s názory， které K。 R。 Popper nezastával。 Stačí si pečlivě přečíst poslední kapitolu a dodatky， a ne jen prvních 50 stran。 Knihu jsem si užil mnohem víc než v roce 1997， protože tato kniha a několik dalších mě přesvědčily， že bez dokonalé znalosti moderní formální logiky zůstává člověk jen blábolícím hovádkem/dojmologem， a nyní jsem docenil i pasáže s logickými formulemi， kterými jsem se předtím jen těžko prokousával。 。。。more
Volkan
，
Hats off for anyone who fully grasps everything that is written in this book。 Having first read Karl Popper's 'Objective Knowledge' and 'Conjectures and Refutations'， much of what was written in 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery' was not new to me， but Popper lost me as of Chapter VI when he starts writing about quantum physics， among others。 The first five chapters are still a great read on the philosophy of science and it simply deserves five stars for how this work influenced subsequent phil Hats off for anyone who fully grasps everything that is written in this book。 Having first read Karl Popper's 'Objective Knowledge' and 'Conjectures and Refutations'， much of what was written in 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery' was not new to me， but Popper lost me as of Chapter VI when he starts writing about quantum physics， among others。 The first five chapters are still a great read on the philosophy of science and it simply deserves five stars for how this work influenced subsequent philosophers of science。 Much has been written in the reviews about Popper's scientific method and falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation， so here's the author's take on theories: "Theory dominates the experimental work from its initial planning up to the finishing touches in the laboratory。。。 What compels the theorist to search for a better theory， in these cases， is almost always the experimental falsification of a theory， so far accepted and corroborated: it is again， the outcome of tests guided by theory。。。 Accidental discoveries occur too， of course， but they are comparatively rare。" If only I would have read this during the writing of my thesis， it would have made life much easier。 。。。more
Jaime
，
Couldn’t finish it。 Confirmed what a philosopher friend told me about Popper’s problems with falsification， he pointed me to Lakatos too。Afaik there are theories that cannot be falsified due to lack of empirical means， but that does not make those theories less scientific in principle。 Falsification is useful but it is not a fundamental condition for science， as not everything can be falsified。 In fact many theories are just thrown out there awaiting for empirical means to confirm of disprove th Couldn’t finish it。 Confirmed what a philosopher friend told me about Popper’s problems with falsification， he pointed me to Lakatos too。Afaik there are theories that cannot be falsified due to lack of empirical means， but that does not make those theories less scientific in principle。 Falsification is useful but it is not a fundamental condition for science， as not everything can be falsified。 In fact many theories are just thrown out there awaiting for empirical means to confirm of disprove them。 Popper’s falsifiability rules place an impossible burden for objectivity on science。 Most cases， for decision making or for certainty a high enough likelihood is sufficient。We do not know for certain if tomorrow the sun will rise again， there is a possibility it might not。 However in all likelihood it will。 。。。more
Clyde Macalister
，
I am writing this book review quite a while after I read it。Karl Popper is a good example of how 20th century produced a lot of excellent "applied" philosophy but was far-worse-than-worthless when it came to philosophy as a general system -- due， in my opinion， specifically to a sort of cult of hyperspecialization at the expense of generalization and to an unjustified cynicism and skepticism of parts-to-wholes relationships if you were an analytic philosopher （such as Popper， the neopositivists， I am writing this book review quite a while after I read it。Karl Popper is a good example of how 20th century produced a lot of excellent "applied" philosophy but was far-worse-than-worthless when it came to philosophy as a general system -- due， in my opinion， specifically to a sort of cult of hyperspecialization at the expense of generalization and to an unjustified cynicism and skepticism of parts-to-wholes relationships if you were an analytic philosopher （such as Popper， the neopositivists， behaviorists， etc） or wholes-to-parts relationships if you were a continental philosopher （e。g。 20th century existentialism， postmodernism， the New Age movement might as well be considered unconsciously an offshoot of continental philosophy， etc）。 Given that philosophy is the most "general" field of knowledge and that all other fields of knowledge are subdisciplines of philosophy， this should be taken as a damning insult to 20th century philosophy， on net balance。Contrary to Popper， "the point" of philosophy is verification， not falsification。 For Popper to focus on falsification as the paramount objective of science is akin to him looking at the handle of a hammer and saying that "the point" of the hammer is that handle itself。 While the testing of scientific hypothesis does need to resort to "error-checking" （a far less clunky word for "falsification"）， that is far lower on the hierarchy of values in science than the real goal: verifying hypotheses。 Error-checking is a means， not an end。On top of that， Popper's cynicism of the ability to abstract general truths from concrete particulars -- in other words， his excessive empiricism -- is the epistemological corollary of the ethical problem just mentioned， and it is equally as absurd: he could have spent his whole life since the day he learned to walk rolling down a hill 500 times a day and still say on his death bed that gravity's existence is highly doubtful。Science has yielded reliable benefits for mankind because of it verifies what was not previously known， and men would still be living in caves wiping their asses with leaves if they had ever taken seriously Popper's view of scientific objectives。 Even Newton's classical view of physics， for example， was not "wrong" from the standpoint of Einsteinian physics， only incomplete。 Einstein didn't "falsify" it on the whole， as Popper would claim， he merely identified that it was a subset of physics in general。 But the idea that Newton wasn't a tremendous stride forward simply because he did not see the whole picture is insane on its face。If you understand and accept this general treatment of Popper， then his Logic of Scientific Discovery unfolds pretty much how you would expect: each chapter is filled with highly technical， mathematically precise analysis of distinct subjects （for example， probability）， but taken as a whole， it is a disintegrated mess that doesn't really even seem to attempt to prove his falsificationist views。Popper's impact would surely have been far more positive if he had just stuck with mathematics。 Instead， his decision to speak heavily on philosophy of science is a good example of how a lot of rare talent in history is tragically wasted toward idiotic ends。 。。。more
Parker
，
A lot of probably theory that I didn't understand or skimmed。 Glad I read this after Conjectures and Refutations， and Open Society and It's Enemies。SOME RAMBLING NOTES。。。There are two ways in which we can think about the logical relationship between singular observations we make in the world and the universal laws we come up with to explain them:1。 That we start with nothing， and until we experience enough observations/facts as to logically induce a new universal law， a truth that explains why w A lot of probably theory that I didn't understand or skimmed。 Glad I read this after Conjectures and Refutations， and Open Society and It's Enemies。SOME RAMBLING NOTES。。。There are two ways in which we can think about the logical relationship between singular observations we make in the world and the universal laws we come up with to explain them:1。 That we start with nothing， and until we experience enough observations/facts as to logically induce a new universal law， a truth that explains why we observe some fact of life （ie the sun will come up tomorrow）。 Inductivists: addition of observations to establish Truth。2。 That we must first creatively float new ideas for universal laws， then empirical test logically deduct the faulty hypothesis。 Deductivists = subtraction of proven false hypothesis to correct our course to tentative truth。It is #2 （deductivism） that Popper believes is the foundation for scientific discovery。 The inductivists （#1） will always be troubled with a justification for the link between the observation and what proves that it is in fact universally true。 For you can watch 1000 white swans go by and it will never price there are no black swans。 You'd need an infinity of observations。 Thus the inductivists resort to probabilities。Deductivism is not similarly troubled with justification。 Because scientific hypothesis are never justified， they are always assumed to be wrong and that a more clever explanation will soon provide empirical data that shows where the error was。 Einstein on creatively floating new scientific hypotheses: "there is no logical path （to a new hypothesis）。。。 They can only be reached by intuition， based on something like an intellectual love of the objects of experience。"Criterion for Demarcation of Psuedo-science:#1。 Inductivists: we must logically be able to not only falsify theories， but also verify true ones through continual observations that justify our theories。 But how many confirming observations are required for "conclusive verification"？#2。 Deductivists: we can only test to falsify incorrect explanations and attempt to come up with better ones in it's place。Empiricist Validation of Truth:1。 Inductivists: experience alone can establish truth through the positive outcome of each observation （Positivism）。 Any statement without the possibility for conclusive truth is meaningless （meaning and truth are both empirical）。2。 Deductivists: no statement's truth can ever be conclusively verified。 Meaning comes from falsifiability， not verifiability/positivism。The asymmetry of falsifiability = a theory can be falsified with one observation that doesn't match prediction， but a million singular observations does not make a universal truth。 So a theory that puts more on the line by making wider claims about what it rules out says much more about our particular world。 This can be described as the aim of science in general: to create stronger and stronger explanations that incrementally rid the errs of myths we're handed down。 That we can explain our world and grow our explanations at all is practically miraculous。 That there is something for us to discover， and that we can and clearly do make progress， is reason enough to pursue this aim even though we cannot ever achieve it with certainty。 Progress is a moral imperative， and end in itself， that can only happen through a falsiable approach。Validation Versus Corroboration: given the above asymmetry between ability to prove a theory wrong but never right， we realized a theory cannot be judged to be almost certain or probably right to any degree。 Probabilistic logic looks at similar events， not universal laws which use infinity。 Corroboration vs probability: a theory is a universal hypothetical statement that either get continually corroborated as it stands up to tests or evidence comes out against it forcing it to be replaced by a better explanation。 Believers in probably logic argue that we need to find what is almost true because we cannot prove either entirely false or entirely true， but Popper's view is that anything that can't be falsified is metaphysical for the time being until science has moved to allow us an explanation that can be falsified through experiment （or tentatively corroborated）。 When is it possible to decide between a theory and it's rival？ When it is presented in a falsifiable form。 This is the criteria of demarcation。 Thus the more falsiable a hypothesis （simplicity）， the more it says about our world through more and more severe tests。 Or challenge isn't too prove our theories right， it is to disprove them。Conclusion:"I believe that in the history of science it is always the theory and not the experiment， always the idea and not the observation， which opens up the way to new knowledge。" "We do not know， we can only guess。" （Progress/science's） "advance is， rather， towards an infinite yet attainable aim; that of ever discovering new， deeper， and more general problems， and of subjecting our ever tentative answers to every renewed and every more rigorous tests。" 。。。more
David Álvaro Martínez
，
A pesar de que resulte frustrante leer a Popper queriendo refutar y desmarcarse una y otra vez del positivismo， y de principios como el de incertidumbre -frustrante porque plantea una problemática meramente superficial y terminológica que， de verdad， no da para tanto （Popper postula lo mismo que critica， que la ciencia no es una verdad objetiva）-， a pesar de esto， digo， el libro es maravilloso。
Twój Cichy Wielbiciel
，
Boring。 5 stars。
Rosie
，
Quality of the writing: 5Quality of the content/organisation/research: 5Impact on my perspective: 4Personal resonance: 1Rereading potential: 3Overall score: 4The reason I read it: Researching the classic philosophy of science texts。 I'd also wanted to read it for a few years and was scared of not understanding it。 The problem with reading books that you've known for ages you really should read and which seem to be referenced everywhere， but which you've been putting off because any time you open Quality of the writing: 5Quality of the content/organisation/research: 5Impact on my perspective: 4Personal resonance: 1Rereading potential: 3Overall score: 4The reason I read it: Researching the classic philosophy of science texts。 I'd also wanted to read it for a few years and was scared of not understanding it。 The problem with reading books that you've known for ages you really should read and which seem to be referenced everywhere， but which you've been putting off because any time you open them you're confronted with a tangle of equations and nonce words， is that if you do ever manage to staple yourself to a chair and hack your way through them， they're usually really good。 So then you commit to reading more classics， buy a bunch， and go through the same ordeal of guilt and duress。 Anyway， The Logic of Scientific Discovery was one such book。 I procrastinated reading it for ages， only to regret not having read it sooner。 Popper's main premise is that induction （using specific statements to draw broad conclusions） is not a valid basis for science。 Instead， science must use 'the deductive method of testing'， which is based on falsification。 A researcher puts forward a hypothesis。 Then they do everything they can to disprove it。 If they don't succeed and neither does anyone else， the hypothesis gets to stick around for the time being， like a virgin bride in a fairy tale who doesn't get murdered on her wedding night because she starts telling a fun story。 Popper's most difficult and controversial take is that nothing is ever proven true， it just doesn't get falsified for the time being。 We can't even say a theory is likely to be true。 Researchers shouldn't try to preserve their ideas， they should try to kill them as hard as possible。 For Popper， the way to define science is as the practice of falsifying hypotheses。 Anyone doing anything else is not doing science。 If a theory can't be proven false （e。g。 psychoanalysis）， it's pseudoscience。 This is probably the best non-scientist lesson from the book: if you can't imagine a piece of evidence that would cause you to stop believing something， you're not being rational。 Really， the world would be 50% better if we all stopped believing things we wouldn't ever stop believing。 This took me the best part of a week to read。 I wrestled with it， sweating， looking up half a dozen names or definitions per page。 At a certain point， I feared I wouldn't be able to get more from it than the superficial summary of Popper's ideas I'd encountered in my pre-reading research。 But， after the first reading， the pieces were all there in my mind。 On the second reading， everything came together and a lot of things are clearer for having exposed myself to Popper's ideas。 This book could be structured better。 I don't find the arrangement of the chapters to be intuitive and there are two whole chapters that seemed irrelevant （no one ever seems to mention them in writing about this book， except to say they're irrelevant， so I think I'm right about that。） For a lay audience， most of the value is in the first 50–100 pages of the book。 Interesting tidbits:-'If we ignore what other people are thinking， or have thought in the past， then rational discussion must come to an end， though each of us may go on happily talking to himself。'-'Now it is far from obvious， from a logical point of view， that we can be justified in inferring universal statements from singular ones， no matter how numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how many instances of white swans we have observed， this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white。'-'I am inclined to think that scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of a purely speculative kind， and sometimes even quite hazy; a faith which is completely unwarranted from the point of view of science， and which， to that extent， is 'metaphysical。''-'…a subjective experience， or a feeling of conviction， can never justify a scientific statement， and that within science it can play no part except that of an object of empirical （psychological） inquiry。''Scientific theories are perpetually changing。 This is not due to mere chance but might well be expected， according to our characterization of empirical science。'-'Science can be viewed from various standpoints， not only from that of epistemology; for example， we can look at it as a biological or as a sociological phenomenon。 As such it might be described as a tool， or an instrument， comparable perhaps to some of our industrial machinery。 Science may be described as a means of production - as the last word in 'roundabout production。''- 'Science does not rest upon a solid bedrock。 The bold structure of its theories rises， as it were， above a swamp。 It is like a building erected on piles。 The piles are driven down from above into the swamp， but not down to any natural or 'given' base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper， it is not because we have reached firm ground。 We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure， at least for the time being。' 。。。more
Wejdan
，
I am utterly delighted to read it。
Andrew
，
While dealing with important philosophy of science issues， such as provability vs falsifiability of theories and putting due emphasis on foundations of scientific method， the chapters on probability are rather dated。 My best guess， only about 30% of the text remains relevant today。
Owlseyes
，
About the usage of Chloroquine in time of coronavirus。 Magic versus science。https://www。philomag。com/lactu/distin。。。 About the usage of Chloroquine in time of coronavirus。 Magic versus science。https://www。philomag。com/lactu/distin。。。 。。。more
Mr Shahabi
，