How Spies Think: Ten Lessons in Intelligence
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- Create Date：2021-08-23 06:51:08
- Update Date：2025-09-06
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- Author：David Omand
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Summary
LONGLISTED FOR THE ORWELL PRIZE FOR POLITICAL WRITING 2021
'One of the best books ever written about intelligence analysis and its long-term lessons' Christopher Andrew， author of The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5
'An invaluable guide to avoiding self-deception and fake news' Melanie Phillips， The Times
From the former director of GCHQ， Professor Sir David Omand， learn the methodology used by British intelligence agencies to reach judgements， establish the right level of confidence and act decisively。 Full of revealing examples from a storied career， including key briefings with Prime Ministers and strategies used in conflicts from the Cold War to the present， in How Spies Think Professor Omand arms us with the tools to sort fact from fiction， and shows us how to use real intelligence every day。
'One of the best books ever written about intelligence analysis and its long-term lessons' Christopher Andrew， author of The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5
'An invaluable guide to avoiding self-deception and fake news' Melanie Phillips， The Times
From the former director of GCHQ， Professor Sir David Omand， learn the methodology used by British intelligence agencies to reach judgements， establish the right level of confidence and act decisively。 Full of revealing examples from a storied career， including key briefings with Prime Ministers and strategies used in conflicts from the Cold War to the present， in How Spies Think Professor Omand arms us with the tools to sort fact from fiction， and shows us how to use real intelligence every day。
Reviews
John Fullerton
，
I can imagine that the publishers were dazzled by the author's background and qualifications: a former director of GCHQ， seven years on the Joint Intelligence Committee， permanent secretary at the Home Office and a professor of war studies。 Impressive stuff， indeed。And there are of course reviews one would expect for an establishment figure。。。a tour de force。。。fascinating。。。a rare insight。。。a brilliant book。。。etcetera。So let's look at some of his pearls of wisdom， taken at random。 'Intelligence I can imagine that the publishers were dazzled by the author's background and qualifications: a former director of GCHQ， seven years on the Joint Intelligence Committee， permanent secretary at the Home Office and a professor of war studies。 Impressive stuff， indeed。And there are of course reviews one would expect for an establishment figure。。。a tour de force。。。fascinating。。。a rare insight。。。a brilliant book。。。etcetera。So let's look at some of his pearls of wisdom， taken at random。 'Intelligence agencies prefer to keep quiet about success。。。''Reality is what it is。''Context is therefore needed to infer meaning。。。''In all sustained thinking， assumptions do have to be made。。。''The best way to secure situational awareness is when you can see for yourself what is going on。。。' 'A well-studied lesson of the dangers of misinterpreting complex situations is the "security dilemma" when rearmament steps taken by one nation with purely defensive intent trigger fears in a potential adversary。。。''Do not believe what you want to believe until you know what you need to know。。。' '。。。we are all liable to wrestle with inconsistent beliefs， often suffering stress as a result。' 'intelligence communities have the duty of trying to forestall unwelcome surprises by spotting international developments that would spell real trouble。'No shit， Sherlock。Then， for the academically minded reader， there's plenty of gobbledygook to keep her/him amused:'The analysis of computing hypotheses using Heur tables is an example of one of the structured analytic techniques in use today。。。'And if that isn't enough:'The Bayesian method of reasoning therefore involves adjusting our prior degree of belief in a hypothesis on receipt to form a posterior degree of belief in it。。。'Final observation: while this book is entitled 'How Spies Think' - it really isn't。 The title is frankly misleading。 It's really how the suits - Whitehall analysts， managers and those charged with assessing intelligence - might， could or should， think （but usually don't）。 Spies are people who collect intelligence ie。 facts - and the latter - God help us all - then provide an interpretation。 Spies don't， and shouldn't assess， their own material。 Obviously。And perhaps it's a little odd that Professor Omand does not take the trouble to list the several failures of the JIC over the years， regardless of his beautiful formula: p（N）/E=p（N。（p（E/N/p（E）I didn't finish it。 Hence no rating。 。。。more
Uffe Jon Ploug
，
The majority of the book would earn it a solid 5 stars - but the last chapter seems to be written without the critical thinking so eminently demonstrated in all the prior chapters。 A small blemish on a book that is still absolutely worthwhile。
Mika
，
I like the way Omand's book uses the logics of intelligence to foster critical， scientific modes of inquiry for everyone。 There is relatively little new here for anyone familiar with scientific inquiry， heuristics， Bayesian inference， or cognitive biases， on the one hand， or the history of intelligence in the twentieth century， especially of Anglo-American history。 But the book is well-written and thoughtful。 Omand's hypotheticals are a bit contrived， not because they are implausible， but becaus I like the way Omand's book uses the logics of intelligence to foster critical， scientific modes of inquiry for everyone。 There is relatively little new here for anyone familiar with scientific inquiry， heuristics， Bayesian inference， or cognitive biases， on the one hand， or the history of intelligence in the twentieth century， especially of Anglo-American history。 But the book is well-written and thoughtful。 Omand's hypotheticals are a bit contrived， not because they are implausible， but because they feel simplistic — exactly what the rest of the book argues against。 。。。more
Sonia Williams
，
I have taken time to read and digest the lessons in this book and this was time well spent。 As a librarian I was intrigued to discover that skills used by 'spies' are often put in to play by librarians the world over。 I live in a world of information， sifting through searches， verifiying the source， ferreting out that elusive connection to a enquiry uses many of the skills of an information analyst。There are traps the unwary can fall in to when sifting through information and the two most import I have taken time to read and digest the lessons in this book and this was time well spent。 As a librarian I was intrigued to discover that skills used by 'spies' are often put in to play by librarians the world over。 I live in a world of information， sifting through searches， verifiying the source， ferreting out that elusive connection to a enquiry uses many of the skills of an information analyst。There are traps the unwary can fall in to when sifting through information and the two most important ones highlighted by the author are: 1。 No one cat foretell the future - the unexpected happens and all our careful plans can go out the widow2。。The consensual hallucination - group belief and telling our bosses what they want to hear not what they should hear。The author leads us thorugh the process of critical thinking and analysis in a accessible way and the cases provided as examples often sent me down the rabbit hole of Google/ Firefox 。 Thanks to the publisher and Netgalley for the opportunity to review this book， all views are my own。 。。。more
Kirk Mayer
，
The lessons are far more wide ranging than just Intelligence， covering life and business skills。 Well written， makes use of a wide range of well supported philosophical and behavioural economics ideas， generally to effect。Somewhat let down by the final chapter， which is a bit of a whimper。 Notwithstanding that it is a worthwhile read。
Patrick Fay
，
Practical tips on how to make decisions based on incomplete and potentially unreliable information。 My biggest take aways are the desire to take a course in logic （get more practice with Bayesian Inference） and go with the theory that has the least factors seeming to disprove it - not the one with the most supporting evidence。
Mike
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This was a well written and enlightening book。 I found the section on {REDACTED} especially useful and the discussion of {REDACTED} quite interesting。OK， obvious jokes aside this was a very well written， entertaining and educating at the same time。 The lesson he provides in an approach to critical thinking and analysis are as applicable in the world of government policy analysis， business development or investing as they are in the intelligence realm。 The section on dealing with the deluge of di This was a well written and enlightening book。 I found the section on {REDACTED} especially useful and the discussion of {REDACTED} quite interesting。OK， obvious jokes aside this was a very well written， entertaining and educating at the same time。 The lesson he provides in an approach to critical thinking and analysis are as applicable in the world of government policy analysis， business development or investing as they are in the intelligence realm。 The section on dealing with the deluge of disinformation and deception is also useful and well worth the time of anyone keen to see our democracies live up to their potential as opposed to being dragged down by demagogues。I enjoyed this as an audio book， read by the author。 He makes a great narrator。 。。。more
Jason Sebera
，
In How Spies Think: Ten Lessons in Intelligence， Sir David Bruce Omand GCB， former Director of the Government Communications Headquarters， presents techniques necessary to making sense of the world around us， and making decisions that lead to the most favorable outcome。 The respective favorable outcomes， aren't realpolitik， expediency-focused outcomes。 Omand's writing is based on the preeminence of integrity and an ethical approach。 Certainly not a textbook， the book is full of anecdotes and re In How Spies Think: Ten Lessons in Intelligence， Sir David Bruce Omand GCB， former Director of the Government Communications Headquarters， presents techniques necessary to making sense of the world around us， and making decisions that lead to the most favorable outcome。 The respective favorable outcomes， aren't realpolitik， expediency-focused outcomes。 Omand's writing is based on the preeminence of integrity and an ethical approach。 Certainly not a textbook， the book is full of anecdotes and real-life examples。 Informative and captivating。 "There is a deeper way of looking at intelligence， and that is to distinguishbetween secrets and mysteries" （Omand， 69）。 。。。more
Doc Martin
，
This was a Christmas present and a great book to start my reading new year。The latest James Bond film release ‘No Time to Die’ may have put pushed back to the end of the year， but thanks to David Omand I am now able to think like a spy。 Step aside Daniel Craig， I have taken onboard the ten lessons in intelligence and now have a license to practice my learning。 I’m actually excited to build the SEES model of analytical thinking into my work life。 * Situational awareness * Explanation* Estimate* S This was a Christmas present and a great book to start my reading new year。The latest James Bond film release ‘No Time to Die’ may have put pushed back to the end of the year， but thanks to David Omand I am now able to think like a spy。 Step aside Daniel Craig， I have taken onboard the ten lessons in intelligence and now have a license to practice my learning。 I’m actually excited to build the SEES model of analytical thinking into my work life。 * Situational awareness * Explanation* Estimate* Strategic noticeWill also work harder to make sure any predictions and forecasts in my work are expressed as probabilities。 Well in saying that I mean。。。Realistic Possibility 40%-50%Likely/ Probable 55%-75% 🤣 。。。more
Sebastian Reyn
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Sir David Bruce Omand （1947） is， met meer dan een halve eeuw praktijkervaring， een icoon in de inlichtingen- en veiligheidswereld。 De Britse econoom， wiskundige en natuurkundige trad in 1969 als jongeman in dienst bij het roemruchte Global Communications Headquarters （GCHQ）。 Als directeur van GCHQ， het Britse equivalent van de Amerikaanse National Security Agency， zou hij in de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw zijn organisatie als een van de eerste inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten het inter Sir David Bruce Omand （1947） is， met meer dan een halve eeuw praktijkervaring， een icoon in de inlichtingen- en veiligheidswereld。 De Britse econoom， wiskundige en natuurkundige trad in 1969 als jongeman in dienst bij het roemruchte Global Communications Headquarters （GCHQ）。 Als directeur van GCHQ， het Britse equivalent van de Amerikaanse National Security Agency， zou hij in de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw zijn organisatie als een van de eerste inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten het internettijdperk inleiden。 Behalve voor GCHQ werkte Omand vele jaren voor het Britse ministerie van Defensie en was hij Permanent Secretary of the Home Office （1997-2000）。 Daarna maakte hij zeven jaar deel uit van het UK Joint Intelligence Committee。 Na de terroristische aanslagen op de Verenigde Staten （‘9/11’） werd hij bovendien als eerste UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator namens de Britse premier verantwoordelijk voor “the professional health” van de Britse inlichtingengemeenschap。 Hij werd in die hoedanigheid tevens de geestelijke vader van de Britse Counter Terrorism Strategy （CONTEST）。Omand is een klassiek voorbeeld van de ‘professional turned scholar’。 Sinds het einde van zijn loopbaan in overheidsdienst geeft hij als buitengewoon hoogleraar college aan onder meer het prestigieuze Kings College in Londen。 Als zodanig treedt hij geregeld op bij conferenties en denktanks en is een veelgevraagd commentator in de media。 Zijn wetenschappelijke activiteiten komen verder tot uitdrukking in artikelen en inmiddels een drietal boeken。 In 2010 publiceerde hij Securing the State over de relatie tussen veiligheid en inlichtingen。 In 2018 schreef hij， samen met Mark Phythian， Principled Spying over de ethiek van geheime inlichtingen。 En nu ligt， voorzien van een opvallende oranje omslag， zijn derde boek in de schappen: How Spies Think: Ten Lessons in Intelligence （gepubliceerd door Penguin Random House in 2020）。Omand weet dus waar hij het over heeft， kan putten uit een rijke ervaring en beschikt over een scherpe， analytische geest。 How Spies Think is de weerslag van meer dan vijftig jaar praktijkervaring en denkwerk。 Wie belang stelt in het werk van inlichtingendiensten en van hun interactie met beleidsmakers en besluitvormers kan， kortom， niet om dit boek heen。 How Spies Think is bovendien goed geschreven en zorgvuldig opgebouwd。 Omand put daarbij rijkelijk uit zijn lange loopbaan， met boeiende anekdotes en ‘participerende observaties’ over de Falklandoorlog， de hoogtijdagen van de Koude Oorlog， de val van de Sovjet-Unie， de Irak-oorlog， de burgeroorlogen in Noord-Ierland en Bosnië en het internationale terrorisme。 Wie verwacht dat de ‘spionnen’ uit de titel van het boek lijken op de personages uit de boeken van Ian Flemming of John le Carré， komt bedrogen uit， al komen Le Carré’s belangrijkste personage George Smiley en diens roman Tinker， Tailor， Soldier， Spy kort even om de hoek kijken wanneer Omand beschrijft hoe inlichtingenanalisten hun hypotheses voortdurend aan nieuwe informatie toetsen （148-9）。 De inlichtingenfunctionaris die in How Spies Think centraal staat， is de analist。 Omand richt zijn aandacht op de uitdagingen van hun werk。 Het zijn de inlichtingenanalisten wier taak het is wijs te worden uit de vaak tegenstrijdige en onvolledige informatie die hen door anderen wordt aangereikt。 Omands inzichtrijke beschrijving van hun methodes en van de vele valkuilen die zij moeten omzeilen， bepaalt， samen met de vele praktijkvoorbeelden over de interactie van inlichtingendiensten met de wereld van de politiek， de toegevoegde waarde van zijn boek。How Spies Think is onderverdeeld aan de hand van tien ‘lessons in intelligence’ in vier delen。 In het eerste deel （“ordering our thoughts”） introduceert hij een analytisch denkmodel waarvoor hij het acroniem SEES hanteert。 Wat ziet de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsanalist？ Beter nog， wat zou hij of zij moeten zien？ Als rechtgeaard inlichtingenman met een wiskundige en academische inslag， onderstreept Omand het belang van “a systematic way of unpacking the process of arriving at judgements and establishing the appropriately level of confidence in them” （9）。 Zijn SEES-model laat in wezen zien wat analisten doen als zij ontwikkelingen en gebeurtenissen in de wereld onderzoeken。 Het vertegenwoordigt de vier soorten informatie waaruit een inlichtingenproduct kan bestaan en de verschillende analyseniveaus waaruit ze zijn afgeleid。 Het acroniem SEES staat voor: · Situational awareness of what is happening and what we face now; · Explanation of why we are seeing what we do and the motivations of those involved; · Estimates and forecasts of how events may unfold under different assumptions;· Strategic notice of future issues that may become a challenge in the longer term。 （9）Dus: weten， begrijpen， voorzien en tijdig waarschuwen。 Het stelsel van dekkingsgraden dat de Nederlandse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten hanteren， is met dit model grotendeels in overeenstemming。Omand gaat in vele pagina’s dieper in op het verschijnsel analyse en beoordelingen。 Hij zoomt in op de aannames die daaraan noodzakelijkerwijs ten grondslag liggen en de analytische methoden die analisten gebruiken om bruikbare beoordelingen en analyses met voorspellende waarde te produceren。 Hypothesevorming en permanente toetsing zijn belangrijk elementen in zijn betoog。 Zo behandelt hij ‘Ockhams scheermes’， genoemd naar de veertiende-eeuwse Franciscaner monnik William of Ockham （ca。 1287-1347） die de zogenaamde wet van de spaarzaamheid hanteerde en als eerste het kentheoretische uitgangspunt formuleerde dat de simpelste verklaring meestal de juiste verklaring is。 Omand besteedt daarnaast veel tijd aan de logica van gehanteerde aannames en gevolgtrekkingen （“assumptions and inferences”）。 Om grip te krijgen op hypothetische uitspraken waarvan de waarheid onzeker is， pleit hij voor gebruik van de Bayesiaanse methode， genoemd naar de achttiende-eeuwse wiskundige en theoloog Thomas Bayes， waarbij de waarschijnlijkheid （= relatieve kans） van een bepaalde gebeurtenis of ontwikkeling telkens wordt herzien op basis van beschikbaar gekomen nieuwe informatie。 Deze methode weerspiegelt de inlichtingenpraktijk van veel westerse inlichtingendiensten。 De methode draagt ertoe bij dat de beschikbaarheid van wezenlijk nieuwe informatie metterdaad leidt tot aanpassing van analyses of， in de termen die de Nederlandse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten hanteren， van het ‘normbeeld’。Dit is echter geen vanzelfsprekendheid， wat Omand er in deel twee （over “checking our reasoning”） toe brengt aandacht te besteden aan mentale belemmeringen als tunnelvisie， groepsdenken en allerlei vormen van onbewuste bias， zowel op persoonlijk als op institutioneel niveau。 “We do not have to be so surprised by surprise，” luidt zijn belangrijke vierde les。 Over de mondiale coronapandemie schrijft hij bijvoorbeeld dat er voldoende signalen waren om beter beslagen ten ijs te komen: “the COVID-19 outbreak should not have caught us unprepared”。 （90） De tekortkomingen van het menselijke brein blijven niettemin een belangrijke hinderpaal voor analisten， beleidsmakers en besluitvormers。 Om deze tekortkomingen tegen te gaan， wijst Omand net als Edward Syed in Rebel Ideas op het belang van cognitieve diversiteit in een organisatie: “In group discussions it helps to have one or more contrarians， those who by inclination like swimming against the tide and thus help surface all the relevant arguments” （123）。 Niet voor niets beschikt de Nederlandse Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst （MIVD） sinds de Irak-oorlog over een ‘devil’s advocate’， een functionaliteit waarvan ook Omand het belang onderschrijft。In het derde deel （“making intelligent use of intelligence”） verlegt Omand zijn aandacht naar de gebruikers van inlichtingenanalyses。 Vergaring en verwerking van geheime informatie dient immers geen enkel doel als de afnemer niet wordt bereikt of er niet mee uit de voeten kan。 Dit vereist van inlichtingendiensten begrip voor en inlevingsvermogen in het werk van de beleidsmaker en besluitvormer。 Ook mag hun betrouwbaarheid en professionaliteit nooit ter discussie staan。 Wederzijds vertrouwen en aantoonbare betrouwbaarheid zijn volgens Omand overigens ook onontbeerlijk voor het smeden van succesvolle partnerschappen in internationale inlichtingenkringen。 Hij put daarbij vooral uit zijn diepgaande inzicht in de werking van de Angelsaksische ‘Five Eyes’-gemeenschap。 Betrouwbare， wederkerige relaties zijn voor inlichtingendiensten belangrijker dan de ‘quid pro quo’-balans in enge zin。 “Intelligence agencies have learned more than most the lesson that strong partnerships add value，” aldus Omand。 （209） Hij corrigeert daarmee het heersende transactionele beeld als zou internationale inlichtingensamenwerking vooral gelijkenis vertonen met het ‘ruilen van postzegels’。 Het sociologische perspectief op internationale inlichtingensamenwerking is tot dusver in de wetenschap onderbelicht gebleven。 Omands relaas biedt goede aanknopingspunten voor een dergelijk perspectief。Behalve aan het werk van inlichtingendiensten， besteedt Omand in het laatste deel van zijn boek uitvoerig aandacht aan de verstrekkende， nadelige politieke en maatschappelijke gevolgen van de informatierevolutie。 In hoofdstuk 7 maakt hij een verhelderend onderscheid tussen ‘misinformation’ （i。e。 ‘information in circulation that turns out not to be true， or only a misleading part of the truth’）， ‘disinformation’ （i。e。 ‘information that is known to be false before it is circulated’ – ook wel bekend als nepnieuws） en ‘malinformation’ （i。e。 ‘deliberate us of true information obtained covertly that was never intended to become public’， zoals de persoonlijke e-mails van presidentskandidaat Hillary Clinton）。 Omand is uiterst bezorgd over de gevolgen voor democratische samenlevingen van het huidige informatietijdperk， met zijn social media， filter bubbles en echo chambers。 Deze samenlevingen zijn bij uitstek vatbaar voor manipulatie door kwaadwillenden。 “Combating modern subversion and sedition must 。。。 be a properly funded component part of national security effort for the democracies，” aldus Omand。 （284） Hij deinst daarbij niet terug voor scherpe kritiek op de Amerikaanse oud-president Donald Trump。 De bestorming van Capitol Hill door Trump-aanhangers in Washington DC op 6 januari 2021 kwam te laat om te worden opgenomen in Omands boek， maar past naadloos in diens analyse。 Ook de Britse premier Boris Johnson valt overigens een kritische bejegening ten deel， vooral wegens diens rol in de Brexit-saga。How Spies Think heeft veel te bieden。 Omand schrijft goed， heeft een heldere redeneertrant en verwoordt zijn meningen zorgvuldig。 Enige geconcentreerde aandacht is vooral in de eerste hoofdstukken vereist， maar gelukkig doorspekt hij zijn betoog met talloze aansprekende voorbeelden uit de praktijk。 Omand eindigt optimistisch in zijn afsluitende vierde deel: “A final lesson in optimism”。 De wil om optimistisch te eindigen lijkt hier misschien wat sterker te zijn geweest dan de kracht van de analyse。 Omand vertrouwt op de redelijkheid， de integriteit en de bekwaamheid van westerse overheden， met inbegrip van hun inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten。 Hij gaat daarbij voorbij aan het gegeven dat de inspanningen van goedwillende， integere mensen nog geen garantie geven op een goed resultaat。 Wielrenners kennen het begrip ‘vals plat’: een klim die visueel niet meteen als zodanig valt te onderkennen totdat kuitspieren en longen de eerste protesten doorgeven。 Het hellende vlak kan als tegenhanger daarvan worden beschouwd; het kan even duren voordat de neergaande ervaring als zodanig wordt onderkend， maar dan is de afbrokkeling al wel een feit en is men dus te laat。 Van westerse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten wordt daarom niet alleen permanente alertheid gevraagd om bedreigingen te onderkennen。 Er is ook permanente alertheid geboden om de eigen professionaliteit en integriteit te bewaken。 De tien lessen van Omand zijn bij deze opgave een uitstekende raadgever， in het belang van de democratische rechtsorde。 。。。more
Kate Potapenko
，
Ten brilliant lessons in intelligence that are definitely worth learning！ I was always interested in all kind of investigation， disinformation， intelligence etc。 Now I use quite a bit of it in my line of work。However lessons learnt here would be handy for anyone， be it for life or work。 Book gives us an insight into different problems， breaks down techniques and explores outcomes。 In a way it teaches you to approach problem solutions differently along with telling us about fake news， elections c Ten brilliant lessons in intelligence that are definitely worth learning！ I was always interested in all kind of investigation， disinformation， intelligence etc。 Now I use quite a bit of it in my line of work。However lessons learnt here would be handy for anyone， be it for life or work。 Book gives us an insight into different problems， breaks down techniques and explores outcomes。 In a way it teaches you to approach problem solutions differently along with telling us about fake news， elections campaigns， cold wars etc。It took me a while to read it as I would often get sucked into Google， researching cases mentioned and getting more details here and there。But generally very enjoyable。 。。。more
Tamara Boston
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gave up after a few chapters。 i’m usually super into this genre， but this was just so dull
Paul
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The image we have of spies has long been tarnished by Bond。 It is not a glamourous job and often involves long hours watching and waiting for a target or asset to make a move。 For those that collates the information gather from signals intelligence or actual observations have to try and place the pieces together is some semblance of order。 This is not particularly easy， especially when you don’t know what the full picture is nor do you know if the snippet of information in front of you actually The image we have of spies has long been tarnished by Bond。 It is not a glamourous job and often involves long hours watching and waiting for a target or asset to make a move。 For those that collates the information gather from signals intelligence or actual observations have to try and place the pieces together is some semblance of order。 This is not particularly easy， especially when you don’t know what the full picture is nor do you know if the snippet of information in front of you actually relates to the task in hand。Somehow they manage to pull together a picture of what is happening。 So how do they do it？ One of the methods that they use is the SEES modelSituational AwarenessExplanationEstimatesStrategic NoticeThe first part is gaining a fuller understanding as you are able to of what is happening。 The second part is a deep understanding as to why it is happening and the various motivations behind any parties involved。 From that， you need to assess different scenarios of what might happen if events unfold in particular ways。 The final element is the assessment of any issues that might affect the item under consideration， including events that might be considered as outliers at the moment。Even though these four stages sound fairly simple， they can absorb a lot of time and effort and things still get missed。 It is also important to think of all possible outcomes as the assumptions that are made are often not bold enough。 In this book， Omand takes us through the process behind this system in ten lessons and provides lots of examples of how he used these techniques in his time in government and as the director of GCHQ。It is very detailed， which is kind of what I would expect from someone of his calibre and experience in the role。 There are some really useful lessons in here， especially the final lesson on digital subversion and sedition and that seeing is not always believing， especially with the sophisticated。 Parts of the book did feel like there were more of a memoir of his time in various government departments and was loosely linked to the lesson being discussed。 That was a minor detail though， there are lots of details to take away here and use。 。。。more
Gerrit G。
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The first and third part of the book are its strength。 The former essentially is a write-up what one would also get to know from "The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis" by Heuer — an excellent， well-known work。 The latter part teaches practical knowledge of handling humans in the contemporary times， touching topics such as fake news， modern sedition and subversion campaigns， as well as the cold war。 In summary， one finds valuable reflections about both very important and very actual topics abo The first and third part of the book are its strength。 The former essentially is a write-up what one would also get to know from "The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis" by Heuer — an excellent， well-known work。 The latter part teaches practical knowledge of handling humans in the contemporary times， touching topics such as fake news， modern sedition and subversion campaigns， as well as the cold war。 In summary， one finds valuable reflections about both very important and very actual topics about humans in cyberspace in this book; that alone is worth the read。Can be classified as pragmatic-analytical。 As fiction gets mixed with reflections， historical accounts， reflections on the level of concepts as well as on political happenings in the then and now， the book is quite hard to read， or at least it requires some "mental agility" from the reader。 。。。more
TBHONEST
，