Social Theory of International Politics
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- Author：Alexander Wendt
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Summary
Drawing on philosophy and social theory， Social Theory of International Politics develops a cultural theory of international politics that contrasts with the realist mainstream。 Wendt argues that states can view each other as enemies， rivals， or friends。 He characterizes these roles as "cultures of anarchy，" which are shared ideas that help shape states' interests and capabilities。 These cultures can change over time as ideas change。 Wendt thus argues that the nature of international politics is not fixed， and that the international system is not condemned to conflict and war。
Reviews
Peter Fox
，
Wendt has produced a piece of writing that is worthy of his reputation and brings social theory to a new level。 Understanding international relations is complicated due to the multi layering and multi-faceted perspectives that are associated with the subject matter。 Reading Wendt's essays in this field of study cannot only enhance the reader's knowledge but also bring about a change in perspective。There is more to international relations than realism and liberalism and their various saplings。 We Wendt has produced a piece of writing that is worthy of his reputation and brings social theory to a new level。 Understanding international relations is complicated due to the multi layering and multi-faceted perspectives that are associated with the subject matter。 Reading Wendt's essays in this field of study cannot only enhance the reader's knowledge but also bring about a change in perspective。There is more to international relations than realism and liberalism and their various saplings。 Wendt highlights this through strong arguments and consistent philosophical referencing to key authors in the field of study: Locke， Hobbes， Kant and occasionally draws in Rousseau， Wittgenstein， Nietzsche and Poppers。Just as imperative are the social theory concepts that are generated and utilised in the setting of IR， to make the concepts and ontology not only relevant but foundational。 The only disappointment that I have is the limited reference to Huntington whose work is benchmark material， even though it may sit on the opposite side of the argument to Wendt。If you are wanting to understand international relations than reading both Wendt and Huntington are a must。 Waltz's work lays the foundation， Huntington will supply the practicalities and Wendt adds the social and philosophical grounding。 。。。more
Patrick F
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A must read for IR graduate students。
Aziz Qaissi
，
Social Theory of International Politics is principally a work of theory。 In it， Alexander Wendt， a political scientist， suggests rather a different reading for international relations and states systems。 This he calls the social constructivist theory。 On one level， Wendt’s constructivism， which basically builds on previous stripes of the same theory， is established both as a meta-theory that examines the social world and as a substantial theory of International Relations scholarship。 In 429 page Social Theory of International Politics is principally a work of theory。 In it， Alexander Wendt， a political scientist， suggests rather a different reading for international relations and states systems。 This he calls the social constructivist theory。 On one level， Wendt’s constructivism， which basically builds on previous stripes of the same theory， is established both as a meta-theory that examines the social world and as a substantial theory of International Relations scholarship。 In 429 pages， the book is divided into two parts， respectively entitled Social Theory and International Politics， with a long， explanatory chapter， a Map of Structural Theorizing， that precedes both parts addressing the philosophical and sociological roots of his social constructivist theory。 The philosophical line of thought that Wendt draws upon is that of Immanuel Kant。 Obtained knowledge about the world， the Kantian view argues， will always be subjective knowledge in the sense that it is filtered through human consciousness。 From this follows the focus that constructivism puts on human awareness or consciousness and its influence on world affairs。 The sociological link to Wendt’s theory stems from two sociologists whose ideas have so long influenced social theory in general。 The first is Max Weber’s ideas about how human beings rely on understanding of each other’s actions and assigning “meaning” to them。 Thus in order to comprehend human interaction， we cannot merely describe as we do with physical phenomena。 Instead， the comprehension requires rather new ways of understanding （what he calls in German “verstehen”）。 The second is Anthony Giddens’ views about structure-agency problems。 This relationship between the structure and agents is neither top-down nor bottom-up。 It is a relationship of “structuration” and its implications mean that the structure and the agents are mutually constituted and shaped， hence involves intersubjective understanding。 Provided the structure-agents problem， Wendts differentiates between two levels where this problematic is realized: the macro-level and the micro-level。 The former consists of individuals with ideas and beliefs。 These are exhibited through the creation of cultural forms such as rules， norms， laws， institutions， myths， customs， traditions， ideologies， narratives， etc。 These constitute a “common knowledge” of the micro-structure which is highly subjective。 The latter consists of states， international organizations， international norms and rules， etc。 together they form a set of “representations” or “collective knowledge”。 The macro-structure （collective knowledge） and micro-structure （common knowledge） are involved in a constitutive and co-determining relationship。 Constructivists， accordingly， disagree with and differ from classical theories of International Relations （Realism， Neorealism and Neoliberalism） with respects to three levels。 First is the methodological difference in which realists are interested in how incentives in the international system affect the price of behaviour （constructivists instead ask the question: where those identities and incentives come from？）。 The second is the ontological difference; that is the nature of the international system （classical theories claim it is materialist， individualist， while constructivists argue it is idealist）。 Third is the empirical difference which addresses the extent to which identities and interests are constructed by domestic structures versus the systemic structures。From the disagreements pointed out above come the two effects of structure: causal and constitutive。 The former can be reduced to this mathematical formula X generates Y → X exists independently of Y。 The latter as X is what it is in virtue of its relation to Y →X presupposes Y → their relationship is necessary rather than contingent。 Based on the differentiation between constitutive and causal effects of structure， constructivists assume that （i） international system is a social phenomenon not a materialist one – an idealist view of structure as a distribution of knowledge and ideas and not material capabilities; （ii） state identities and interests are more constituted by the international system， and （iii） anarchy has no specific logic apart from process and that structure is structured resulting in rather three logics of anarchy （Hobbesian， Lockean and Kantian）。 Linked to this is the distinction made between two types of knowledge， based on which interests are constituted。 The first is private knowledge。 This kind of knowledge held within single individuals and include their ideas and beliefs。 The second is shared knowledge。 This type of knowledge is reached when private knowledge is socially shared; that is when private knowledge is disseminated internationally through foreign policy。Wendt goes as far as to postulate a state theory-like and calls it “the essential state” whose ontological basis is not materialist but ideational/idealist/ideal。 The attempt is identify the common properties and features that states have in common。 The objectives of such theorization tend to （i） give a model of state as a “body” by showing that it is an actor which cannot be reduced to its parts; （ii） give a the model of state a “life” by identifying its intrinsic motivational dispositions or “national interests”， and （iii） show that states are ontologically prior to states system per se。 In doing so， Wend uses three significant conceptualizations of state。 First is the Webrian organizational theory which views state as an organization possessing sovereignty and territorial use of organized violence。 Second is the Marxist structural theory which views the state as a structure that binds organizational actors and society in a relationship of mutual constitution。 The third is the reductive theory which claims that state is reducible to the interest groups and individuals in society。 The synthetic position of Wendt drawing upon these three conceptualizations is that “the referent object of “the state” should be conceptualized as ab organizational actor that is internally related to the society it governs by a structure of political authority， which in effect rolls all three views up in one。” （p。 201）。 Wendt uses the term “essential state” to refer to the common properties and features that all states share regardless of their formal variations （i。e。， democratic， communist， capitalist， etc。）。Constructivism view the state as a “corporate agency” with properties （institutional-legal order， monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence， internal and external sovereignty， territory， and society）; with the agency of state structure （individuals’ ideas， beliefs and intentionality）， and with identities and interests （individuals’ ideas and intentionality are constitutive elements of the interests and actions of the state）。 Wendt synthesizes his view of essential state as corporate agency stating that "concrete individuals play an essential role in state action， instantiating and carrying it forward in time， but state action is no more reducible to those individuals than their action is reducible to neurons in the brain。 Both kinds of agency exist only in virtue of structured relationships among their elements， but the effect of those structures is to constitute irreducible capacities for intentionality。 These capacities are real， not actions。" （p。 221）。The ontological status of state is “idealist”。 As a social structure， state action （agency） depends on the actions of those individuals， since social structures exist in virtue of the practices which instantiate them。 This structure is reducible to the properties and interactions of the individuals who make it up。 Actors ↔Ideas ↔ Identities ↔ interests（State Structure – while ↔means ‘constitute’）The application of the structural theorizing laid down in the first part of the book takes on the assumption that the states international system is ontologically informed by anarchy， but anarchy is what the states make of it！ This ordering principle of the international system does not have an inherent logic of its own。 Shared knowledge， culture， constitute the resulting logic of anarchy which then characterizes society， either in cooperative terms or conflictual ones。 Not least because shared ideas may constitute conflict while material forces may induce cooperation， or to use the famous example Wendt states: “five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than five North Korean ones” because the British are friends， North Koreans are not。 Thus， Wendt proposes three ideal types of anarchy but asserts they are not definitively exhaustive。The first is the Hobbesian culture。 The principle of this culture is “war of all against all”。 It is a characteristic of the nature state。 This culture generates enmity role as a position of the Other and has implications for the posture of the Self。 The logic of this culture is conflict that produces a security dilemma。The second is the Lockean culture。 Its principle is captured by the phrase “live and let live”。 While generating rival roles， unlike the Hobbesian culture， the logic of this culture is to recognize the Other’s sovereignty， life and liberty。 Rivalry of the Lockean culture does not make it less contingent in terms of conflict。 Conflict may occur at any moment。 The third is the Kantian culture。 Here the relationship between the Self and Other is characterized by friendship under the aphorism of “live in peace but go their separate ways”。 This culture leaves room for cooperation and creates a rather collective security in which the security of the Other is seen as the security of the Self – this is when Kantian norms are deeply internalized。It should be mentioned that Wendt suggests three degrees of internalization for each culture and argues that the transition from one degree to another， or from one culture to another presupposes a process （temporal and special frameworks）; that is how “state agents and systemic cultures are sustained by foreign policy practices， and sometimes transformed” （p。 313）。 On the basis of what has been established above， it seems that the tendency to look at International Relations from a constructivist lens requires four central points of focus:（i）tSocial being。 This point addresses the ontology/nature of states system。 For neorealists and neoliberals， it is a purely materialist and individualist ontology。 For constructivists， it is rather an idealist ontology。（ii）tMutual constitution。 A social structure leaves space for agency， that is， for individuals to influence and act upon the structure， as well as to be influenced by it （structuration）。 Wendt’s famous article （1992） captures this idea: “Anarchy Is What the States Make of It”。（iii）tSocial facts。 These includes culture， politics， economy， history， religion， etc。 Being indispensible elements to the formation of world politics， these social facts are seen as social phenomena which are constituted and informed by ideas and beliefs。 That is to say， the international relations phenomenon is not one that is to be understood and described as a physical， material object。 It is rather a social phenomenon requiring new ways of understanding （>“verstehen”）。（iv）tSocial cognition。 The issue of intentionality and intent in designing material objects or institutions invites issues about the role of human reasoning。 Social meaning attributed to these objects and institutions must be understood from within as the Weberian concept of “verstehen” suggests。 。。。more
Yunze
，
In the IR literature， it is as hard to bypass Wendt as it is to ignore constructivism， whose singular representativeness for a new school of theory counts as an enlightening trail-blazer that opens up a whole spectrum of possibilities aside from traditionally predominant paradigms of realism and liberalism。 By investigating and integrating sophisticated findings from sociology， linguistics， anthropology into his ingenious frame of analysis， Wendt's penetrating insights into the subtle connexion In the IR literature， it is as hard to bypass Wendt as it is to ignore constructivism， whose singular representativeness for a new school of theory counts as an enlightening trail-blazer that opens up a whole spectrum of possibilities aside from traditionally predominant paradigms of realism and liberalism。 By investigating and integrating sophisticated findings from sociology， linguistics， anthropology into his ingenious frame of analysis， Wendt's penetrating insights into the subtle connexion between social theory， epistemology， and international politics would only stimulate more fruitful points of exchanges and refinement for politics scholars interested in broadening their research agendas。 A must read for IR theories， though sufficient theoretical grounding in IR， politics， and even sociology is a definite prerequisite for any in-depth absorption！ 。。。more
Will
，
This is Wendt's seminal work on the approach of social constructivism in International Relations。 Not the easiest of reads， but a must for any IR scholars。 This is Wendt's seminal work on the approach of social constructivism in International Relations。 Not the easiest of reads， but a must for any IR scholars。 。。。more
Raj Agrawal
，
[Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it。 This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique – only as some words on how I engaged with this book for the purposes of building a theoretical framework on strategy。]-- Assigned portions of chapters 3 and 6 for School of Advanced Air & Space Studies – （pp。 165-190）In this first （turgid） assigned section， Wendt discusses his two effects of structure: causal and constitutive。 Causal [Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it。 This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique – only as some words on how I engaged with this book for the purposes of building a theoretical framework on strategy。]-- Assigned portions of chapters 3 and 6 for School of Advanced Air & Space Studies – （pp。 165-190）In this first （turgid） assigned section， Wendt discusses his two effects of structure: causal and constitutive。 Causal relationship lend themselves more to realist IR theory， while he argues for a more holistic approach – one that highlights the complexity of individual interests while considering behavior。 His concern seems to be that while cultural and normative variables can shape the behavior between individuals， they also can shape the individual as well as the context of the relationship。 Even further， the context may be a variable in of itself that affects the individuals as well as the normative variables。 Wendt is attempting to expand on the realist perspective of the individual – that it is not a single variable， but a representative of multiple variables within the context of other variables。 Culture matters， and culture can be as anticipatory as the traditional rational-actor model。（pp。 215-245）Wendt takes a pretty risky leap with his premise on the state （as perceived by all IR theorists）: “All sides seem to agree that corporate agency is actually a kind of structure: a structure of shared knowledge or discourse that enables individuals to engage in institutionalized collective action” （215）。 I would argue that neorealists do not consider the representative nature of states as they relate to the individual – this may be more of a liberal interpretation that would distort Wendt’s follow-on argument。 As an aside， his premise in the previous section regarding casual relationships also seems suspect to me: “Causal relationships can exist only between independently existing entities” （167）; however， this premise may hold for neorealists such as Waltz。This section is devoted to defending the state as a representative agency within the international structure， but with important caveats from realism。 The idea seems to be what distinguishes states from one another instead of material capability/resources， and these ideas have the potential to build relationships or create conflict between states。 He expresses concern about the rational-actor model （via anthropomorphization） in a similar fashion to Gilpin – that the domestic variables in each state may have more to do with how it behaves in the international system than Waltz gives it credit for。 I argue that Waltz hedges against this risk in his assumptions up front; however， there certainly is room for expansion on the role of domestic variables。 In addition to ideas， identities （corporate， type， role， and collective） play a significant role in how a state behaves。 Nevertheless， he concludes that states may very well be the basic unit in international politics。（pp。 324-343）Finally， in this section the author takes a look at how culture is passed onto subsequent generations within an identity group – through imitation and social learning。 It seems to be a play on “natural selection” from what I can tell， but the ideas are quite reasonable。 He takes a very optimistic view on the individual where “nurture” is a much stronger influence than “nature。” Successful behaviors are emulated and then passed on， and those behaviors that seem to make society better are passed between individuals for the long-term success of the identity group。 I feel he overlooks Waltz’s first image to his theory’s detriment。 If he had included it， it would have demonstrated an intellectual rigor that would have made his theory more useful as an alternative。 。。。more
Arys Aditya
，
Nah， harus ada yang menerjemahkan buku ini ke Bahasa Indonesia， supaya mahasiswa HI di Indonesia tidak terperangkap ke Realisme/Neorealisme dan Liberalisme/Neoliberalisme saja。 Harus！Wendt， yang sangat tersohor lewat kata 'Anarchy is What States Make of It' melahirkan salah satu aliran filsafat paling kuat HI melalui buku ini: Konstruktivisme Sosial。 Maka untuk buku sekelas itu， sudah semestinya telah diterjemahkan。 Nah， harus ada yang menerjemahkan buku ini ke Bahasa Indonesia， supaya mahasiswa HI di Indonesia tidak terperangkap ke Realisme/Neorealisme dan Liberalisme/Neoliberalisme saja。 Harus！Wendt， yang sangat tersohor lewat kata 'Anarchy is What States Make of It' melahirkan salah satu aliran filsafat paling kuat HI melalui buku ini: Konstruktivisme Sosial。 Maka untuk buku sekelas itu， sudah semestinya telah diterjemahkan。 。。。more
Barry McCulloch
，
Although stuck in its own 'via media'， Wendt makes an invaluable contribution to contemporary IR theory。 Although stuck in its own 'via media'， Wendt makes an invaluable contribution to contemporary IR theory。 。。。more
Nisa
，
Wow， that was a hard one to read。 Although "Anarchy is what states make of it。" sounds quite simple， this book is so much more than just that。 Trying to create a via media between existing IR theories that seem to be incompatible with each other， Wendt uses a more holist and idealist approach to IR， while also borrowing the concept of anarchy from Neorealism （especially Waltz's Neorealism）。 It is important to add that he also disagress with Waltz on various points， though。At first glance， you mi Wow， that was a hard one to read。 Although "Anarchy is what states make of it。" sounds quite simple， this book is so much more than just that。 Trying to create a via media between existing IR theories that seem to be incompatible with each other， Wendt uses a more holist and idealist approach to IR， while also borrowing the concept of anarchy from Neorealism （especially Waltz's Neorealism）。 It is important to add that he also disagress with Waltz on various points， though。At first glance， you might see him as a constructivist。 Well， he himself claims his theorizing to be thin constructivism: it is not "ideas all the way down" as radical constructivists or poststructuralists would claim， but he argues that there are ultimately a material basis for everything， eventhough the values and interests in those very same things are constituted of ideas。 This is one his attempts to 'harmonize' two radical views。On cultures of anarchy， Wendt sees three different types of anarchy: Hobbesian， Lockean， and Kantian。 These three are also divided into three degrees of internalization。And there is still so much more in the book which would take me forever to summarize here。All in all， this book is definitely a must for anyone who wants to study IR deeper。 It enriches one's understanding of other IR theories and shows that it is possible to do IR theorizing without being entirely radical。 Two thumbs up！ 。。。more
Eric
，
Alexander Wendt， in his Social Theory of International Politics， explicitly takes aim at Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work， Theory of International Politics。 Wendt， powerfully arguing that Waltz’s characterization of anarchy in the international system is underspecified， makes the claim that distribution of ideas are a key underlying causal factor for anarchy and thus conflict， as opposed to Waltz’s distribution of capabilities。 At first glance， Wendt’s focus on the distribution of ideas is a seeming Alexander Wendt， in his Social Theory of International Politics， explicitly takes aim at Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work， Theory of International Politics。 Wendt， powerfully arguing that Waltz’s characterization of anarchy in the international system is underspecified， makes the claim that distribution of ideas are a key underlying causal factor for anarchy and thus conflict， as opposed to Waltz’s distribution of capabilities。 At first glance， Wendt’s focus on the distribution of ideas is a seemingly major advance for international relations theory， yet Wendt’s analysis is not as revolutionary as it initially appears; though he undermines the logic of certain key Waltzian claims， Wendt is unable to convincingly show that concern for survival might not retain its paramount position in relations between states。 As a result， even if Wendt is able to convincingly move beyond Theory of International Politics， his conclusions are far more circumscribed than might be initially assumed。 Wendt’s argument strikes at the heart of Theory of International Politics by focusing on the Waltzian assumption that systemic anarchy is constant and that interests necessarily follow from that anarchy。 Wendt’s central critique of Waltz’s theory is that， ‘Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which。 U。S。 military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba， despite their similar “structural” positions’。 If states are not pre-determined to act in a particular way toward other states with equal structural attributes to one another， then Waltz’s theory is incomplete and there is a need to further explain these empirical irregularities。 Because states act differently towards other states with the same capabilities， Wendt argues that interests cannot be accounted for purely by Waltz’s anarchy。 This is a major step forward because if interests are indeed exogenous to Waltz’s notion of anarchy， then it begs the question of what determines these interests。 Yet， Wendt limits the cutting nature of this critique by agreeing with Waltz that anarchy does exist – that there certainly is no leviathan or overarching authority within the international system。 What accounts for these different interests therefore is not a lack of anarchy， but rather different types of anarchies。 This is a key conceptual shift because it subsequently refocuses the debate on what determines when each type of anarchy occurs （Hobbesian， Lockean， or Kantian）。 At this point， Wendt argues that the distribution of ideas about these anarchies， determined by processes of socialization， is what really explains the international system。 By increasing the number of potential anarchies， Wendt is able to move the causal chain back multiple notches and unleash the possibility for systemic change。 Such a move seems to have great conceptual and applicable promise because if the anarchy of the system varies and if that variation has cooperative or non-warlike manifestations， the potential for positive systemic change （specifically in Wendt’s language from a 1st order Hobbesian to 3rd order Kantian world） exists。 Despite this move however， Wendt’s argument runs into significant problems that undermine this potential。 The first is Wendt’s claim regarding state interests。 Wendt tries to move the debate away from a focus solely on state survival by both suggesting that other types of anarchies and other types of interests exist that often play important roles。 Along this second line of reasoning， Wendt suggests three other potential interests that states follow: autonomy， collective well-being， and self-esteem。 The problem with this approach is that Wendt incorrectly claims that a stable hierarchy of interests does not exist。 Though states do have each of these interests， Wendt’s suggestion that each of these interests are required for the long-term survival of the state does not recognize that some are more important than others。 Indeed， it seems that physical survival of the state would be predominately important to a state because without it， it would not be possible to pursue the other interests。 Subsequently， if survival is the pre-eminent interest of states， then this suggests a serious limitation to the potential revolutionary nature of Wendt’s claim of the existence of multiple anarchies。 To illustrate， consider the prescriptive potential of having socially constructed anarchies。 If these anarchies could be constructed over time， one could create the least conflictual one。 If， regardless of the type of anarchy in existence， interest does not change or does not change very much （e。g。 state survival is still paramount）， this suggests that changes in forms of anarchy are not as important as Wendt claims and that socialization is not predominantly important in determining interests。 Because state security is the most important value for state survival， the prescriptive argument that changes in types of anarchy could have a significant ameliorative effect is undermined。 Second， though Wendt argues that social process can change the system， this problematically presupposes that states can overcome previously entrenched social systems to identify in new ways。 Wendt acknowledges the possibility of change over time and explicitly argues that such a possibility provides for a more optimistic approach to IR than what Waltz has previously offered but also offers the caveat that such change might actually be more difficult in systems of entrenched distributions of ideas。 While recognizing the difficulties， he claims， both in Social Theory of International Politics and elsewhere that the prospect for this socialization leading to change exists because states were， at one time， pre-social and through first contacts able to form opinions of other states。 Because of this initial process of socialization， which was not determined to be hostile， Wendt reasons that the possibility for change continues to exist in international relations。 The problem with this optimism is that it is unclear whether states， in their initial ‘pre-social’ forms， were actually these blank slates。 As Jonathan Mercer has shown via experimental testing， human subjects in groups will form negative opinions of out-group members regardless of whether the in-group members have had previous contact with the out-group members。 Using this data， Mercer concludes that even in these ‘pre-social stages’， groups are predisposed to be hostile towards one another: Once we assume that we have two states， we can assume each will compete against the other regardless of the other’s behavior。 Competition need not be triggered by economic or security concerns and is not necessarily function of selfishness or limited resources; instead， competition results from categorization， comparison， and a need for a positive social identity。 Thus Wendt’s argument that there is some blank slate which serves as a starting point appears incorrect。 If no blank slate exists， then Wendt cannot accurately claim that the movement from a blank slate to a process of socialization occurred and the optimism of his reconceptualization is significantly dampened。 Wendt tries to address this problem by recognizing Mercer’s assertion but claiming that， even though groups form in-group/out-group notions of identity before processes of socialization， this does not dispose them a priori to enmity。 If they are not initially hostile， then the possibility exists for these states to become socialized to cooperation。 This possibility might be true according to his theory， but， according to Mercer’s Social Interaction Theory， the possibility is nothing more than theoretical – interactions between individuals and states will not， in reality， produce non-competitive relations。 This is because any of the mechanisms Wendt posits as necessary to socialize units often increase misunderstanding and merely reflect ethnocentric projections rather than accurate communications。 The resulting picture is that， even if states were blank slates which could be socialized， the likelihood of positive socialization leading away from the Hobbesian world of anarchy is essentially nil。 This image points to the larger conclusion that， though Wendt’s theory is a significant break from Waltz’s， it is not nearly as revolutionary， especially in its optimism， than it initially appears。 Wendt’s positing of state survival as the most important issue for states， combined with the theoretically mutable but seemingly practically immutable identities of states seems to leave us much in the same position as Waltz’s work did。 In this way， Wendt’s world resembles Waltz’s and will for any foreseeable future。 Despite this limited scope， Social Theory of International Politics still moves the conceptualization of international relations forward significantly and at least introduces the theoretical possibility of change。 。。。more
Chris
，
So Wendt's another IR guy who you can't ignore， even if you don't quite buy his ideas。 He includes an excellent justification of science， although he's defining science a little broadly than I appreciate。 He's definitely among the "smarter" constructivists， as he takes strategic action seriously。 Unfortunately， while his approach is compelling， few constructivists can tell us where norms come from in a way that satisfies rationalist concerns with the second-order problems inherent to making norm So Wendt's another IR guy who you can't ignore， even if you don't quite buy his ideas。 He includes an excellent justification of science， although he's defining science a little broadly than I appreciate。 He's definitely among the "smarter" constructivists， as he takes strategic action seriously。 Unfortunately， while his approach is compelling， few constructivists can tell us where norms come from in a way that satisfies rationalist concerns with the second-order problems inherent to making norms matter （if you violate the norm， and it's costly for me to sanction you for doing so， why do I sanction you？ When does my adherence to a norm overcome these costs？）。 Also， Wendt's unwillingness to do any empirical work is a bit of bother。 。。。more
Jonathan
，