Nonfiction

The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine

The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine

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  • Author：Michael Lewis
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Summary

The #1 New York Times bestseller: "It is the work of our greatest financial journalist， at the top of his game。 And it's essential reading。"—Graydon Carter， Vanity Fair

The real story of the crash began in bizarre feeder markets where the sun doesn't shine and the SEC doesn't dare， or bother， to tread: the bond and real estate derivative markets where geeks invent impenetrable securities to profit from the misery of lower- and middle-class Americans who can't pay their debts。 The smart people who understood what was or might be happening were paralyzed by hope and fear; in any case， they weren't talking。




Michael Lewis creates a fresh， character-driven narrative brimming with indignation and dark humor， a fitting sequel to his #1 bestseller Liar's Poker。 Out of a handful of unlikely-really unlikely-heroes， Lewis fashions a story as compelling and unusual as any of his earlier bestsellers， proving yet again that he is the finest and funniest chronicler of our time。

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Reviews

Martin ，

Impresionante el cochinero en la crisis financiera de 2007-2008。 Causada por el abuso y la codicia de los bancos titánicos de Wall Street。Lewis logra una gran descripción de los hechos y causas， a través de las historias de los individuos quienes vieron venir la crisis con muchos años de anticipación。

Mikael Cohen ，

Great story but I had hard times to understand the half of financial terms in the book。 One shall know a lot about finances before starting the book

Nathan Mukoma ，

Amazing read。 Witty， funny， insightful and some bits of tragedy。 It almost feels like that escape reading when you are diving into a fictional work。 Michael Lewis somehow manage to turn a story that would normally be 'boring' into a formidable tale。 Amazing read。 Witty， funny， insightful and some bits of tragedy。 It almost feels like that escape reading when you are diving into a fictional work。 Michael Lewis somehow manage to turn a story that would normally be 'boring' into a formidable tale。 。。。more

GOKUL S M ，

Financial crime ❤️

Rafa ，

This is a difficult book to rate。 I feel like it deserves five stars， yet I would only give it three。 Let me list my reasons。Five stars because the author ventured to do what no others in their sane minds would have attempted: to explain the 2007-2008 crisis on Wall Street in layman’s terms。 This is truly a commendable effort， due to the enormously complicated nature of the material he is working with。 Five stars， furthermore， because his starting point are the people who populated the scene。 Th This is a difficult book to rate。 I feel like it deserves five stars， yet I would only give it three。 Let me list my reasons。Five stars because the author ventured to do what no others in their sane minds would have attempted: to explain the 2007-2008 crisis on Wall Street in layman’s terms。 This is truly a commendable effort， due to the enormously complicated nature of the material he is working with。 Five stars， furthermore， because his starting point are the people who populated the scene。 This lends an indispensably （beautifully） human dimension to the book: it not only talks about what the crisis was and how it came about， but how it was experienced up close and in the thick of it。 Ultimately， this sets it apart as a great novel。 It must also be noted that to reach this level of realism， there was a sublime convergence of factors at work。 Michael Lewis is a former stock trader， having spent three years at Salomon Brothers himself。 This provided him with a great understanding of Wallstreet already。 It also blessed him with connections to the people on the inside， neccessary to craft the story the way it is: packed with information and details he could have obtained in no other way but through extensive interviews with the subjects。 The book drops these details left and right as if they were nothing， but the work behind-the-scenes in order to achieve this sort of carelessness must have amounted to a staggering amount。 Thirdly， the fact that he left Wallstreet early enough to dissociate from it and become， effectively， an outsider。 This was an advantage in that he was not dragged into the crisis and the whirlpool of his own experiences of it （which could have coloured the book differently） but instead could remain far removed from it - objective and fresh like snow。 His account keeps a bird eye’s perspective at all times。 These factors （and his writing talent） positioned him as maybe one of only a handful in the world who could’ve pulled this off。 Now why only three stars then？ Because this books so obviously could’ve used an editor。 The crisis is a complicated matter， so when getting to the core of it the explanation should be as simple and succinct as possible。 Though Lewis gives a few stellar metaphors （most notably on p。144）， the writing style blundered too often。 Sentences that were opaque， technical terms that were only explained dozens of pages later， technical terms that were assumed to be known to the reader and never explained at all， important information that belonged together scattered over different chapters or key points that were skimmed over too quickly all did the book a disservice。 In short: （Writing） The novel part was great， the technical part was a mess。 （World-building） The general architecture was brilliant， on a chapter level this book could’ve benefitted from so much more structure and clarity。 I often felt as if the author was explaining me something that I had to figure out all on my own， because he wasn’t being clear enough。 It required a lot of concentration and slowed down my reading pace considerably。 It bothered me to the point that it subtracted two full points off my reading experience。 However， I got some stunning insights from this reading experience that I simply cannot ignore and made this book particularly worthwhile to read。 So I am happy to even out it out to 4 out of 5 stars <3 。。。more

Elliot ，

Legendary book。 Contains the greatest final page I've ever read in a nonfiction book Legendary book。 Contains the greatest final page I've ever read in a nonfiction book 。。。more

Chris Sheridan ，

The Big Short is the first Michael Lewis book I've read and I was impressed。 Lewis explains an in depth and murky corner of the trading world while exposing greed and the fragility of our economy。 If you don't understand or know about the 2008 housing crisis you should read this book。 I would also reccomend it to true crime， contemporary history and economic readers。 The Big Short is the first Michael Lewis book I've read and I was impressed。 Lewis explains an in depth and murky corner of the trading world while exposing greed and the fragility of our economy。 If you don't understand or know about the 2008 housing crisis you should read this book。 I would also reccomend it to true crime， contemporary history and economic readers。 。。。more

Andrew Breza ，

The Big Short tells the story of a group of Wall Street outsiders who saw the madness in the housing market and found a way to profit from it。

Dedra ，

I liked the 2 main characters and can see how their life's have influenced their take on life。 Their individual stories did make me feel quite sad at times though。 I liked the 2 main characters and can see how their life's have influenced their take on life。 Their individual stories did make me feel quite sad at times though。 。。。more

Pall ，

I like businesss and this fits the bill。

Tom Greulich ，

Very entertaining， not a great account of the crisis though。

Horace ，

The characters were complex with understandable motivations， and had their own flaws， making them human。

Nathan ，

Michael Lewis’ The Big Short details the lead up and collapse of the real estate market in 2008; subprime mortgage loans （interest only negative-amortizing， no-doc， and 2 year teaser rates to boot） were packaged into subprime mortgage bonds which were packaged into subprime mortgage CDOs and given triple-A ratings due to their “diversity”， however， Burry then Lippman then Eisman were the early investors who bet the most once they caught on to this discrepancy and used CDSs （in which the buyer pa Michael Lewis’ The Big Short details the lead up and collapse of the real estate market in 2008; subprime mortgage loans （interest only negative-amortizing， no-doc， and 2 year teaser rates to boot） were packaged into subprime mortgage bonds which were packaged into subprime mortgage CDOs and given triple-A ratings due to their “diversity”， however， Burry then Lippman then Eisman were the early investors who bet the most once they caught on to this discrepancy and used CDSs （in which the buyer pays premiums to the seller who in return guarantees the payment/interest of the fixed income asset） to place their bet against the collapse of the original subprime mortgage loans。The willingness of a Wall Street investment bank to pay me hundreds of thousands of dollars to dispense investment advice to grown-ups remains a mystery to me to this day I was twenty-four years old， with no experience of， or particular interest in， guessing which stocks and bonds would rise and which would fall。 Wall Street's essential function was to allocate capital: to decide who should get it and who should not。 Believe me when I tell you that I hadn't the first clue。By pretty much every account， Eisman was a curious character。 And he'd walked onto Wall Street at the very beginning of a curious phase。 The creation of the mortgage bond market， a decade earlier， had extended Wall Street into a place it had never before been: the debts of ordinary Americans。 A mortgage bond was a claim on the cash flows from a pool of thousands of individual home mortgages。 These cash flows were always problematic， as the borrowers had the right to pay off any time they pleased。 This was the single biggest reason that bond investors initially had been reluctant to invest in home mortgage loans: Mortgage borrowers typically repaid their loans only when interest rates fell， and they could refinance more cheaply， leaving the owner of a mortgage bond holding a pile of cash， to invest at lower interest rates。 The investor in home loans didn't know how long his investment would last， only that he would get his money back when he least wanted it。 To limit this uncertainty， the people I'd worked with at Salomon Brothers， who created the mortgage bond market， had come up with a clever solution。 They took giant pools of home loans and carved up the payments made by homeowners into pieces， called tranches。 The buyer of the first tranche was like the owner of the ground floor in a flood: He got hit with the first wave of mortgage prepayments。 In exchange， he received a higher interest rate。 The buyer of the second tranche-the second story of the skyscraper-took the next wave of prepayments and in exchange received the second highest interest rate， and so on。 The investor in the top floor of the building received the lowest rate of interest but had the greatest assurance that his investment wouldn't end before he wanted it to。Vinny had to teach himself。 When he was done， he had an explanation for the unpleasant odor wafting from the subprime mortgage industry that Eisman had detected。 These companies disclosed their ever-growing earnings， but not much else。 One of the many items they failed to disclose was the delinquency rate of the home loans they were making。allowed to book as profit the expected future value of those loans。 The accounting rules allowed them to assume the loans would be repaid， and not prematurely。 This assumption became the engine of their doom。"Eventually I saw that all the subprime sectors were either being prepaid or going bad at an incredible rate，" said Vinny。 "I was just seeing stunningly high delinquency rates in these pools。" The interest rate on the loans wasn't high enough to justify the risk of lending to this particular slice of the American population。 It was as if the ordinary rules of finance had been suspended in response to a social problem。 A thought crossed his mind: How do you make poor people feel wealthy when wages are stagnant？ You give them cheap loans。Eisman published his report in September 1997， in the middle of what appeared to be one of the greatest economic booms in U。S。 his tory。 Less than a year later， Russia defaulted and a hedge fund called Long-Term Capital Management went bankrupt。 In the subsequent flight to safety， the early subprime lenders were denied capital and promptly went bankrupt en masse。 Their failure was interpreted as an indictment of their accounting practices， which allowed them to record profits before they were realized。 No one but Vinny， so far as Vinny could tell， ever really understood the crappiness of the loans they had made。By early 2005 Eisman's little group shared a sense that a great many people working on Wall Street couldn't possibly understand what they were doing。 The subprime mortgage machine was up and running again， as if it had never broken down in the first place。 If the first act of subprime lending had been freaky， this second act was terrifying。 Thirty billion dollars was a big year for subprime lending in the mid 1990s。 In 2000 there had been $130 billion in subprime mortgage lend ing， and 55 billion dollars' worth of those loans had been repackaged as mortgage bonds。 In 2005 there would be $625 billion in subprime mortgage loans， $507 billion of which found its way into mortgage bonds。As early as 2004， if you looked at the numbers， you could clearly see the decline in lending standards。 In Burry's view， standards had not just fallen but hit bottom。 The bottom even had a name: the interest only negative-amortizing adjustable-rate subprime mortgage。 You， the home buyer， actually were given the option of paying nothing at all， and rolling whatever interest you owed the bank into a higher principal balance。In his quarterly letters he coined a phrase to describe what he thought was happening: "the extension of credit by instrument。" That is， a lot of people couldn't actually afford to pay their mortgages the old-fashioned way， and so the lenders were dreaming up new instruments to justify handing them new money。 "It was a clear sign that lenders had lost it， constantly degrading their own standards to grow loan volumes，" Burry said。 He could see why they were doing this: They didn't keep the loans but sold them to Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo and the rest， which pack aged them into bonds and sold them off。 A credit default swap on a thirty-year subprime mortgage bond was a bet designed to last for thirty years， in theory。 He figured that it would take only three to pay it off。 The only problem was that there was no such thing as a credit default swap on a subprime mortgage bond， not that he could see。。。 There was no point buying insurance from a bank that went out of business the minute the insurance became valuable。Inside of three years， credit default swaps on subprime mortgage bonds would become a trillion-dollar market and precipitate hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of losses inside big Wall Street firms。 Yet， when Michael Burry pestered the firms in the beginning of 2005， only Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs had any real interest in continuing the conversation。 No one on Wall Street， as far as he could tell， saw what he was seeing。He'd moved back to San Jose， buried his father， remarried， and been misdiagnosed by experts as bipolar when he shut down his Web site and announced he was quitting neurology to become a money manager。 The chairman of the Stanford Department of Neurology thought he'd lost his mind and told him to take a year to think it over， but he'd already thought it over。 "I found it fascinating and seemingly true，" he said， "that if I could run a portfolio well， then I could achieve success in life， and that it wouldn't matter what kind of person I was perceived to be， even though I felt I was a good person deep down。" His $40，000 in assets against $145，000 in student loans posed the question of exactly what portfolio he would run。A doctor had failed to spot the cancer on an X-ray， and the family had received a small settlement。 The father disapproved of the stock market， but the payout from his death funded his son into it。 His mother was able to kick in $20，000 from her settlement， his three brothers kicked in $10，000 each of theirs。 With that， Dr。 Michael Burry opened Scion Capital。When the Goldman Sachs saleswoman called Mike Burry and told him that her firm would be happy to sell him credit default swaps in $100 million chunks， Burry guessed， rightly， that Goldman wasn't ultimately on the other side of his bets。 Goldman would never be so stupid as to make huge naked bets that millions of insolvent Americans would repay their home loans。The party on the other side of his bet against subprime mortgage bonds was the triple-A-rated insurance company AIG-American International Group， Inc。 Or， rather， a unit of AIG called AIG FP。The long answer was that there were huge sums of money to be made， if you could somehow get them re-rated as triple-A， thereby lowering their perceived risk， however dishonestly and artificially。 This is what Goldman Sachs had cleverly done。 Having gathered 100 ground floors from 100 different subprime mortgage buildings （100 different triple-B-rated bonds）， they persuaded the rating agencies that these weren't， as they might appear， all exactly the same things。 They were another diversified portfolio of assets！ The rating agencies， who were paid fat fees by Goldman Sachs and other Wall Street firms for each deal they rated， pronounced 80 percent of the new tower of debt triple-A。 The CDO was， in effect， a credit laundering service for the residents of Lower Middle Class America。 For Wall Street it was a machine that turned lead into gold。The losses， by design， were no big deal; the losses were part of the plan。 They had more losers than winners， but their losses， the cost of the options， had been trivial compared to their gains。 There was a possible explanation for their success， which Charlie and Jamie had only intuited but which Ben， who had priced options for a big Wall Street firm， came ready to explain: Financial options were systematically mispriced。 The market often underestimated the likelihood of extreme moves in prices。 The options market also tended to presuppose that the distant future would look more like the present than it usually did。 Finally， the price of an option was a function of the volatility of the underlying stock or currency or commodity， and the options market tended to rely on the recent past to determine how volatile a stock or currency or commodity might be。A CDO， in their view， was essentially just a pile of triple-B-rated mortgage bonds。 Wall Street firms had conspired with the rating agencies to represent the pile as a diversified collection of assets， but anyone with eyes could see that if one triple-B subprime mortgage went bad， most would go bad， as they were all vulnerable to the same economic forces。To wipe out any triple-B bond-the ground floor of the building-all that was needed was a 7 percent loss in the underlying pool of home loans。 That same 7 percent loss would thus wipe out， entirely， any CDO made up it。Of course， if you are going to gamble on a CDO， it helps to know what， exactly， is inside a CDO， and they still didn't。 The sheer difficulty they had obtaining the information suggested that most investors were simply skipping this stage of their due diligence。 Each CDO contained pieces of a hundred different mortgage bonds-which in turn held thousands of different loans。 It was impossible， or nearly so， to find out which pieces， or which loans。 Even the rating agencies， who they at first assumed would be the most informed source， hadn't a clue。 "I called S&P and asked if they could tell me what was in a CDO，" said Charlie。 "And they said， 'Oh yeah， we're working on that。"There had been hundreds of CDO deals-400 billion dollars' worth of the things had been created in just the past three years and yet none， as far as they could tell， had been properly vetted。It made no sense。 The CDO manager's job was to select the Wall Street firm to supply him with subprime bonds that served as the col lateral for CDO investors， and then to vet the bonds themselves。 The CDO manager was further charged with monitoring the hundred or so individual subprime bonds inside each CDO， and replacing the bad ones， before they went bad， with better ones。 That， however， was mere theory; in practice， the sorts of investors who handed their money to Wing Chau， and thus bought the triple-A-rated tranche of CDOs German banks， Taiwanese insurance companies， Japanese farmers' unions， European pension funds， and， in general， entities more or less required to invest in triple-A-rated bonds-did so precisely because they were meant to be foolproof， impervious to losses， and unnecessary to monitor or even think about very much。 The CDO manager， in practice， didn't do much of anything， which is why all sorts of unlikely people suddenly hoped to become one。There was a reason Greg Lippmann had picked Wing Chau to sit beside Steve Eisman。 If Wing Chau detected Eisman's disapproval， he didn't show it; instead， he spoke to Eisman in a tone of condescension。 I know better。 "Then he says something that blew my mind，" said Eisman。 "He says， 'I love guys like you who short my market。 Without you I don't have anything to buy。" Say that again。 He says to me， 'The more excited that you get that you're right， the more trades you'll do， and the more trades you do， the more product for me。"" That's when Steve Eisman finally understood the madness of the machine。 He and Vinny and Danny had been making these side bets with Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank on the fate of the triple-B tranche of subprime mortgage-backed bonds without fully understanding why those firms were so eager to accept them。 Now he was face-to-face with the actual human being on the other side of his credit default swaps。 Now he got it: The credit default swaps， filtered through the CDOs， were being used to replicate bonds backed by actual home loans。 There weren't enough Americans with shitty credit taking out loans to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product。"Whatever that guy is buying， I want to short it。" Lippmann took it as a joke， but Eisman was completely serious: He wanted to place a bet specifically against Wing Chau。 "Greg，" Eisman said， "I want to short his paper。 Sight unseen。"Lippmann had introduced them to the people inside Deutsche Bank peddling CDOs to investors， and these helpful Deutsche Bank people had arranged for Eisman and his partners to meet the bond market's financial intermediaries: the mortgage lenders， the banks that packaged the mortgage loans into mortgage bonds， the bankers who repackaged the bonds into CDOs， and the rating agencies that blessed the process at each stage。 The only interested parties missing from the conference were the ultimate borrowers， the American home buyers， but even they， in a way， were on hand， serving drinks， spinning wheels， and rolling dice。As most of these loans were structured， however， the homeowner would pay a fixed teaser rate of， say， 8 percent for the first two years， and then， at the start of the third year， the interest rate would sky rocket to， say， 12 percent， and thereafter it would float at permanently high levels。 It was easy to understand why originators like Option One and New Century preferred to make these sorts of loans: After two years the borrowers either defaulted or， if their home price had risen， refinanced。 To them the default was a matter of indifference， as they kept none of the risk of the loan; the refinance was merely a chance to charge the borrower new fees。 Bouncing between the rating agencies and people he knew in the subprime bond packaging business， Eisman learned that the rating agencies simply assumed that the borrower would be just as likely to make his payments when the interest rate on the loan was 12 percent as when it was 8 percent-which meant more cash flow for the bondholders。 Bonds backed by floating-rate mortgages received higher ratings than bonds backed by fixed-rate onesWith no one else buying and selling exactly what Michael Burry was buying and selling， there was no hard evidence what these things were worth-so they were worth whatever Gold man Sachs and Morgan Stanley said they were worth。 Burry detected a pattern in how they managed their market: All good news about the housing market， or the economy， was treated as an excuse to demand collateral from Scion Capital; all bad news was pooh-poohed as in some way irrelevant to the specific bets he had made。At the end of the quarter， he'd report that the fund was up more than 100 percent。 By the end of the year， in a portfolio of less than $550 million， he would have realized profits of more than $720 million。 Still he heard not a peep from his investors。 "Even when it was clear it was a big year and I was proven right， there was no triumph in it，" he said。 "Making money was nothing like I thought it would be。" To his founding investor， Gotham Capital， he shot off an unsolicited e-mail that said only， "You're welcome。" He'd already decided to kick them out of the fund， and insist that they sell their stake in his business。 When they asked him to suggest a price， he replied， "How about you keep the tens of millions you nearly prevented me from earning for you last year and we call it even？"The monster was exploding。 Yet on the streets of Manhattan there was no sign anything important had just happened。 The force that would affect all of their lives was hidden from their view。 That was the problem with money: What people did with it had consequences， but they were so remote from the original action that the mind never connected the one with the other。 The teaser-rate loans you make to people who will never be able to repay them will go bad not immediately but in two years， when their interest rates rise。 The various bonds you make from those loans will go bad not as the loans go bad but months later， after a lot of tedious foreclosures and bankruptcies and forced sales。 The various CDOs you make from the bonds will go bad not right then but after some trustee sorts out whether there will ever be enough cash to pay them off。 Whereupon the end owner of the CDO receives a little note， Dear Sir， We regret to inform you that your bond no longer exists。。。 But the biggest lag of all was right here， on the streets。 How long would it take before the people walking back and forth in front of St。 Patrick's Cathedral figured out what had just happened to them？ 。。。more

Paula ，

A book based on true events is still so far from reality。 Merideth Whitney actually played a huge roll in discovering the gaps of the financial system。 Jet the male author decided to erase and discredit her。 A questionable choice for a book classified as non fiction。

Matt Pisini ，

Great insight into a very complex period in financial history！

Heskarioth ，

Great book。

Luis Cuevas ，

Cómo unos cuántos lograron predecir la crisis hipotecaria del 2008… lo impensable ocurrió。Michael Lewis nuevamente describe a lo personajes de una manera memorable， explica conceptos complejos de una manera simple y lo más importante… me abrió los ojos。El sistema financiero tiene vulnerabilidades。Intereses egoístas generan las decisiones más absurdas。El impacto más grande sigue siendo para el pueblo。Y hoy… parece que no hemos aprendido nada。Si quieres replantear tus creencias sobre el sistema fi Cómo unos cuántos lograron predecir la crisis hipotecaria del 2008… lo impensable ocurrió。Michael Lewis nuevamente describe a lo personajes de una manera memorable， explica conceptos complejos de una manera simple y lo más importante… me abrió los ojos。El sistema financiero tiene vulnerabilidades。Intereses egoístas generan las decisiones más absurdas。El impacto más grande sigue siendo para el pueblo。Y hoy… parece que no hemos aprendido nada。Si quieres replantear tus creencias sobre el sistema financiero y disfrutar una historia llena de detalles apasionantes。 Lee “The Big Short”。 。。。more

Alexandre Contreras ，

Good book that explains the 2008 financial crisis and how some people saw it coming。 It is somewhat technical and can be overwhelming for readers who aren't familiar with the financial jargon， but overall an interesting read。 Michael Lewis' writing makes it as simple as possible。 Good book that explains the 2008 financial crisis and how some people saw it coming。 It is somewhat technical and can be overwhelming for readers who aren't familiar with the financial jargon， but overall an interesting read。 Michael Lewis' writing makes it as simple as possible。 。。。more

Krishnan ，

This book was outstanding。 This is the first non fiction that I couldn't get enough of and couldn't stop reading back to back pages。 Huge respect to Michael lewis This book was outstanding。 This is the first non fiction that I couldn't get enough of and couldn't stop reading back to back pages。 Huge respect to Michael lewis 。。。more

Esteban Roche ，

Ches gringos pt2

Thu Phương ，

Một cuốn sách hay về Đại khủng hoảng 2007 - 2008。 Sách là câu chuyện về những người quan sát được “biến” trước khi bong bóng nhà đất tại Mỹ xảy ra và từ đó kiếm tiền bằng cách bán khống thông qua việc đầu cơ Credit Default Swap từ các ngân hàng lớn （sau đó lại nhìn được bờ vực phá sản của các ngân hàng này lại tiếp tục bán các hợp đồng trên）。 Đồng thời họ cũng cố gắng cảnh báo cho tất cả mọi người nhưng bất lực。 Có lẽ có 2 lý do cho sự bất lực đó: 1 là sự cố gắng che đậy của chính phủ và các tổ Một cuốn sách hay về Đại khủng hoảng 2007 - 2008。 Sách là câu chuyện về những người quan sát được “biến” trước khi bong bóng nhà đất tại Mỹ xảy ra và từ đó kiếm tiền bằng cách bán khống thông qua việc đầu cơ Credit Default Swap từ các ngân hàng lớn （sau đó lại nhìn được bờ vực phá sản của các ngân hàng này lại tiếp tục bán các hợp đồng trên）。 Đồng thời họ cũng cố gắng cảnh báo cho tất cả mọi người nhưng bất lực。 Có lẽ có 2 lý do cho sự bất lực đó: 1 là sự cố gắng che đậy của chính phủ và các tổ chức tài chính， 2 là người mua thường không có kiến thức mà chạy theo thị trường。 Sách có nhiều thuật ngữ khó， bối cảnh dễ bị lạc nhưng đáng đọc。 Có thể xem phim “The Big Short” trước để hiểu về bối cảnh trước khi đọc sách （tên nhân vật bị đổi so với sách nên có thể gây “lú” ban đầu）。 Phim cũng là một tác phẩm thật sự đáng xem。 。。。more

KARTHIK B ，

Still looks reading Fiction to me？？？？！！ Such a stupidity at Wall Street！

Drago Saric ，

One of the best books on this topic。 Easy to understand and fun to read。

David ，

Loved the movie， love the book！Unfortunately， the thing we learn from history is that we never learn from history。The corrupt financial system is still at it。。。

Nicolas ，

This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers。 To view it， click here。 A recount on what led to the 2008 financial crisis。 Won't provide a rating as it is a purely informational book， but regarding that， the author did a fine job in interjecting humor to contrast the rather dull inner workings of the ordeal。 The crisis is fascinating in that it seems ridiculous how so many big name corporation could have allowed this to happen， but the actual details and logistics of the numbers made it a hard read。 A recount on what led to the 2008 financial crisis。 Won't provide a rating as it is a purely informational book， but regarding that， the author did a fine job in interjecting humor to contrast the rather dull inner workings of the ordeal。 The crisis is fascinating in that it seems ridiculous how so many big name corporation could have allowed this to happen， but the actual details and logistics of the numbers made it a hard read。 。。。more

Georgia Fanning ，

Lewis has a talent for explaining complex ideas

Lauren Porras ，

This is probably a case where watching the movie would improve my enjoyment of the book。 As someone who is not well-versed in financial management， I struggled to make sense of the nitty gritty details laying out the structure of the crisis。 That being said， I always enjoy Lewis’s ability to tell a story out of true events and the way that he gets to know his subjects。

Shreedhar Manek ，

I'm biased towards finance writers who have a penchant for simplifying complex financial information and events。 Michael Lewis， obviously， ranks up there。 So maybe the rating on this one can be disregarded。Before reading Big Short， I knew that the financial crisis was triggered by home loans that couldn't be repaid。 And that when house prices fell， it would make more sense for borrowers to just give up their houses instead of trying to repay their loans。 I had no idea of the specifics。 I do have I'm biased towards finance writers who have a penchant for simplifying complex financial information and events。 Michael Lewis， obviously， ranks up there。 So maybe the rating on this one can be disregarded。Before reading Big Short， I knew that the financial crisis was triggered by home loans that couldn't be repaid。 And that when house prices fell， it would make more sense for borrowers to just give up their houses instead of trying to repay their loans。 I had no idea of the specifics。 I do have some idea now （thanks， Michael！）， but honestly， my biggest takeaway from book isn't its causes and results。 My biggest takeaway is the observation of just how clueless everyone was about what was going on。 How nobody （apart from a handful outsiders） knew shit about what they were doing， but kept on doing that anyway。 This includes the CEOs of the big investment banks， traders， credit rating agencies， fund managers， insurance companies。 They were all clueless。 Somehow they had been fed the idea that house prices never fall and they ran with it until oblivion。 Because why shouldn't they have？ They all made a lot of money in the process。Oh， that's my second biggest takeaway。 Nothing new。 Just a testimony to the power of incentives。 All these participants had nothing to gain from acknowledging the impending crisis that their actions would result。 Sure， they could've shorted the market and earned a fair bit of money in the process--but why take that risk when you're going to be paid millions for ignoring it in the first place？ Why be right while risking being a pauper when you can continue your pristine life and be a millionaire instead？The third takeaway that I have from the book is that the world of finance loves its losers--but in a bad way。 You can be incompetent/defraud people/be clueless af and lose a million dollars but as long as that money wasn't *yours* （but the investors'）， it's all good。 Then， you were never a loser。 The financial kingdom comprises of middlemen who have little to lose while winning constantly， everytime。Big Short has only reinforced my belief that most complex sounding， jargony information is just an intentional obfuscation of simple ideas。 That's really what the financial crisis was。 Bankers took a pile of bullshit and covered it in layers and layers of bullshit， and then covered that with more bullshit， only to have bullshit that was so deep and so thick， that the same bankers that had covered it in those layers in the first place refused to believe that their handiwork could be bullshit at all。 They just all convinced themselves that they were geniuses and couldn't go wrong。Honestly， there were some bits where I struggled to understand what the hell was actually going on。 Not in the context of the book's narrative -- that was brilliant -- but what was happening with the financial product （the CDO）。 But you know what？ I'm quite okay with that。 I didn't understand it all。 But neither did Goldman。 。。。more

Jeff Birk ，

This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers。 To view it， click here。 I like Michael Lewis （particularly "Liar's Poker） and pretty much knew the content of this book but enjoy reviewing the facts behind perhaps the biggest financial collapse in history。 I could have done without all the f-words which were primarily quotes from the characters and not the author。 If you're looking for a better understanding of the housing bubble and subsequent pop， this is a good book。 I also read "Too Big to Fail" years ago which I also recommend。 Greed has always been connected to I like Michael Lewis （particularly "Liar's Poker） and pretty much knew the content of this book but enjoy reviewing the facts behind perhaps the biggest financial collapse in history。 I could have done without all the f-words which were primarily quotes from the characters and not the author。 If you're looking for a better understanding of the housing bubble and subsequent pop， this is a good book。 I also read "Too Big to Fail" years ago which I also recommend。 Greed has always been connected to Wall Street but the insane incentives attached to the greed herein was astoundingly stupid and the real downfall as the author points out。 And there is no doubt that some companies and individuals most at fault walked away with full pockets and not even a slap on the wrist。 。。。more

David Lopez ，

Written with introspective view， engaging and humorous。 Great detail on the biggest financial collapse of our generation。 A collapse that could have been avoided if the powers that be had been more responsible and less negligent。 instead the banks get bailed out and the taxes get passed on to working class。

Reference

google book https://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&q=The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine

hathitrust digital library https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/ls?q1=The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine&field1=ocr&a=srchls&ft=ft&lmt=ft

The British Library https://bll01.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/search?query=any,contains,The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine&tab=LibraryCatalog&search_scope=Not_BL_Suppress&vid=44BL_INST:BLL01&lang=en&offset=0