Philosophy

Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction

Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction

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  • Author：Samir Okasha
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Summary

How much faith should we place in what scientists tell us？ Is it possible for scientific knowledge to be fully 'objective'？ What， really， can be defined as science？ In the second edition of this Very Short Introduction， Samir Okasha explores the main themes and theories of contemporary philosophy of science， and investigates fascinating， challenging questions such as these。
Starting at the very beginning， with a concise overview of the history of science， Okasha examines the nature of fundamental practices such as reasoning， causation， and explanation。 Looking at scientific revolutions and the issue of scientific change， he asks whether there is a discernible pattern to the way scientific ideas change over time， and discusses realist versus anti-realist attitudes towards science。 He finishes by considering science today， and the social and ethical philosophical questions surrounding modern science。
ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area。 These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly。 Our expert authors combine facts， analysis， perspective， new ideas， and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable。

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Reviews

Anwarul Abeer ，

A pretty good start for philosophy of science。 Whoever reads it won't be disappointed I believe。 A pretty good start for philosophy of science。 Whoever reads it won't be disappointed I believe。 。。。more

Héctor Mata ，

Does what it says。 Overall， a fine introduction。 However， I did feel that Popper gets somewhat straw-manned， as his contributions to the philosophy of science go far beyond the demarcation problem。One section of the book that I enjoyed was the chapter on the realism/anti-realism debate， presented as a tit-for-tat review of the arguments on both sides。 I found it very well done for an introductory book， and being myself a layperson in the subject。

Amirreza Mahmoudzadeh-Sagheb ，

"Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction" by Samir OkashaIt was just ok。 As it is obvious from the title， it is a "Very Short Introduction" to the philosophy of science。 There are many other books about philosophy of science which discuss about such things deeper for sure。This is not a fiction book。 Therefore， it is not interesting or exciting which of course doesn't mean that it is not worth reading。 "Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction" by Samir OkashaIt was just ok。 As it is obvious from the title， it is a "Very Short Introduction" to the philosophy of science。 There are many other books about philosophy of science which discuss about such things deeper for sure。This is not a fiction book。 Therefore， it is not interesting or exciting which of course doesn't mean that it is not worth reading。 。。。more

Stone ，

"truth itself is relative to a paradigm" Study Notes:（view spoiler）[Realism & Anti-Realism The debate is between a position known as scientific realism and its converse， known as anti-realism or instrumentalism。 The contrast between realism and anti-realism is starkest for sciences which make claims about the unobservable region of reality。 Physics is the obvious example。 Physicists advance theories about atoms， electrons， quarks， leptons， and other strange entities， none of which can be observed "truth itself is relative to a paradigm" Study Notes:（view spoiler）[Realism & Anti-Realism The debate is between a position known as scientific realism and its converse， known as anti-realism or instrumentalism。 The contrast between realism and anti-realism is starkest for sciences which make claims about the unobservable region of reality。 Physics is the obvious example。 Physicists advance theories about atoms， electrons， quarks， leptons， and other strange entities， none of which can be observed in the normal sense of the word; moreover these theories are typically couched in a highly mathematical language。 So physical theories are rather different from the commonsense descriptions of the world that non-scientists give。 Nonetheless， realists argue， these theories are attempts to describe the world—the subatomic world—and the measure of their success is whether what they say about the world is true。 In this respect， scientific theories and commonsense descriptions of the world are on a par。 We can see why anti-realism is sometimes called ‘instrumentalism’—it regards scientific theories as instruments for helping us predict observable phenomena， rather than as attempts to describe the underlying nature of reality。Kuhn （incommensurability）Of course， scientific revolutions happen relatively infrequently—most of the time any given science is not in a state of revolution。 Kuhn coined the term ‘normal science’ to describe the ordinary day-to-day activities that scientists engage in when their discipline is not undergoing revolutionary change。 Central to Kuhn’s account of normal science is the concept of a paradigm。 A paradigm consists of two main components: first， a set of fundamental theoretical assumptions which all members of a scientific community accept; secondly， a set of ‘exemplars’ or particular scientific problems which have been solved by means of those theoretical assumptions， and which appear in the textbooks of the discipline in question。normal scientists are not trying to test the paradigm。 On the contrary， they accept the paradigm unquestioningly， and conduct their research within the limits it sets。 If a normal scientist gets an experimental result which conflicts with the paradigm， they will usually assume that their experimental technique is faulty， not that the paradigm is wrong。But over time anomalies are discovered—phenomena which simply cannot be reconciled with the paradigm， however hard scientists try。 When anomalies are few they tend to just get ignored。 But as anomalies accumulate， a burgeoning sense of crisis envelops the scientific community。 Confidence in the existing paradigm breaks down， and the process of normal science grinds to a halt。 This marks the beginning of a period of ‘revolutionary science’ as Kuhn calls it。 During such periods， fundamental scientific ideas are up for grabs。 A variety of alternatives to the old paradigm are proposed， and eventually a new paradigm becomes established。theory choice in science was ‘a matter for mob psychologyIncommensurability is the idea that two paradigms may be so different as to render impossible any straightforward comparison of them with each other—there is no common language into which both can be translated。 As a result， the proponents of different paradigms ‘fail to make complete contact with each other's viewpoints'， Kuhn claimed。The doctrine of incommensurability stems from Kuhn’s belief that scientific concepts derive their meaning from the theory in which they play a role。 So to understand Newton’s concept of mass， for example， we need to understand the whole of Newtonian theory—concepts cannot be explained independently of the theories in which they are embedded。 This idea， which is sometimes called ‘holism’， was taken very seriously by Kuhn。 He argued that the term ‘mass’ actually meant something different for Newton and Einstein， since the theories in which each embedded the term were so different。 This implies that Newton and Einstein were in effect speaking different languages， which obviously complicates the attempt to compare their theories。 If a Newtonian and an Einsteinian physicist tried to have a rational discussion， they would end up talking past each other。If old and new paradigms are incommensurable， then it cannot be correct to think of scientific revolutions as the replacement of ‘wrong’ ideas by ‘right’ ones。 For to call one idea right and another wrong implies the existence of a common framework for evaluating them， which is precisely what Kuhn denies。 Incommensurability implies that scientific change， far from being a straightforward progression towards the truth， is in a sense directionless: later paradigms are not better than earlier ones， just different。Kuhn continued to maintain that fully objective choice between paradigms was impossible。 For in addition to the incommensurability deriving from the lack of a common language， there is also what he called ‘incommensurability of standards’。 This is the idea that proponents of different paradigms may disagree about what features a good paradigm should have， what problems it should be able to solve， and what an acceptable solution to those problems would look like。 So even if they can communicate effectively， they will not be able to reach agreement about whose paradigm is superior。 In Kuhn's words， 'each paradigm will be shown to satisfy the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a few of those dictated by its opponent。The theory-ladenness of data had two important consequences for Kuhn。 First， it meant that a dispute between competing paradigms could not be resolved by simply appealing to ‘the data’ or ‘the facts’， for what a scientist counts as data， or facts， will depend on which paradigm they accept。 Perfectly objective choice between two paradigms is therefore impossible: there is no neutral vantage-point from which to assess the claims of each。 Secondly， the very idea of objective truth is called into question。 To be objectively true， a theory must correspond to the facts， but the idea of such a correspondence makes little sense if the facts themselves are infected by our theories。 This is why Kuhn was left to the radical view that truth itself is relative to a paradigm。Another important impact of Kuhn’s work was to focus attention on the social context in which science takes place， something that traditional philosophy of science ignored。 Science for Kuhn is an intrinsically social activity: the existence of a scientific community， bound together by allegiance to a shared paradigm， is a prerequisite for the practice of normal science。The strong programme was based around the idea that science should be viewed as a product of the society in which it is practised。 Strong programme sociologists took this idea literally: they held that scientists’ beliefs were in large part socially determined。 So to explain why a scientist believes a given theory， for example， they would cite aspects of the scientist's social and cultural background。HumeHe began by noting that whenever we make inductive inferences， we seem to presuppose what he called the ‘uniformity of nature’。 To see what Hume meant by this， recall our examples。 We had the inference from ‘the first five eggs in the box were good’ to ‘the sixth egg will be good’; from ‘the Down’s syndrome patients examined had an extra chromosome’ to ‘all those with Down’s syndrome have an extra chromosome’; and from ‘my computer has never exploded until now’ to ‘my computer will not explode today’。We place great faith in what scientists tell us about the world。 But science relies on induction， and Hume’s argument seems to show that induction cannot be rationally justified。 If Hume is right， the foundations on which science is built do not look as solid as we might have hoped。 This puzzling state of affairs is known as Hume’s problem of induction。CorrelationSuppose a medical researcher wishes to test the hypothesis that obesity causes depression。 How should they proceed？ A natural first step is to see whether the two attributes are correlated。 To assess this， they could examine a large sample of obese people， and see whether the incidence of depression is higher in this group than in the general population。 If it is， then unless there is some reason to think the sample unrepresentative， it is reasonable to infer （by ordinary induction） that obesity and depression are correlated in the overall population。 Would such a correlation show that obesity causes depression？ Not necessarily。 How could we test the hypothesis that low income causes both obesity and depression？ The obvious thing to do is to find a sample of individuals all with the same income level， and examine whether obesity and depression are correlated within the sample。 If we do this for a number of different income levels， and find that within each income-homogeneous sample the correlation disappears， this is strong evidence in favour of the common cause hypothesis。 For it shows that once income is taken into account， obesity is no longer associated with depression。Conversely， if a strong obesity–depression correlation exists even among individuals with the same income level， this is evidence against the common cause hypothesis。 In statistical jargon， this procedure is known as ‘controlling for’ the variable income。ControlFor example， the larvae should all be from the same species， the same sex， and be fed the same food。 So the entomologist must design their experiment carefully， controlling for all variables that could potentially affect adult body size。 Only then can a difference in adult body size between the two groups safely be attributed to the temperature difference。It is sometimes argued that controlled experiments are the only reliable way of making causal inferences in science。 Proponents of this view argue that purely observational data， without any experimental intervention， cannot give us knowledge of causality。 However this is a controversial thesis。 For while controlled experimentation is certainly a good way of probing nature’s secrets， the technique of statistical control can often accomplish something quite similar。Randomized Controlled Trial （RCT） In a typical RCT， patients with a particular medical condition， e。g。 severe migraine， are divided into two groups。 Those in the treatment group receive the drug， while those in the control group do not。In medicine， the RCT is usually regarded as the ‘gold standard’ for assessing causality。 Indeed proponents of the movement known as ‘evidence-based medicine’ often argue that only an RCT can tell us when a particular treatment is causally effective。 However this position is arguably too strong （and the appropriation of the word ‘evidence’ to refer only to RCTs is misleading）。 In many areas of science， RCTs are not feasible， for either practical or ethical reasons， and yet causal inferences are routinely made。 Furthermore， much of the causal knowledge we have in everyday life we gained without RCTs。Probabilityno one knows how many celestial bodies there are， nor how many of them contain life。 So a different notion of probability is at work here。 Now since there either is life on Mars or there isn’t， talk of probability in this context must presumably reflect our ignorance of the state of the world， rather than describing an objective feature of the world itself。（damn right）Main/WowOne of the main tasks of philosophy of science is to understand how techniques such as experimentation， observation， and theory construction have enabled scientists to unravel so many of nature’s secrets。The social sciences， such as economics， anthropology， and sociology， also flourished in the 20th century， though some believe they lag behind the natural sciences The principal task of philosophy of science is to analyse the methods of enquiry used in the sciences。philosophical reflection can uncover assumptions that are implicit in scientific enquiry。 To illustrate， consider experimental practice。 Suppose a scientist does an experiment and gets a particular result。 They repeat the experiment a few times and keep getting the same result。 After that they will probably stop， confident that were the experiment repeated again under exactly the same conditions， the same result would obtain。 This assumption may seem obvious， but as philosophers we want to question it。 Why assume that future repetitions of the experiment will yield the same result？ How do we know this is true？ The scientist is unlikely to spend much time puzzling over this: they probably have better things to do。 The idea that simplicity or parsimony is the mark of a good explanation is quite appealing， and helps flesh out the abstract idea of IBE。 But if scientists use simplicity as a guide to inference， this raises a deep question。 Do we have reason to think that the universe is simple rather than complex？（Damn。 Very likely。 That means the simplest idea we haven't yet discovered。）According to many philosophers， there is a purely logical reason why science will never be able to explain everything。 For in order to explain something， whatever it is， we need to invoke something else。 But what explains the second thing？ To illustrate， recall that Newton explained a diverse range of phenomena using his law of gravity。 But what explains the law of gravity itself？ If someone asks why all bodies exert a gravitational attraction on each other， what should we tell them？ Newton had no answer to this question。 In Newtonian science the law of gravity was a fundamental principle: it explained other things， but could not itself be explained。 The moral generalizes。 However much the science of the future can explain， the explanations it gives will have to make use of certain fundamental laws and principles。 Since nothing can explain itself， it follows that at least some of these laws and principles will themselves remain unexplained。 （damn）Neuroscientists may one day be able to give a detailed account of the complex goings-on in the brain which produce our feeling of terror。 But will this explain why watching a horror movie feels the way it does， rather than feeling some other way？ Some philosophers argue that it will not。Galileo is generally regarded as the first modern physicist。 He was the first to show that the language of mathematics could be used to describe the behaviour of material objects， such as falling bodies and projectiles。 To us this seems obvious—today’s scientific theories are routinely formulated in mathematical language， not only in physics but also in the biological and social sciences。 But in Galileo’s day it was not obvious: mathematics was widely regarded as dealing with purely abstract entities， hence inapplicable to physical reality。 Another innovative aspect was Galileo’s emphasis on testing hypotheses experimentally。 To the modern scientist this may again seem obvious。 Confidence in the Newtonian picture was shattered in the early years of the 20th century， thanks to two revolutionary new developments in physics: relativity theory and quantum mechanics。 Relativity theory， discovered by Einstein， showed that Newtonian mechanics does not give the right results when applied to very massive objects， or objects moving at very high velocities。 Quantum mechanics， conversely， shows that the Newtonian theory does not work when applied on a very small scale， to subatomic particles。 Both relativity theory and quantum mechanics， especially the latter， are strange and radical theories， making claims about the nature of reality which conflict with common sense， and which many people find hard to accept or even understand。 Their emergence caused considerable conceptual upheaval in physics， which continues to this day。 Marx claimed that in industrialized societies around the world， capitalism would give way to socialism and ultimately to communism。 But when this didn’t happen， instead of admitting that Marx’s theory was wrong， Marxists would invent an ad hoc explanation for why what had happened was actually perfectly consistent with their theory。 For example， they might say that the inevitable progress to communism had been temporarily slowed by the rise of the welfare state， which ‘softened’ the proletariat and weakened their revolutionary zeal。 In this way， Marx’s theory could be made compatible with any possible course of events， just like Freud’s。 Therefore neither theory qualifies as genuinely scientific， according to Popper’s criterion。 Now clearly we should not criticize Adams’s and Leverrier’s behaviour as ‘unscientific’—after all， it led to the discovery of a new planet。 But they did precisely what Popper criticized the Marxists for doing。 They began with a theory—Newton’s theory of gravity—which made an incorrect prediction about Uranus’ orbit。 Rather than concluding that Newton’s theory must be wrong， they stuck by the theory and attempted to explain away the conflicting observations by postulating a new planet。 Similarly， when capitalism showed no signs of giving way to communism， Marxists did not conclude that Marx’s theory must be wrong， but stuck by the theory and tried to explain away the conflicting observations in other ways。 So surely it is unfair to accuse Marxists of engaging in pseudo-science if we allow that what Adams and Leverrier did counted as good， indeed exemplary， science？（fair）The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that there is no fixed set of features that define what it is to be a ‘game’。 Rather there is a loose cluster of features most of which are possessed by most games。 But any particular game may lack any of the features in the cluster and still be a game。 The same may be true of science。 If so， a simple criterion for demarcating science from pseudo-science is unlikely to be found。（Same here Wittgenstein）The central role of induction in science is sometimes obscured by how we talk。 For example， you might read a newspaper report which says that scientists have found ‘experimental proof’ that genetically modified maize is safe to eat。 What this means is that the scientists have tested the maize on a large number of people and none have come to any harm。 But strictly speaking this doesn’t prove that the maize is safe，（hide spoiler）] 。。。more

Alejandra López ，

What is science？ Who classifies something as scientific or unscientific？ Is it really that objective？ Does science rely on leaps of faith？ How do we achieve scientific progress？ This book attempts to provide a framework to think about these questions。 Overall a great read。

Mark Mills ，

Shockingly readable given the subject

Brandon ，

This was an admirably succinct introduction to the philosophy of science。 Rather than trying to be comprehensive， the author opted for clarity， which I appreciated。 Only a handful of the most basic topics were covered， but they were explained with such simplicity that they seemed approachable by anyone。 And rather than attempting to give the final word on most topics， which generally are still subject to ongoing debate， he presents a series of arguments for and against and ultimately leaves it t This was an admirably succinct introduction to the philosophy of science。 Rather than trying to be comprehensive， the author opted for clarity， which I appreciated。 Only a handful of the most basic topics were covered， but they were explained with such simplicity that they seemed approachable by anyone。 And rather than attempting to give the final word on most topics， which generally are still subject to ongoing debate， he presents a series of arguments for and against and ultimately leaves it to the reader to continue the philosophical debate in further readings。 Okasha touches on the definition of science， what constitutes a scientific explanation， realism vs anti-realism， and touches on the nature of truth in a few different ways。 He also introduces the problems of brain modality in psychology， species definition/delineation in biology， and the nature of space in physics。 The final chapter on criticisms of science I thought was the weakest。 The sympathy and understanding that Okasha extends in previous chapters to now discredited ideas and philosophers isn't on display in this chapter。 Rather， Okasha often gives fairly vague and seemingly incomplete descriptions of the criticisms。 This may be because such criticisms are equally leveled against a philosopher of science， such as himself。 It may also be， at least in part， that the criticisms themselves are rather vague and incomplete。 I know from reading Feyerabend's 'The Tyranny of Science' that science's critics can be nearly incoherent in their vagueness。 。。。more

Cal Davie ，

Brilliant overview of the topic！ As always this series provides a lovely readable introduction to a variety of topics。 This book is organised in a way which really helps the reader understand the topics at an introductory level without feeling overwhelmed with technical terms and names。 It is written incredibly well and is very engaging。 I've been looking into the philosophy of science a fair bit recently， and this was a great read to refresh myself on bits and pieces。 Thoroughly recommend。 Brilliant overview of the topic！ As always this series provides a lovely readable introduction to a variety of topics。 This book is organised in a way which really helps the reader understand the topics at an introductory level without feeling overwhelmed with technical terms and names。 It is written incredibly well and is very engaging。 I've been looking into the philosophy of science a fair bit recently， and this was a great read to refresh myself on bits and pieces。 Thoroughly recommend。 。。。more

Shihab ，

A good introduction to the subject。

Alejandro León ，

Muy interesante y conciso。

Simon A。 ，

A little gem from this wonderful VSI series， the book written in a clear style， is concise but far from being shallow。 It introduces the complex and contentious field of the philosophy of science covering its various aspects， subjects， controversies， and debates。

Minh Anh ，

I read this for my very interesting course of Philosophy of Science from Father Lawrence Huy my professor。 Thought-provoking indeed。

Elia Mantovani ，

A good introductory essay on the general issues of philosophy of science expressed in a neat and plain style。 The first chapters are very good as they approach the classics （Popper， Hempel， Strawson， Kuhn， etc。） with in a very comprehensible manner making the essence of the subject matter entirely emerge。 The last ones， a bit more focused on specific sciences， are more technical but they are equally a good glimpse of how a philosopher of science actually works。

Donato Colangelo ，

A really short introduction to science philosophy。 Good for those who wants to taste the line of reasoning and， let’s say， the relative position of philosophy and science， but for those who want to read more， this is not the right book。 The contents are exposed in a clear way - what I feared would become an incomprehensible series of postulates arranged in a mystical lexicon did not appeared anywhere in the text - and is an easy reading。 Very good as an introduction， but I think that a little mo A really short introduction to science philosophy。 Good for those who wants to taste the line of reasoning and， let’s say， the relative position of philosophy and science， but for those who want to read more， this is not the right book。 The contents are exposed in a clear way - what I feared would become an incomprehensible series of postulates arranged in a mystical lexicon did not appeared anywhere in the text - and is an easy reading。 Very good as an introduction， but I think that a little more in-depth on many of the central aspects of the field was due。 。。。more

Sivasothi N。 ，

This is the 2016/17 second edition。 I found it to be an excellent summary in seven chapters， with suggestions of further reading at the end。 What is this fundamental approach which brings about an understanding of nature and the environment？ Does science reveal the truth？ Is this even an objective or claim？ What is this in pursuit of？Every science student is ultimately a practitioner to some degree （unknowingly or otherwise！） and should be overtly aware of the thought process underlying their do This is the 2016/17 second edition。 I found it to be an excellent summary in seven chapters， with suggestions of further reading at the end。 What is this fundamental approach which brings about an understanding of nature and the environment？ Does science reveal the truth？ Is this even an objective or claim？ What is this in pursuit of？Every science student is ultimately a practitioner to some degree （unknowingly or otherwise！） and should be overtly aware of the thought process underlying their domain。 There is a need to strengthen their understanding of what they have acquired innately which helps them answer some questions at least！An interesting source the author Samir Okasha references a few times is the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: https://plato。stanford。edu/entries/sc。。。 。。。more

Tomas ，

Nice overview of how philosophy of science originated and progressed。 I can see why it is important to ask the questions that these philosophers asked。 The book is greatly structured with plenty of examples and metaphors。I am really getting into the "A Very Short Introduction" series， what a great concept， you can learn a lot in a very short timeframe。 Cannot wait till I get another one of the series。 Nice overview of how philosophy of science originated and progressed。 I can see why it is important to ask the questions that these philosophers asked。 The book is greatly structured with plenty of examples and metaphors。I am really getting into the "A Very Short Introduction" series， what a great concept， you can learn a lot in a very short timeframe。 Cannot wait till I get another one of the series。 。。。more

S G Akshaykumar ，

The book began well。 There are interesting parts。 But it drags in some parts as well。

Nahid Mubin ，

Brief one but excellent one。

Sahand Moezi ，

a very straight forward and might i add enjoyable little introduction to Phil of science。

Nicktimebreak ，

一本作为科学哲学入门非常合适的书，因为买的是实体版，意外的发现是双语版本，第一次尝试直接读原文，收获很大。下面是读书笔记：# 科学哲学## 第一章第一章中对关于卡尔波普儿的科学定义阐述，让我有了新的认识。之前以为能讲一句科学是「可证伪的」（falsifiable）就感觉很懂了。然而实际上，可证伪本身对于科学的定位仍然是有问题的，书中用了两个例子来说明，一个是波普儿鄙视佛洛依德的精神分析法和马克思的共产主义理论不可证伪性，另一个是牛顿计算的天王星轨道偏移预测了海王星的存在。在两个例子中前者的不可证伪遭到鄙夷，而后者却通过修正得到了证实。结尾处还引用了维特根斯坦关于「游戏」的定义来说明定义科学的困难，一个很有意思的观点。## 第二章第二章在介绍完推理和归纳的定义区分后作者引入了著名的休谟归纳难题（Hume's Problem of Incduction）。即归纳结论是否值得信任，我们无法证明。后世哲学家有从概率角度解释，有从意义角度解释，但都无一个令所有人满意的答案。归纳推理中又延伸出了一种最佳归纳解释（IBE）的方法，书中例举了达尔文进化论和爱因斯坦证明布朗运动展示IBE的使用效果。对于 一本作为科学哲学入门非常合适的书，因为买的是实体版，意外的发现是双语版本，第一次尝试直接读原文，收获很大。下面是读书笔记：# 科学哲学## 第一章第一章中对关于卡尔波普儿的科学定义阐述，让我有了新的认识。之前以为能讲一句科学是「可证伪的」（falsifiable）就感觉很懂了。然而实际上，可证伪本身对于科学的定位仍然是有问题的，书中用了两个例子来说明，一个是波普儿鄙视佛洛依德的精神分析法和马克思的共产主义理论不可证伪性，另一个是牛顿计算的天王星轨道偏移预测了海王星的存在。在两个例子中前者的不可证伪遭到鄙夷，而后者却通过修正得到了证实。结尾处还引用了维特根斯坦关于「游戏」的定义来说明定义科学的困难，一个很有意思的观点。## 第二章第二章在介绍完推理和归纳的定义区分后作者引入了著名的休谟归纳难题（Hume's Problem of Incduction）。即归纳结论是否值得信任，我们无法证明。后世哲学家有从概率角度解释，有从意义角度解释，但都无一个令所有人满意的答案。归纳推理中又延伸出了一种最佳归纳解释（IBE）的方法，书中例举了达尔文进化论和爱因斯坦证明布朗运动展示IBE的使用效果。对于IBE，人们倾向于用简单和简洁作为它的一个要求，但科学哲学家们还无法在此达成一个共识。基于概率的三种解释：频率性解释、主观性解释、逻辑性解释，其中逻辑性解释貌似更利于解答休谟难题，但也碰到了在数学和哲学上无法解释的问题。## 第三章第三章主要涉及的是科学的实现和解释。书中首先介绍了卡尔亨普尔用于解释科学而构建的的“覆盖率”模型（Covering Law Model），这一模型通过引入1、至少一个普适规律和2、一些既定事实来3、解释一个现象（因被解释的现象由普适的自然规律覆盖而得名）。通过两个例子，1、旗杆投影计算旗杆长和2、男性服用避孕药无法怀孕，作者阐述了此模型的弊端，即因果性和相关性问题。实际上，亨普尔的这一模型缺少因果性并非他的无意疏忽，而是他作为一个经验主义者的立场决定的。基于此，近年来有很多哲学家会更倾向于基于因果性的科学解释。本章后半段探讨了科学能否解释一切的问题，当然，目前并无定论，部分哲学家表示随着科学进步，尽管科学能解释诸多现象产生的原因，但是解释这个原因有何而来则是困难的，如是什么导致的万有引力。我想这当然就是各种宗教和神学被诉诸的一大原因。最后，本章谈了科学和还原，关于所有科学学科能否最终被还原为物理学来解释的问题，因为人类的研究对象最终都是由物理实体组成的，从这个角度看物理学似乎最终可以统一所有的科学学科。然而，还有一个观念涉及到一个“多重实现”的理论，即同一个物理实体，随让最终都是由原子能微观粒子构成，但是有可能是通过不同的排列组合进行的多重的实现（举了烟灰缸的例子），如果用微观物理学的角度去观察，并不能得出更具体的解释。所以让生物的归生物，经济的归经济，化学的归化学可能是更正确的看法。## 第四章第四章开始谈实在论和反实在论，当然指并非广义的实在论，而是自然科学实在论，和其反实在论，或者称为工具主义论。反实在论的观点是科学发现解释的东西包括可观察的和不可观察的，其中对可观察实体的解释为真的毋庸置疑，但不可观察的实体的解释则是不确定的，只是提供了一种预测观察的方便方法。而实在论则不区分可观察实体和不可观察实体，科学能够解释描述我们的世界。实在论的立足点在于“经验成功”，科学理论能够精确的符合现实观察，并且能够做出预测，则为真，因此还提出一种“无奇迹”论点，不存在这种奇迹，即与理论符合的如此之好的不可观察实体是不存在的。但反实在论的反击同样有力，因为科学发展史上存在数次这样的例子来说明，如燃素论，如以太论，最终由现在的科学证明，这两个不可观察的实体的确是不存在的。为此，实在论者通过诘问如何区分可观察和不可观察实体来进行反击。在用眼睛、眼镜、低倍光学仪器、高倍光学仪器等一系列渐变的观察手段中，如何区分那些“观察”到的实体，哪些算可观察的哪些算不可观察的？通过模糊观察的定义，这一观点让反实在论陷入困境。反实在论者反驳道，尽管没有一条明晰的可观察和不可观察实体的分界线，但现实中的不可观察实体是确实存在的，这并不妨碍反实在论者对解释这类实体的科学理论提出质疑。反实在论者还提出一种“证据不足理论”，即对于不可观察实体的科学解释基于的是间接的观察，如气体温度变化的动力学解释，由于证据不够充分，实际上可能存在其他不同的科学解释也能符合这种间接观察数据。实在论者虽然承认原则上有这样的可能，但不同的理论的存在优劣的差别，如简单性。然而，对于理论的选择依据怎样的标准本身还是一个值得争议的事情。最后，实在论者认为，“证据不足理论”本质上其实就是对科学采取归纳法的质疑，因为在实际的科学理论得出操作中，即使是可观察实体，也并未尽到完全观察，如陨石撞击、恐龙的存在，若采取“证据不足理论”，那么很大程度上我们的科学理论都是值得怀疑的。所以跟观察无能否观察和大小反而无关了。## 第五章第五章内容主要论述了科学史家、科学哲学家托马斯库恩的"科学革命的结构"中的观点。逻辑实证主义者们对科学史关注过少，高看自然科学，认为存在客观真理和得出真理的有效理论以及科学是绝对客观的和理性的，库恩在这几点上做了有力的反驳。他使用的是“范式转换”、“不可通约性”、“理论负荷”这几个概念。通过研究科学史，他将科学发展分为常规科学和变革科学，常规科学期中，科学的发展被既有的“范式主导”，范式不仅仅是一套理论，它是对科学的总体观点，包括一系列的价值观、信念、假设等。常规科学的活动是尽量让所有科学发现理论去适应这一范式，而不是相反，直到越来越多的反常现象的出现，才有可能出现范式的变革。而范式之间的切换选择，也并非是朝着理性向上线性发展的，科学的发展史也不是线性的，即非累积性的。科学家在理论上的选择可能就像“群众心理学”一样。库恩认为，不同范式之间很大程度上是不可通约的，即对两种范式进行比较时，没有一种共同语言能实现其互通。通过这点，他强调范式之间的切换是非客观的。甚至，他认为真理本身是相对范式而言的。在判别两种范式的优劣过程中，我们无法用实验数据的有效性来作为依据，因为这些数据存在“理论负荷”，即被科学家称为数据或事实的东西依赖于她所接受的范式。没有这样的算法能指导我们对科学理论进行选择。## 第六章第六章内容不怎么涉及科学哲学的理论知识，主要是举了三个领域，物理、生物学以及心理学上的例子来展示当今的科学哲学难题。物理学的例子是关于牛顿和莱布尼兹关于空间是否是绝对的争论。生物学的例子是关于生物学分类到底是该以表现型分类学还是分支分类学为准的争论。心理学上的例子是关于人的意识到底是否有模块性的争论。## 第七章第七章探讨了科学遇到的评论。“科学主义”是一个贬义词，它指的是对科学的盲目崇拜。近代的科学发展，让它在人们生活中的地位超越了任何其他学科，甚至一切学科问题最终都能用理性的科学来解答，连哲学都只是用来的理清科学知识的一种附庸工具。而在科学内部，自然科学对于社会科学亦有一种优越感，这种优越感的来源可能来自于自然科学使用的“数学化”的方法，亦可能是社会科学还处在发展萌芽期。但即便如此，现今我们对什么是科学方法仍然没有一个准确的答案。文章后续列举了两个例子来阐述科学面临的挑战。其一是美国民众对达尔文进化论和神创论两种理论之间的选择斗争。这里探讨了神创论反驳进化论只不过是一种理论假说的观点，基于我们的科学实践都是归纳的而非推理的，想要通过数据、实验来完美证明一个理论是不可能的，对于一组数据，总能找到多个符合的理论解释。这也是本书前文论述过的内容。另外一个例子是关于人类社会生物学的，这里探讨了科学家在进行科学实践时是否能秉持价值中立，一如既往，作者从正面到反面对各种观点进行了叙述，最终很难得到一个确切的答案。 。。。more

AKHIL TP4 ，

Conceptual， Coherent， and Concise。 Offers a brisk walk through the philosophy of science。

Taavi Mandel ，

Very well structured concise discussion of what science is and has been， what are its limitations and criticisms， and strengths， presenting the cases of both proponents and opponents of selected philosophical issues in science。 It also provides a list of suggested further readings for those who are interested in going into more depth in each of the issues。Stylistically， despite choosing to present both sides of each issue， in many sections the language was normative and somewhat favorable toward Very well structured concise discussion of what science is and has been， what are its limitations and criticisms， and strengths， presenting the cases of both proponents and opponents of selected philosophical issues in science。 It also provides a list of suggested further readings for those who are interested in going into more depth in each of the issues。Stylistically， despite choosing to present both sides of each issue， in many sections the language was normative and somewhat favorable towards a particular one side， rather than being a neutral description。 It seemed like a case was being built for a view without using logical argumentation， but rather by expressing some form of personal preference or value judgment by the author。 Given the philosophical context， I expected more neutral language based on strength of argumentation and deduction only。 Consequently， due to a position（s） being assumed， as a reader I felt a need to challenge the author's position by using argumentation that was omitted from the book as I was reading along。 However， I do appreciate that this outcome may be a result of the format that limited it to a 'vert short introduction'。Overall， as the book was very well structured and concise， it was a good read - recommend it to anyone interested to learn more about the philosophy of science with no previous background in the area。 。。。more

Kaaveh ，

برا اینکه بفهمی علم چیه، شبه‌علم چیه، ناعلم چیه، فلسفه چیه میای سراغ این کتاب و میبینی اووووعه، اوضاع خیلی شیر تو شیره！ اونجاس ک میفهمی داری درست درک میکنی داستان رو！ :）معمولا هروقت فک کردم کانسپتی رو کامل درک کردم، چن وقت بعدش دیدم اشتباه می‌کردم。 دیگه وقتی این حس میاد سراغم، ترسم میگیره！ 😄

Yi-Fan ，

科学工作者、特别是基础科学工作者，会有很多关于科学本身的思考。这本书从哲学的角度讨论了一些科学的问题，比如什么是科学推理，实在论和反实在论，科学与价值观等。对于科学可能没有什么帮助，但是对于科学工作者，有一些一般性的启发。本书涵盖范围比较广，因此讲得也浅。

Nghia Nguyen ，

Written from a philosopher's perspective， this book provides the definition， methods， the schools of scientists， and their paradigm in doing science， along with the course in the history of scientific progressing and other problems of science， including ethical and social issues。 Being a physician， I feel quite familiar with aspects of natural sciences， but this book was so helpful to elaborate the arguments related to sciences and widen my view thanks to many philosophical aspects， which in the Written from a philosopher's perspective， this book provides the definition， methods， the schools of scientists， and their paradigm in doing science， along with the course in the history of scientific progressing and other problems of science， including ethical and social issues。 Being a physician， I feel quite familiar with aspects of natural sciences， but this book was so helpful to elaborate the arguments related to sciences and widen my view thanks to many philosophical aspects， which in the end made my understanding of science broader， more thorough and most importantly， more aware of the limitations and the controversial of science， both in the past and in the persisting problems of the present。 The author included in the book many key problems， arguments， discoveries， and pivotal events in the history of science raised by Hume， Kuhn， Popper， Galileo， Newton， Darwin， and many others。 The further reading section is also very informative。 Highly recommend this book for any scientist。 。。。more

Koohesefid ，

کتاب مختصر و جمع و جوری هست و برای آشنایی ابتدایی با یه سری از مباحث فلسفه‌ی علم کتاب خوبی هست به نظر من。 متن هم روان هست و ترجمه‌ی خوبی داره。

Logan Carter ，

As the name suggests， this short introduction is a great opener for those interested in philosophy of science。 This book was one of the required texts for the Philosophy of Science course I just finished， though it does not have a rigorous “textbook” vibe to it。

Nathan Zorndorf ，

Loved this book！ Notes on Philosophy of Science1。 Scientific claims must be falsifiable2。 Deductive reasoning - if the premises are true， then the conclusion must be true as well。 （Ex。 All Frenchmen like red wine， Pierre is a Frenchman， therefore Pierre likes red wine）。 1。 （Me:） Says nothing interesting， because it only describes， it does not make inferences/generalizations that we can apply to unseen data 2。 Popper’s claim: a scientific claim is one that is “falsifiable”， it can be proven wrong Loved this book！ Notes on Philosophy of Science1。 Scientific claims must be falsifiable2。 Deductive reasoning - if the premises are true， then the conclusion must be true as well。 （Ex。 All Frenchmen like red wine， Pierre is a Frenchman， therefore Pierre likes red wine）。 1。 （Me:） Says nothing interesting， because it only describes， it does not make inferences/generalizations that we can apply to unseen data 2。 Popper’s claim: a scientific claim is one that is “falsifiable”， it can be proven wrong。 1。 The refutation of theories is possible with deductive reasoning。 2。 “Finds one piece of metal that does not conduct electricity” -> “it is false that all pieces of metal conduct electricity” is deductive reasoning 3。 Deductive reasoning can be used to prove theories false， but it cannot be used to prove that theories are true。3。 Inductive reasoning - The first five eggs in the box were good， all the eggs have the same best-before date stamped on them， therefore the sixth egg will be good too。 1。 （Me）: Helpful insomuch as it makes accurate predictions on new data 2。 Humes problem: use of induction cannot be justified rationally， because induction requires generalizing from objects we have seen to objects that we haven’t （the ‘uniformity of nature’）。 1。 Can we prove that the uniformity of nature is true？ No， because justifying it involves circular reasoning。 The uniformity of nature may have proven to hold true up until now， but that does not mean it will continue to hold true in the future。 “To argue that induction is trustworthy because it has worked well up to now is to reason inductively”4。 Inference to the Best Explanation （IBE） 1。 One criteria for finding a ‘best explanation of the data’ is that of preferring the simpler explanation （explanations that are more parsimonious/require fewer conditions） （Ex。 mouse hypothesis vs。 maid & boiler hypothesis）5。 Causal Inference 1。 It is sometimes argued that controlled experiments are the only reliable way of making causal inferences in science。 2。 In recent years， statisticians and computer scientists have developed powerful techniques for making causal inferences from observational data。 3。 Much of the knowledge we have gained in life does not come from RCT。 RCT is a very rigorous method that is unnecessary in many cases。 4。 Probability and Inference 1。 Probability has both an objective and a subjective guise。 2。 In its objective guise， probability refers to how often things in the world happen， or tend to happen （frequentists）。 Understood this way， statements about probability are objectively true or false， independently of what anyone believes。 1。 Ex。 The result of a coin flip is either heads or tails - there is no probability about it， and we are not interested in our belief about the the result （that would be the Bayesian approach）。 3。 In its subjective guise， probability is a measure of rational degree of belief。 （Bayesian）。 Now since there either is life on Mars or there isn’t， talk of probability in this context must presumably reflect our ignorance of the state of the world， rather than describing an objective feature of the world itself。 1。 The idea is that any rational scientist can be thought of as having an initial credence in their theory or hypothesis， which they then update in the light of new evidence or data by following the rule of conditionalization。 1。 If the only objective constraints concern how we should change our credences， but what our initial credences should be is entirely subjective， then individuals with very bizarre opinions about the world will count as perfectly rational。 So a probabilistic escape from Hume’s problem will not fall out of the Bayesian view of scientific inference。 6。 Chapter 3 - Explanation in Science 1。 Hempel’s Covering Law Model of Scientific Explanation 1。 The task of providing an account of scientific explanation then becomes the task of characterizing precisely the relation that must hold between a set of premises and a conclusion， in order for the former to count as an explanation of the latter。 1。 Deductive reasoning 2。 Premises must all be true 3。 Must consist of at least one general law 2。 Covering law model structure: = set of facts + general law -> phenomenon to be explained 3。 Hempel said that every scientific explanation is potentially a prediction， and every correct prediction is possibly an explanation。 4。 Problem: Hempel’s covering model is too liberal （classifies explanations as scientific that clearly are not） 1。 Case 1: Problem of symmetry - in general， if x explains y， given the relevant laws and additional facts， then it will not be true that y explains x， given the same laws and facts （Ex。 flagpole example） 2。 Case 2: The Problem of Irrelevance - a good explanation of a phenomenon should contain information that is relevant to the phenomenon’s occurrence （John and the maternity ward example） 2。 Explanation and causality 1。 Causality is asymmetric 1。 Covering law model has no concept of causality built into it - hence the awkward examples of “scientific explanations” 2。 Hempel subscribed to the philosophical doctrine called empiricism， and empiricists are traditionally suspicious of the concept of causality。 1。 Empiricism says that all our knowledge comes from experience。 2。 David Hume， was a leading empiricist， and he argued that it is impossible to experience causal relations。 So he concluded that they don’t exist—causality is something that we humans ‘project’ onto the world！ 1。 He allowed that it is an objective fact that most glass vases which have been dropped have in fact broken。 But our idea of causality includes more than this。 It includes the idea of a causal connection between the dropping and the breaking， i。e。 that the former brings about the latter。 No such connections are to be found in the world - we just experience sounds， sights， feelings， but that their connection is a man-made story。 1。 This is very buddhist-like， actually。 It’s encompassed in the idea of illusion - that there is no objectivity or subjectivity， there is just pure experience。 That is all we’re ever doing - experiencing thoughts， or sensations - so there actually is no story possible， no causal explanation possible， just the illusion of it as experienced by the various mental and physical senses。 3。 Many philosophers have come to the conclusion that the concept of causality， although problematic， is indispensable to how we understand the world。 3。 Can science explain everything？ 1。 However much the science of the future can explain， the explanations it gives will have to make use of certain fundamental laws and principles。 Since nothing can explain itself， it follows that at least some of these laws and principles will themselves remain unexplained。 4。 Explanation and reduction 1。 Multiple realization - It’s an attempt at solving the philosophical puzzle of， if economics eventually comes down to particles of matter， shouldn’t physics be able to make economic predictions？ Yet， in practice， physics does not make predictions concerning biology or economics - they are autonomous disciplines。 1。 so it is impossible to define the concept ‘ashtray’ in purely physical terms。 We cannot find a true statement of the form ‘x is an ashtray if and only if x is。。。’ where the blank is filled by an expression taken from the language of physics。 This means that ashtrays are multiply realized at the physical level。 2。 The answer is that objects studied in the higher sciences are multiply realized at the physical level。 1。 （My example）: If you take a dog - we cannot define a dog using the language of physics， we must use the language of biology。 Because a dog can have many varieties （spotted， big， small， matted vs curly hair， etc）。 2。 （My opinion）: it comes down to abstraction and language - again， no model is correct， some are just better than others （in some cases）。 3。 This concept is embodied in Buddhism by the concept of emptiness。 3。 There is no true statement of the form ‘x is a cell if and only if x is 。 。 。’ where the blank is filled by an expression taken from the language of microphysics… The vocabulary of cell biology and the vocabulary of physics do not map onto each other in the required way。 7。 Chapter 4 - Realism vs Anti-realism 1。 Realism holds that the physical world exists independently of human thought and perception。 Idealism denies this—it claims that the physical world is in some way dependent on the conscious activity of humans。 2。 Realists hold that science aims to provide a true description of the world。 anti-realists hold that the aim of science is to find theories that are empirically adequate， i。e。 which correctly predict the results of experiment and observation。 1。 The rest of this chapter is a back and forth debate between realist perspective and the anti-realist perspective。 It is a blast to read。8。 Chapter 5 - Scientific Change and Scientific Revolutions 1。 In 1963， Thomas Kuhn published a book called The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1。 Before Kuhn， science， for the logical empiricists was thus a paradigmatically rational activity， the surest route to the truth that there is。 2。 The essence of a scientific revolution is the shift from an old paradigm to a new one。 3。 Kuhn suggested that facts about the world are paradigm-relative， and thus change when paradigms change。 9。 Chapter 6 - Philosophical Problems in Physics， Biology， and Psychology 1。 Q: Is there a ‘correct’ way to classify， or are all classification schemes ultimately arbitrary？ 1。 Particularly important for taxonomy in biology， because biologists do not agree on what a species actually is， nor therefore on what criteria should be used for identifying species （‘the species problem’） 1。 Biological species concept （BSC），hybrid zones， ring species， “genuine kinds”， 2。 Q: Is the mind modular？ 10。 Chapter 7 - Science and its Critics 1。 Scientism 2。 Science and Religion 1。 Creationism vs。 Darwinism 3。 Is Science value-free？ 。。。more

Mahin ，

The other day I was conversing with one of my roommates。 After hearing that I am an agnostic， he asked me the reason behind that stand。 Then he started telling me how scientific the Qur'an is。 He lamented， "I am sorry that you don't see that Qur'an is the most scientific book of all time。" As I was already familiar with this kind of situation， I somehow tried to veer the conversation in a different direction because I know this debate will go nowhere。 When someone says Qur'an， Gita， Bible， or an The other day I was conversing with one of my roommates。 After hearing that I am an agnostic， he asked me the reason behind that stand。 Then he started telling me how scientific the Qur'an is。 He lamented， "I am sorry that you don't see that Qur'an is the most scientific book of all time。" As I was already familiar with this kind of situation， I somehow tried to veer the conversation in a different direction because I know this debate will go nowhere。 When someone says Qur'an， Gita， Bible， or any other this kind of religious book is scientific， you know there is no point in arguing with him/her， as you can say he/she doesn't possess a sound amount of knowledge on how science works。 This is just a random example that depicts a somewhat sad aspect of our science education。 Even someone who has a formal science education doesn't know a lot of things about the structure and the coherence of the methods scientists use to verify natural truths。 Now you can ask why there exists such a thing called 'Philosophy of Science'？ And what is the job of these Philosophers？ Isn't science itself enough to assess its validity？ Some scientists even claim that the branch of knowledge named philosophy is dead。 This kind of attitude stems from the fact that science can now answer a lot of questions， that were considered as questions of philosophical investigation in the past。 So， it is not so unreasonable to believe that there will be a time when science will be able to answer all the questions about our cosmos and there will be nothing left for philosophy。 This book is a very good starting point if you want to explore this kind of questions and possibilities。 The author first started with a chapter on the nature of Science。 He elucidated what are the traits that a branch of Science should possess。 Then there is a chapter on Scientific Inference。 This is a really interesting chapter where you will confront Hume's problem of induction。 Hume's Problem is quite unsettling for us as it shows a subtle gap in the method of inductive inference。 The inherent premise of inductive inference is that our universe is symmetric and harmonious。 But there is no reason to believe this assumption。 In almost all cases， scientists use inductive inference to construct their theories。 Does this mean that scientific theories are not as much trustable as we used to think？ When scientists find some data from an experiment， they try to construct theory to explain this data as effectively as possible。 But what if there are two opposing theories that explain the same data equally effectively。 How should we choose from those two theories？ In most cases， scientists prefer simple theory over the comparatively complex one。 But is there any reason to believe that nature behaves in the simplest way possible？Another fascinating thing I learned from this book is the relation between causality and correlation。 For instance: when a mug falls on the floor from a table， it breaks。 Is hitting the floor the reason it broke？ Or it hit the floor because it broke？ Or there is another phenomenon that is the cause of both incidents？ Then there is a chapter on the debate between Scientific Realism and Anti-realism。 A very interesting chapter indeed。 'Scientific change and scientific revolutions' is a chapter solely based on Thomas Kuhn's wacky ideas。 Some of Kuhn's ideas seemed plain silly to me。 But I think I should read his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions before delivering any opinion。 The chapter on Philosophical problems in some specific sciences was my least favorite as it seemed to me that the discussed problems are not philosophical at all。 I had a sense that when these fields will be advanced enough， they will be able to answer these questions without any support from philosophy。 The author's writing style is lucid and amiable。 The best thing about the writing is that he was not biased at the time of presenting different opposing doctrines（At least I wasn't able to sense any bias）。 He presented all those things with equal importance and played the role of just a narrator。 That is why the book was somewhat enjoyable to read。The book is very small in length（as you can get from the title）。 So， this is not an academic textbook。 You will find everything in a very superficial way。 But this is the sole purpose of these very short introduction series books。 They will inflame a craving inside you to know more so that you can dive into some more sophisticated texts。Recommended for someone who wants a very elementary introduction on the subject。 。。。more

Marco ，

The book allows the reader a soft introduction into Philosophy of science。 At some points it seemed a bit unstructured and not quite clear， why the order of chapters is as it is。

Reference

google book https://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&q=Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction

hathitrust digital library https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/ls?q1=Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction&field1=ocr&a=srchls&ft=ft&lmt=ft

The British Library https://bll01.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/search?query=any,contains,Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction&tab=LibraryCatalog&search_scope=Not_BL_Suppress&vid=44BL_INST:BLL01&lang=en&offset=0