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The Changing of the Guard: the British army since 9/11

The Changing of the Guard: the British army since 9/11

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  • Create Date：2021-07-25 00:51:30
  • Update Date：2025-09-06
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  • Author：Simon Akam
  • ISBN：1914484126
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Summary

A revelatory， explosive new analysis of the military today。


Over the first two decades of the twenty-first century the British Army fought in Iraq and Afghanistan， at considerable financial and human cost。 Yet neither war achieved its objectives。 Award-winning journalist Simon Akam questions why， and provides challenging but necessary answers。 Composed from assiduous documentary research， field reportage， and hundreds of interviews， this book is a strikingly rich， nuanced portrait of one of our pivotal national institutions in a time of great stress。


This is as much a book about Britain， and about the politics of failure， as it is about the military。

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Reviews

Anthony Lesurf ，

The Changing of the Guard is an engaging， well-written， researched， and presented read。 While I don't agree with everything in the book， it is thought-provoking and even-handed and I agree with its central thesis that after four and a half decades of the Cold War， the British military， its leadership， in particular， was complacent and inflexible。 When our military deployed in the post 9/11 wars there were successes but there were also mistakes， failures， infighting， and in extreme cases rule-bre The Changing of the Guard is an engaging， well-written， researched， and presented read。 While I don't agree with everything in the book， it is thought-provoking and even-handed and I agree with its central thesis that after four and a half decades of the Cold War， the British military， its leadership， in particular， was complacent and inflexible。 When our military deployed in the post 9/11 wars there were successes but there were also mistakes， failures， infighting， and in extreme cases rule-breaking。 Throughout the organisation struggled to identify， adapt， and to overcome the new challenges。 Despite this， hard lessons were learned， albeit slowly， and in general， the military came out the other end the better for it。The book in particular highlights pre-9/11 British ‘hubris’ in being ‘the best little Army in the World’: a fair observation as this was the firm belief right through the cold war and probably before it。 As a young Infantry soldier in the 1980s， I was always told that despite our limited numbers， terrible kit， and stifling class system we were without equal the toughest and most professional army。 In fact， the resource and equipment limitations were seen as proof that the Americans had ‘all the gear but no idea’ while we relied on our pluck and initiative。 Plus， we had centuries of tradition behind us as well as successful counter-insurgency campaigns in places like Malaya and Northern Ireland。 The Americans probably even agreed with us， even if they did not like it。 I remember an urban legend about US forces in Germany， or it might have been US Marines going ashore in Hong Kong， being issued with cards warning them of the dangers of drinking， fighting， or gambling with British soldiers: all of which they would lose at， they were told。Then came 9/11 and British participation in Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent nation-building in both places， for which they were neither prepared nor equipped。 Stretched too thin， ‘heart and minds’ went out of the window （considered the winning strategy in the Malayan emergency） in order to concentrate on war-fighting—there are a couple of interesting chapters here on the awards system and its potential to encourage bad behaviour， the impact of the slew of memoirs and YouTube trophy videos that came out of the two campaigns and the related enigma that is ‘ally’ （looking the part and doing cool stuff）。 In the end， the military was let down at both a political and a strategic level—and by decisions the Americans’ made， especially in Iraq。 The application of a ‘Hearts and Minds’ strategy was considered the winning element of the Malayan Emergency campaign and this wasn’t in my opinion possible。 I would argue that it was actually the ‘hearts and minds’ strategy coupled with significant force protection that won the day—one without the other cannot work。 The number of Commonwealth troops deployed to head of population during the in Malayan Emergency was roughly 1:150， with a similar number of police plus a huge home guard force （1:25）。 In Iraq （Basra and Maysan） that number was around 1:300 and in Afghanistan （Helmand） about 1:150—but neither Iraq nor Afghanistan had existing military or police forces that were trained or trustworthy enough to be considered an asset （in those early days）。 Ultimately， the British military had neither the troops for nation-building or for force protection and the situations in both theatres quickly spiralled out of control: ‘quantity has a quality all of its own。' In all fairness though， the Americans fared little better overall in Iraq and Afghanistan， despite their massive resources。 Although embarrassingly， they ended up having to bail us out in both Basra and Helmand—and in the process， no doubt got their revenge for all those years of being told they were inferior。Criticism regarding excessive use of violence is mixed。 Troops are cited as having been too aggressive， The PWRR in Maysan in 2004 and 3 Para in Helmand in 2006 for example。 But troops are also cited as not being aggressive enough in Basra city in 2006 before the ‘accommodation’: highlighted by the fact that most of the award citations during this period were for saving comrades rather than taking the fight to the enemy。 Likewise， in Helmand in 2011 the main military effort became casualty reduction and enemy suppression rather than assault。 Much of this was， I suspect， tactically reactive and relates back to my earlier argument about having insufficient resources for force protection given the circumstances—also the end of the Iraq campaign was in sight by this time。 I’m often reminded that it’s human nature to criticise subsequent generations as not being as tough or as good as those that went before。 The old sweats when I joined up berated us and we berated those that followed us。 By the time I left the Army， it was that period between the cold war and 9/11: the end of history。 9/11 changed all that and although I would spend over a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan， that was as a contractor， not as a serving soldier， they belonged to a younger generation。 And from where I was standing， observing， I was proud of the professionalism， bravery， toughness， and flexibility of those boys and girls。 But those conflicts are over now and the next generations are having to adapt to a new military once again: and the cycle goes on。I firmly stand by the conviction that pound for pound the British soldier is still the best， and the British Army is still ‘the best little （emphasis） army in the world’。 That said， the US military also impressed me no end: the best enormous army in the world。 Respect。 。。。more

Walter Stevens ，

A well researched book on the forces for change on the British Army post Irag and Afghanistan， the the manner in which the Army is adapting。 I really enjoyed the author's style， and how he interjected his personal story into what could have been quite a dry treatise。 I didnt feel it was altogether successful though， perhaps due to the sheer amount of material he covers。 So it left me with some unanswered questions。 I recommend it though。 A well researched book on the forces for change on the British Army post Irag and Afghanistan， the the manner in which the Army is adapting。 I really enjoyed the author's style， and how he interjected his personal story into what could have been quite a dry treatise。 I didnt feel it was altogether successful though， perhaps due to the sheer amount of material he covers。 So it left me with some unanswered questions。 I recommend it though。 。。。more

Barbara Wells ，

Very good， interesting and engaging throughout。Good read for any military history buffs。 Doesn’t reflect too well on UK armed forces leadership。Possibly unfair in places。

Scribe Publications ，

Akam’s beautifully written， from the inside out， account of the British Army’s reluctance to engage with the realities of recent small wars， in Afghanistan in particular， is a must-read for every serious student of modern military history。 At one level， it explains how and why we managed to turn victory over Al Qaeda in Afghanistan into defeat at the hands of the Taliban。 But this book is about much more than the army in Afghanistan — it is a parable about failure， the failure of a revered insti Akam’s beautifully written， from the inside out， account of the British Army’s reluctance to engage with the realities of recent small wars， in Afghanistan in particular， is a must-read for every serious student of modern military history。 At one level， it explains how and why we managed to turn victory over Al Qaeda in Afghanistan into defeat at the hands of the Taliban。 But this book is about much more than the army in Afghanistan — it is a parable about failure， the failure of a revered institution， with a proud history and an uncritical public， to come to terms with a changed and changing world。Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles， Former British Ambassador to AfghanistanSimon Akam delivers a devastating indictment of Britain’s military chiefs for overseeing the shocking decline of the nation’s armed forces。Tom Bower， BiographerSimon Akam has written a perceptive， challenging and passionate book that looks at modern soldiering。 In doing so， Akam provides an invaluable look at how the British Army works — and how the changing world in the 21st century is asking new and complex questions for soldiers and military strategy alike。Peter Frankopan， Author of The Silk RoadsThis brave， absorbing and prodigiously well-researched tour de force renders every previous account of the British Army in its disastrous recent campaigns obsolete。 Akam makes an unanswerable case that we are no longer very good at fighting wars， building his arguments with panache and good sense。 In doing so he has done his country， and the army， a great service — although the Generals may not see it quite that way just yet。 Put away the self-serving autobiographies and the obsequious histories of in-house academics; this is the definitive account of the British Army in its 21st Century misadventures。Frank Ledwidge， Author of Losing Small Wars[An] excellent and valuable book。Jason Burke， The GuardianAkam is an angry young man and the book is better for it。The TimesA passionate book。The Sunday TimesIt’s compellingly written – I got through all 500-plus pages in two sittings – and it is certainly worth the effort。Mail on SundayThis detailed， academic book argues flawed leadership led to military disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan … Akam just manages to prevent his detailed account from becoming too crowded in military jargon， with some illuminating tales from barracks， brothel and battlefield。Anthony Loyd， New StatesmanImpassioned … It is a valuable addition to analysing the past， present and future of a venerated institution。Kim SenguptaA scathing account of the British army in the years after 9/11。Shashank Joshi， Spectator AustraliaAkam makes many important points and reports in depth on officers’ recollections of specific episodes。ProspectThe Changing of the Guard is a major book that provides the first serious analysis of the effectiveness of the modern British Army … With a particular focus on the failure of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan， he gives a brunt assessment of the Army as an institution and its role in society。 There is lots of interesting material here and some relevant lessons for Australia。Jeff Popple， Canberra WeeklyIt is a review of the British Army … It does not tell a ‘pretty’ story — rather， it is a ‘warts and all’ tale … Simon Akman has written a fine book on how and why the British Army has changed， between2001 and 2020。 For those who have seen military service， it will provide a broad picture of the conditions some soldiers have faced in the early 21st Century。 For those who have not， it shows clearly the true face of war， as it is fought in this day and age， and may， possibly， be fought in the near future and within current social value sets。Rob Ellis， RUSI VIC Library 。。。more

Reference

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