The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy
- Downloads：3104
- Type：Epub+TxT+PDF+Mobi
- Create Date：2021-07-06 09:51:11
- Update Date：2025-09-07
- Status：finish
- Author：Kenneth Pomeranz
- ISBN：0691217181
- Environment：PC/Android/iPhone/iPad/Kindle
- Download
Summary
A landmark comparative history of Europe and China that examines why the Industrial Revolution emerged in the West
The Great Divergence sheds light on one of the great questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe？ Historian Kenneth Pomeranz shows that as recently as 1750， life expectancy， consumption， and product and factor markets were comparable in Europe and East Asia。 Moreover， key regions in China and Japan were no worse off ecologically than those in Western Europe， with each region facing corresponding shortages of land-intensive products。 Pomeranz's comparative lens reveals the two critical factors resulting in Europe's nineteenth-century divergence-the fortunate location of coal and access to trade with the New World。 As East Asia's economy stagnated， Europe narrowly escaped the same fate largely due to favorable resource stocks from underground and overseas。 This Princeton Classics edition includes a preface from the author and makes a powerful historical work available to new readers。
The Great Divergence sheds light on one of the great questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe？ Historian Kenneth Pomeranz shows that as recently as 1750， life expectancy， consumption， and product and factor markets were comparable in Europe and East Asia。 Moreover， key regions in China and Japan were no worse off ecologically than those in Western Europe， with each region facing corresponding shortages of land-intensive products。 Pomeranz's comparative lens reveals the two critical factors resulting in Europe's nineteenth-century divergence-the fortunate location of coal and access to trade with the New World。 As East Asia's economy stagnated， Europe narrowly escaped the same fate largely due to favorable resource stocks from underground and overseas。 This Princeton Classics edition includes a preface from the author and makes a powerful historical work available to new readers。
Reviews
Alex Krentsel
，
I would recommend grabbing a different book， unless you are planning to write a research paper on this topic， in which case this is the perfect book for you。 I found Pomeranz’s writing to be dense and not very clear。 I found his logic to also be convoluted at times， especially in how he structures his arguments。 The approach of stating all assumptions and conclusions as facts， but then disproving some assumptions and proving others， comes off as pedantic。 It might work well for a lecture or disc I would recommend grabbing a different book， unless you are planning to write a research paper on this topic， in which case this is the perfect book for you。 I found Pomeranz’s writing to be dense and not very clear。 I found his logic to also be convoluted at times， especially in how he structures his arguments。 The approach of stating all assumptions and conclusions as facts， but then disproving some assumptions and proving others， comes off as pedantic。 It might work well for a lecture or discussion， but it does not work well in keeping a reader following along with the argument。 。。。more
Jindřich Zapletal
，
The book attempts to explain why western Europe diverged economically from India and China from 18th century on， and posits a theory which abstracts from everything except for the most basic economic tensions between demand and supply of land and energy。 A part of this argument is that all other circumstances of the three regions were so similar that their differences can be neglected。 It is dense reading。 As a prerequisite， the reader should have good understanding of the histories of England， The book attempts to explain why western Europe diverged economically from India and China from 18th century on， and posits a theory which abstracts from everything except for the most basic economic tensions between demand and supply of land and energy。 A part of this argument is that all other circumstances of the three regions were so similar that their differences can be neglected。 It is dense reading。 As a prerequisite， the reader should have good understanding of the histories of England， India， and China， their topography， and the driving inventions of the industrial revolution。I find the theory presented in this book rather too reductionist。 The archival evidence for the comparison of economies of England and southeastern China is very thin on the Chinese side， a problem that the author does not even bother to mention。 Abstracting away from the crushing military advantage that Europeans enjoyed first on the sea and then on land， from the devastating effects of the opium trade， from the utter unsuitability of large portions of contemporary Indian nomenclature to responsibly govern a complex society among other things， this sounds like too much to me。 Still， the book motivated me to look in new directions in my studies。 。。。more
Oliver Kim
，
The Great Divergence is a really remarkable synthesis that tackles two of the biggest questions in economic history -- why did the West industrialize first， and why not China？This book is probably best known for advancing the "Late Divergence" view that China and Europe were pretty comparable along most economic / institutional metrics as late as 1800。 But by that point both regions were running into what Pomeranz memorably calls the "pre-industrial cul-de-sac"。 Intensive agriculture was running The Great Divergence is a really remarkable synthesis that tackles two of the biggest questions in economic history -- why did the West industrialize first， and why not China？This book is probably best known for advancing the "Late Divergence" view that China and Europe were pretty comparable along most economic / institutional metrics as late as 1800。 But by that point both regions were running into what Pomeranz memorably calls the "pre-industrial cul-de-sac"。 Intensive agriculture was running into its ecological limits， with exhausted soils and barren forests becoming major constraints to further growth。 What separated Europe from China， allowing the former to escape a developmental dead-end？One factor was the location of coal。 Britain's coal was located near its major industrial centers; China's was in the North， far away from the proto-capitalist South， which was surely the best candidate for a Chinese industrial revolution。 （This answer has the same flavor as Robert Allen's thesis in his later book on the British industrial revolution。）The other， which Pomeranz focuses on more， is the role of the conquest of the Americas and slavery。 The rich resources of the New World -- and new plantations for calorie-rich sugar， exploited with the enslaved labor of Africans -- allowed Europe to escape the Old World's ecological limits。 In one of the most striking passages， Pomeranz describes the Caribbean as a proto-Third World， exploited for Europe's benefit。 What is past is prologue。Even as an academic book， The Great Divergence errs a little on the side of being a little too exhaustive -- I found myself skimming through the Nth page on Chinese vs European luxury consumption patterns。 A non-academic reader can probably just read the excellent first and last sections and get 90% of the argument。 But Pomeranz has earned the right to be a little repetitive， since the sweep of his history is so ambitious， and the strength of the arguments so compelling。 。。。more
Jeffrey
，
The Great Divergence is Pomeranz's attempt to explain how it is that Europe became the pre-eminent centre of power from the nineteenth century onwards。 Pomeranz attacks the orthodox point of view that the reason for Europe's success was the fact it created a structures and institutions based on capitalist ideals。 Instead， Pomeranz argues that much of Europe's success was instead linked instead to imperfect markets， as well a fortuitous breaks。The first part of the book is devoted to showing Euro The Great Divergence is Pomeranz's attempt to explain how it is that Europe became the pre-eminent centre of power from the nineteenth century onwards。 Pomeranz attacks the orthodox point of view that the reason for Europe's success was the fact it created a structures and institutions based on capitalist ideals。 Instead， Pomeranz argues that much of Europe's success was instead linked instead to imperfect markets， as well a fortuitous breaks。The first part of the book is devoted to showing Europe's structures were not particularly exceptional: "when it came to matters of "free labour" and markets in the overall economy， Europe did not stand out from China and Japan; indeed， in may have lagged behind at least China。 At the very least， all three of these societies resembled each other in these matters far more than any of them resembled India， the Ottoman Empire， or southeast Asia。" （p165）Instead， Pomeranz argues that what explained Europe's success was its ability to coerce others， as well as other lucky breaks。 As regards the first point， this is the exact opposite of "free market" ideal， indeed the European success story was largely one in which the governments were able to extract advantages via coercion， rather than relying on market competition: "Generally， where weapons could not provide a trump card， Europeans found themselves losing out to Chinese， Gujarati， and other Asian merchants。。。" （p182）。 But the main advantage is that the Europe was able to outsource its locus of production for primary goods and relieve its domestic ecological constraints to the New World， with slavery helping to keep costs low that helped to generate the later market structures， rather than market dynamics creating the conditions that led to outsourcing abroad。 As Pomeranz highlights: "it is crucial that the direction of explanation runs from coercion abroad to an extra boost to Smithian dynamics （and later to import-substituting industrialisation） at home， not from more efficient marketing and industrial production at home to the power to acquire people abroad。" Pomeranz's second argument is that Europe's development was often assisted by felicitous factors， for example， its geography by providing easy to access coal sources， or by allowing its shipping industry to develop more quickly due to the fact ships were able to sail twice a year。 Or the fact that China's re-monetisation provided demanded for New World silver and kept those mine's profitable （even with the use of slave labour）， until other profitable industries could be developed in the New World。Pomeranz's arguments in The Great Divergence are by and large valid and convincing， but the book suffers from a few deficiencies。 Pomeranz devotes an inordinate amount of time to highlight how much Europe， China and Japan were quite similar - often these rely on statistics， which then rely on certain assumptions。 Quite often， I found myself slightly overloaded with these， weakening Pomeranz's argument。 I also found the conclusion quite rushed， I would have liked to read more on Pomeranz's theory as to the mechanisms that led to Europe's decoupling。 Beckert's Empire of Cotton is a far more tight and focused account that highlights how Europe's trade accelerated because it moved away from market ideals; whereas Diamond's Guns， Germs， and Steel is a more focused account of how felicitous factors led to Europe's rise。 Overall， Pomeranz does a commendable job in trying to explain the history behind Europe's rise， but suffers from trying to do too much， with the result being that The Great Divergence at times lacking focus。 。。。more
Jim Sojourner
，
Leaning on quantitative and comparative method to slice apart prevailing assumptions about a pre-industrial East-West economic divide， Pomeranz plays spoiler for most of the book before setting up his own intriguing thesis: That a unique political economy linking Britain， its New World colonies， and China powered Britain - and thus Western European - divergence from the rest of the world in the 1800s。
Ed Stoddard
，
This is economic and ecological history at its most elegant。 This reviewer has learned of new concepts such as "the industrious revolution" among others， enriching my prisms on the past。 Pomeranz's central thesis is that in many ways， the "Western European" core of the global economy was no better suited - in many ways， it may have been less suited - than core Eurasian regions to the east， notably Japan and China， for full-scale industrialisation。 Ultimately， the exploitation of New World resour This is economic and ecological history at its most elegant。 This reviewer has learned of new concepts such as "the industrious revolution" among others， enriching my prisms on the past。 Pomeranz's central thesis is that in many ways， the "Western European" core of the global economy was no better suited - in many ways， it may have been less suited - than core Eurasian regions to the east， notably Japan and China， for full-scale industrialisation。 Ultimately， the exploitation of New World resources in a number of ways， and the proximity of British coal， led to Europe's 19th century surge。 This important piece of history looks at a range of trends， from deforestation to increased sugar production to the choices made by port-industrial households， to paint an intriguing portrait of the roots of our current global economy。 。。。more
Matthias
，
The positive impact of this book is that it started an entire school of quantitative historiography dedicated to China。 There has been a lot of debate and a lot of work done since then regarding the book's central thesis。 20 years later， with finally a lot of research done on Chinese archives and sources， it's quite clear Pomeranz was wrong when it comes to 1800s China， but his insights on 1500s-1600s China remain interesting。Unfortunately， the worst part of the book， which drives significantly The positive impact of this book is that it started an entire school of quantitative historiography dedicated to China。 There has been a lot of debate and a lot of work done since then regarding the book's central thesis。 20 years later， with finally a lot of research done on Chinese archives and sources， it's quite clear Pomeranz was wrong when it comes to 1800s China， but his insights on 1500s-1600s China remain interesting。Unfortunately， the worst part of the book， which drives significantly down its overall quality， is its author's interpretation of British/European development， which was simplistic， driven by ideology， and factually wrong even at the time it got published。About 10 years later， Wong & Rosenthal published an answer to Pomeranz with Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe。 。。。more
Stephen Harrison
，
This book tries to answer question "Why did Europe industrialize and China did not？" He starts by establishing that we should not normalize what happened in Europe and wonder what was wrong with China that it couldn't do it。 Industrialization was not the standard， so we should look at what allowed Europe （particularly Britain） to accomplish that。 Pomeranz spends a large portion of the book attempting to debunk accepted explanations。 For example， some argue that population growth in China meant t This book tries to answer question "Why did Europe industrialize and China did not？" He starts by establishing that we should not normalize what happened in Europe and wonder what was wrong with China that it couldn't do it。 Industrialization was not the standard， so we should look at what allowed Europe （particularly Britain） to accomplish that。 Pomeranz spends a large portion of the book attempting to debunk accepted explanations。 For example， some argue that population growth in China meant that it had few surplus resources to put towards industrialization， whereas later marriage and lower birthrates in Europe allowed it to maintain more capacity to grow。 He argues that while European birth rates were lower， China's were still manageable and did not hold the region back。 Another explanation he attacks was that Europe's free markets helped it。 He convincingly argues that mercantilism was actually less free than the Chinese system of internal trade。 He also says that financial institutions of Europe were not particularly important in spurring industrialization， but that argument was less convincing。 He also sort of glosses over the scientific advances of the era as well as patent law。Pomeranz's main explanation is twofold: Luck and luck。 The first bit of luck was that coal deposits in Britain were very conveniently located， meaning accessing and transporting coal was much cheaper than it would be in China。 The second luck was the discovery of the Americas， which provided resources to go into the factories as well as capital to pay for them。 Both of these are convincing arguments， although his dismissal of other factors is a little frustrating and undermines his argument a little。This isn't a book for the faint of heart。 Pomeranz makes good arguments and has included a lot of research， even though most of it appears to be synthesizing others' work， but it requires close reading and enjoyment of economics。 If you are looking for a fun read， this probably isn't it， but if you are looking for a book trying to answer a big and important question， this would be a good one for you。 。。。more
Tianxiao
，
久闻这本书的大名，刚刚看完。本书最精彩之处并不是得出了什么样的结论或者结论是否绝对正确，毕竟在任意时间段要搞清楚这个标题的疑问都不是一件易事，史料的残缺、数据的不全面导致的偏差，哪怕只有一点点都可能引向完全不同的结论。而本书内容带来的争论，确实是思想自由市场价值的最好例证。这种「自由」，需要理性作为前提，需要开放的知识传播作为介质，同时在与政治制度的竞争中，共同影响了整个地区的经济走向。地理决定论似乎又是逃不开的一个点。与政治制度相互影响的战争、宗教思想、社群行为等等，导致这些差异的关键，是不是来自华夏大地和地中海的地形差异呢。
Zugz
，
It is while reading the garbage that is the California school that one truly begins to realize how intellectually bankrupt Academia has become。 For most economists the very idea of "GDP" and one can even say "wealth" is naturally associated with post industrial countries， where among other factors economic growth expanded due to productivity gains from technological innovation。 The earliest proponent of historical economic analysis that is now the basis for all this nonsense was Angus Madison， w It is while reading the garbage that is the California school that one truly begins to realize how intellectually bankrupt Academia has become。 For most economists the very idea of "GDP" and one can even say "wealth" is naturally associated with post industrial countries， where among other factors economic growth expanded due to productivity gains from technological innovation。 The earliest proponent of historical economic analysis that is now the basis for all this nonsense was Angus Madison， who unlike the current California school flunkies had the privilege of being an actual economist。 However， due to how utterly speculative historical "economics" is， his ideas had multiple mistakes。 Madison's errors ranged from the significant but technical: assuming per capita income was similar across the entire world。 To errors that would make a high school student blush: indicating virtually no change in GDP for Rome， because he assumes the same geographic area for the entire Roman empire as for modern Italy。That said， Maddison was a godsend compared to the embarrassment that is Pomeranz。 To start with the most obvious， even though he is constantly referred to as an "economist" he is as qualified to write quantum physics as he is to write economics。 By all counts he has never taken an economics class in his life and instead his bio credits his economic knowledge to his experience in the Telluride House investment club（his college residential community）。 With economic qualifications that wouldn't get him a job as a bank teller he then proceeds to abuse the speculative nature of a "science" softer than a marshmallow to push what can only be described as a massively Pro China bias。 He challenges Angus Maddison in many points in regard to Chinese GDP in the early pre industrial period。 However in each case he is consistently proved wrong， see "Before the Great Divergence？ Comparing the Yangzi Delta and the Netherlands" as just one example。 In fact the latest analysis from CHINESE RESEARCHERS indicates that his claims to GDP parity has to be revised by at least 70 years。 Let me say that again！ The country that is banning mixed martial arts because it is culturally insensitive to traditional Chinese fighting styles thinks that Pomeranz's speculation is too aggressive！ By a century！！Thankfully all of this seems to have no impact on Pomeranz， whose only response to his incredible failure was basically: "hehe looks like I made a mistake， oh well"。 After all why should he care？ He makes more income than most， his compensation is in no way tied to results（obviously）， and he has tons of followers due to his university platform。 Pomeranz is the living representation of everything wrong with academia， a pig who saddles his poor students in debt so he push his own political agenda through wild speculation that then immunizes him from any error。 。。。more
B
，
Not really clear who this book is for！The way it's written， it seems clear that the majority of historians seem to ascribe certain reasons as to why England had an industrial revolution before China。 And， according to Pomeranz， those historians wrongly attribute those reasons to all of "Western Europe。"Pomeranz then provides isolated snippets of data showing that China， e。g。， had more roads or more trade or better life expectancy。 So none of those are true。 I think he finally gives his reason fo Not really clear who this book is for！The way it's written， it seems clear that the majority of historians seem to ascribe certain reasons as to why England had an industrial revolution before China。 And， according to Pomeranz， those historians wrongly attribute those reasons to all of "Western Europe。"Pomeranz then provides isolated snippets of data showing that China， e。g。， had more roads or more trade or better life expectancy。 So none of those are true。 I think he finally gives his reason for the difference in a footnote in an epilogue， but the general theme is that there's no reason。 It's just dumb luck。Could be！ But burying this under seemingly isolated examples of data （skeins of cotton or whatever） does not make for an entertaining or coherent read。 It's also not clear why Pomeranz knows that his secondary sources are better than the secondary sources he derides。 Probably should have been a short essay with footnotes for the other scholars to pick apart。 。。。more
Cheeseonaplate
，
Very carefully argued， and draws from a wide range of sources and theory to explain the truly global factors at play。
Spugpow
，
A lot of the reviews mention the importance of colonial resources and coal to Pomeranz's argument， but no one has mentioned the equally important "core" and "periphery" dynamic。 According to the book， the Industrial Revolution was able to happen in part because developing core areas like England were able to sell their manufactured goods to a permanently underdeveloped periphery of overseas colonies。 To take the example of textiles， the American south was prevented from industrializing by its re A lot of the reviews mention the importance of colonial resources and coal to Pomeranz's argument， but no one has mentioned the equally important "core" and "periphery" dynamic。 According to the book， the Industrial Revolution was able to happen in part because developing core areas like England were able to sell their manufactured goods to a permanently underdeveloped periphery of overseas colonies。 To take the example of textiles， the American south was prevented from industrializing by its reliance on slaves， whose need for clothing nonetheless created permanent demand for Britain's textile industry。 Likewise， Britain destroyed India's native textile production to ensure that they would have to buy from British factories。 By contrast， the peripheral areas that bought goods produced by the Yangtze delta， China's proto-industrial core， were allowed to develop a degree of economic parity with the core over time。 This lessened the concentration of capital in the Yangtze， reducing the impetus to industrialize。 。。。more
Who
，
This book sparked a debate but is hopelessly out of date， and has been all but rebutted as the statistics become ever clearer。 I write this review as a warning
Amit Misra
，
The most important thing to know about this book is that it is extremely dense。 It may only be 300 pages， but it feels like 1000 pages。The subject matter was interesting to me， and I learned a lot。 The question I've been thinking about is， was it worth it？ Was this book worth reading？Could I have gotten just as much out of this by reading a 20-25 page paper or essay？ Potentially。 I think the biggest thing I got from this book is learning how academics approach these sorts of questions。 I'm not a The most important thing to know about this book is that it is extremely dense。 It may only be 300 pages， but it feels like 1000 pages。The subject matter was interesting to me， and I learned a lot。 The question I've been thinking about is， was it worth it？ Was this book worth reading？Could I have gotten just as much out of this by reading a 20-25 page paper or essay？ Potentially。 I think the biggest thing I got from this book is learning how academics approach these sorts of questions。 I'm not a historian or an economist， but I think I understand better how both of those fields work with data and support conclusions。 That's valuable。I think this book probably wouldn't be appropriate for most people。 If you like reading general history books， this book is in a completely different genre。 Think of it more like a textbook。 It really is an academic text， and for that reason I'm not even sure I'm part of the intended audience。 。。。more
Susie Nazzaro
，
This book， or more accurately Herculean body of research， makes a rigorously argued and strong contribution to our understanding of early industrialization in Britain and its dependence on exploitation in the Americas。 But it is a huge missed opportunity。 I attribute this partly to the author’s evident higher-level of skill as a researcher than a writer， but also his choice to organize the book around types of markets rather than chronologically。 Because he talks about markets for types of goods This book， or more accurately Herculean body of research， makes a rigorously argued and strong contribution to our understanding of early industrialization in Britain and its dependence on exploitation in the Americas。 But it is a huge missed opportunity。 I attribute this partly to the author’s evident higher-level of skill as a researcher than a writer， but also his choice to organize the book around types of markets rather than chronologically。 Because he talks about markets for types of goods， he fails to put industrial growth in historical context。 The US Civil War gets a few pages at the end （surprising for a book that talks about cotton prices and markets so thoroughly）， the US Revolution even less， Chinese civil wars are mentioned in passing， and unrest within Europe is almost entirely ignored。 In the hands of a better writer， what a valuable contribution to economic history his book could be。 Alas， it is overly dense， poorly written， and unnecessarily convoluted despite it being strongly argued and making points that are really important not only to our understanding of economic history but to our current economic structures。I still think y’all should read it though。 。。。more
Mainereader
，
Really interesting。 Not particularly readable。
Mega
，
Tries to explain why China fell behind， but the reason the book comes up with as Coal and Colonies don't explain why China had a century of humiliation even by its neighbour Japan。 Tries to explain why China fell behind， but the reason the book comes up with as Coal and Colonies don't explain why China had a century of humiliation even by its neighbour Japan。 。。。more
Stone
，
Instead of asking the question， "why didn't the Industrial Revolution take place in China，" the book focused on the historically more precise question of "why was Western Europe the only civilization that developed into industrial society，" -- though it seems to be only a slight swap of perspective， the implications are deep and thought-provoking。The subsequent analysis mainly elaborated on two arguments:- The pre-industrial Europe and China had much more similarity than difference- Western Euro Instead of asking the question， "why didn't the Industrial Revolution take place in China，" the book focused on the historically more precise question of "why was Western Europe the only civilization that developed into industrial society，" -- though it seems to be only a slight swap of perspective， the implications are deep and thought-provoking。The subsequent analysis mainly elaborated on two arguments:- The pre-industrial Europe and China had much more similarity than difference- Western Europe had several uniquely inherent advantages that contributed to its ultimate risePrevious studies， including some more recent papers claimed that the diversion between Europe and China happened far back into the Middle Ages， some even pointed it to the fall of Tang Dynasty in the early 10th century; Pomeranz rejected such idea as condescendingly Eurocentric by comparing in depth the similarity between pre-industrial England and China's lower Yangtze basin -- not only did the two areas share similar level of population， consumption， means of production， standard of living， and scientific developments， but they also faced the same ecological barrier which served as an impregnable ceiling of development。 England's eventual success was but a geographical coincidence， for the country's mineral resources （especially coal） located close to its developed urban areas， whereas China's wealthy urban centres were far away from coal mines。 In addition， England's colonization of North America provided the valuable solution to its awaiting ecological disaster。 It shouldn't be hard to notice that Pomeranz laid heavy emphasis on the determination of geographical factors， which are comparable to those of Jared Diamond's。 Yet it is still too arbitrary to call him a geographical determinist， for he was more concerned with economic consequences of this geographical disparity rather than the disparity itself。 Moreover， the analysis was indeed soundly convincing with plenty of available demographic studies and economic statistics。 Should the author be a bit more concise in language， I'd definitely rate it five stars。 。。。more
Sylvia Zhou
，
上学的时候读的算是现在国内中国经济史必读吧刚读的时候还是蛮震撼的，记得上课的时候还把《大分流》和《白银资本》，还有王国斌的研究放在一起做过讨论。但事实上，加州学派已经过了他们的辉煌时期。去年采访一位LSE的教授时也提到过了，国外对于中国经济史的研究，实际是处在一个古典学派的反扑阶段。而且在当下全球经济下，重读大分流，很多想法也在改变。为了否定西方中心论，是否有些矫枉过正了呢？该以什么方式统合两个系统？或者究竟是否有统合的必要？
Aleksander Østrup
，
Kenneth Pomeranz tries to show that Europe （specifically Britain） were not exceptional in its institutional and productive position at the eve of the industrial solution。 He does this by looking at the relevant aspects of Asia （with a focus on China） and Europe （with a focus on Britain） and comparing the two， to show that they are not significantly different。 The way that this information is presented is by including an enormous amount of numbers in the text， which makes it difficult to compare Kenneth Pomeranz tries to show that Europe （specifically Britain） were not exceptional in its institutional and productive position at the eve of the industrial solution。 He does this by looking at the relevant aspects of Asia （with a focus on China） and Europe （with a focus on Britain） and comparing the two， to show that they are not significantly different。 The way that this information is presented is by including an enormous amount of numbers in the text， which makes it difficult to compare the presented countries。 With the use of graphs and more tables， this information could have been prestented MUCH more clearly。 The way Pomeranz presents it makes for very dry reading。The poor presentation aside， Pomeranz comes to the interesting conclusion that the main difference between the European and Asian scenario was that the European's access to coal and New World resources made Europes development avoid a cul de sac （without the new supply of resources， the resources in Britain would not be sufficient to sustain the high energy use to which the industrial path led them）。 This is of course a very simplified version of the books arguments。 If you find any of this interesting， and think you can follow the arguments through the densely packed information in the text， i can recommend this book。P。S。: An at least superficial knowledge about Asia and Europe in the period 1700-1850 is highly recommended if you decide to take on this book！ 。。。more
Charles Haywood
，
It is hardly news that the West has led the world economically for the past 200 years， or more。 This superiority （let’s be honest—that’s what it is） academics commonly call the “Great Divergence，” a term coined by Samuel Huntington in 1996， though the study of Western economic superiority began much earlier。 There are many sub-questions one can ask—e。g。， what constitutes “the West”？ Is it England？ England and parts of the Continent？ How does America fit in？ When exactly did this takeoff begin？ A It is hardly news that the West has led the world economically for the past 200 years， or more。 This superiority （let’s be honest—that’s what it is） academics commonly call the “Great Divergence，” a term coined by Samuel Huntington in 1996， though the study of Western economic superiority began much earlier。 There are many sub-questions one can ask—e。g。， what constitutes “the West”？ Is it England？ England and parts of the Continent？ How does America fit in？ When exactly did this takeoff begin？ Are other countries now catching up， or even passing， the West？ But these sub-questions are all small change compared to the most important question—why did the West diverge from the rest of the world at all， when all of world history up to that time exemplified the Malthusian Trap， where productivity increased too slowly to increase per capita output even when aggregate output increased？I once saw a list of roughly 200 different answers to this question， each with academic citations。 Probably some of them were Captain Crazy ideas tied to theories like the Phantom Time Hypothesis （look it up）。 But most of them were at least superficially plausible。 Wading through this morass is not for the faint of heart， especially because this is one of those questions where many people want a single answer， and the answer may well be “all of the above，” or at least “many of the above。” But， upon examination， it is possible to divide works examining the Great Divergence along three axes。 One is academic vs。 popular writing。 Another is unitary， or largely unitary， theories vs。 theories that ascribe the difference to a multiplicity of factors。 And the third axis is those theories that cite cultural differences vs。 those that cite material or economic differences。 This book， Kenneth Pomeranz’s “The Great Divergence，” falls squarely into the academic， unitary， material bucket。 It is a scholarly and thought-provoking book—not without failings， but forceful in its conclusions and compelling in much of its analysis。As far as the writing itself goes， this book is a blend of extreme clarity combined with unfortunate opacity。 It is clear in that Pomeranz precisely states every single one of his arguments， identifies opposing arguments， marshals the facts， and gives his conclusions， appropriately hedged if necessary。 The reader is grateful for this focus on academic excellence。 The opacity comes in with the phrasing， which is infected with a heavy dose of academic-speak。 It’s not dreadful， and the careful reader can understand everything。 But Pomeranz does not try to grab the reader’s attention， find compelling turns of phrase， or dazzle the reader with his analogies。 In this， he is the opposite of popular authors such as Jared Diamond （author of “Guns， Germs， and Steel，” which posits that Europeans were the lucky beneficiary of a series of ecological rolls of the dice）， whose book is mostly flash （though that does not mean Diamond is wrong）。 So careful reading of Pomeranz’s book is a chore。 An interesting chore， perhaps， like mucking out the stables of a herd of unicorns， but still a chore。Pomeranz begins， in his Introduction， by narrowing the scope of the discussion。 Every careful author on the topic has to do this， or the size and scope of the topic will necessarily overwhelm。 What specific countries are we examining？ What time period are we talking about？ What measures are we using？ Pomeranz does this， and he applies the same narrowing analysis to both the West and to Eurasia， which is his main comparison area。 Thus， he ascribes to England the prime mover role; he focuses on the （first） Industrial Revolution， beginning around 1800; and he uses mostly precisely defined， but narrow， economic measures， which are widely available for England but less so for Eurasia （a problem he works hard to remedy）。 He sometimes brings in data from other European countries as parallels （e。g。， France， the Netherlands） or as contrasts （e。g。， Denmark）。 Similarly， as to Eurasia， he focuses mostly on parts of China （east and southeast， and most of all the Yangzi Delta）， sometimes bringing in data from other Asian countries （Japan and India）， and sometimes contrasting to other areas of China （which， given China’s size， is roughly analogous to comparing different European countries to each other）。Pomeranz’s analytical and argumentative framework is as follows。 First， European progress prior to 1800 was not significantly advanced beyond the most advanced portions of China。 Past authors thought it was， but new data “has made 。 。 。 [what were previously thought] unique European achievements look more and more ordinary。” Second， past authors ignored the other-than-superficial benefits of the New World to Europe。 They focused on metals， but it was much more than that—the New World “relieved ecological pressures” that Europe faced， primarily “land constraint，” where an increasing population would otherwise have been doomed to increase agricultural output through more， and less efficient， use of labor （the curse of diminishing returns）， and would not have had access to necessary supplies such as timber and fiber。 Third， England’s easy access to large volumes of coal was unique， and it was this that made exponentially increasing energy production， needed for “takeoff，” possible。 Fourth， Europe’s institutions， whether that means capital accumulation， markets， technological inventiveness， state protection of property contractual rights， class structures， or other of the multitude of factors adduced by other authors， were not in fact superior to Chinese structures in their actual impact as that relates to the Industrial Revolution （they may have been superior for human society， and they may have been somewhat superior for certain aspects of expansion， but they were not determinative）。 In short， Pomeranz focuses on “what was truly [globally] scarce: land and energy，” and concludes that the edge Europe， and particularly England， had was more land and more energy at exactly the time they needed it。 This framework is the sum of the book， and it is clearly laid out in the Introduction。 The rest of the book， divided into three parts and six chapters， merely adds detail， and plenty of it。Part One is devoted to “doubt[ing] various contentions that Europe had an internally generated economic edge before 1800，” instead positing “broad similarities among the most densely populated and commercialized parts of the Old World” （i。e。， the entire world of the time）。 Pomeranz identifies this as the main difference between his and the “mainstream” position， with the latter holding that the takeoff of the Industrial Revolution was just the fully visible effect of underlying differences proceeding into the past—although there is little agreement among “mainstream” proponents of what exactly those differences were。 Pomeranz goes through the various candidates for pre-existing relevant differences， ranging from different types of accumulated and non-accumulated capital （mostly non-monetary）; life expectancy; birthrates; technology; market characteristics （which gets their own chapter）; and so on。 He addresses each and concludes it fails to demonstrate a real difference between China and Europe prior to 1800。It is in Part One， though， that the two major faults of this book show up: an eagerness， bordering on desperation， to tout Chinese accomplishments while minimizing European accomplishments; and a failure to adequately acknowledge a fact obvious from the text—that data for China is extremely limited and therefore can only be used with extreme caution， especially as a comparison to the much more voluminous data available from Europe。As to the first fault， for example， Pomeranz begins by admitting that Europe was more advanced technologically and had a culture more open to science。 Then he backpedals rapidly， claiming that he has shown that European productivity was not higher， and therefore， “it is unlikely that the average level of technology [Europeans] deployed was superior。” This is deficient logic， since productivity is not linearly tied to technology， and anyway Pomeranz has not shown （and does not show） that European productivity was not higher。 And， notably， here， and in similar sections where Pomeranz stretches to reach a conclusion he desires， the word “clearly” shows up repeatedly。 My legal writing teacher my first year of law school was useless （even if today she is the dean of a relatively high profile law school）， but she did tell us one thing that was correct—anyone who uses the word “clearly” is trying to cover up that what he says is not actually clear at all。Pomeranz tries to avoid the implications of his initial admission about superior European technology by claiming that “in many ways， various non-European societies remained ahead。” For this， he cites irrigation as being superior in China。 No doubt， but irrigation was not needed in Europe， both because rainfall was more constant and because rice was not the main crop， so it is hardly surprising that Europeans did not focus on the technology of irrigation。 Then he starts rambling about land in the New World， prefiguring one of his main contentions but not sticking to the point at hand。 Then he says that India was better at （hand） textile weaving and dyeing， which is true enough， but irrelevant （and that India is today still the leader in hand-weaving seems relevant， but is not mentioned here）。 And then he says that “various parts of Africa” （which？） “produced large amounts of iron and steel that were of a quality at least as good as anything available in early modern Europe。” That seems unlikely， unless he means Damascus， which isn’t in Africa。 Then he claims that the only reason Europe had “formal scientific societies” was because they were “often essential to protecting science from a hostile established Church，” which is very bad history， given that such societies arose long after the heyday of Church power （and in the case of England， where the most important such society was， totally outside any Church power）， and that the Church was by far the biggest supporter of scientific progress in the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance。 All of this is merely flailing that never gets around to any concrete proof that “various non-European societies remained ahead。” Pomeranz would have been well advised simply to claim lack of certainty （something he does constantly with respect to China， as I note below） about the relative state of technology， and move on。 It may be that those academics who claim superiority for Europe in both technology and scientific thinking are wrong。 But Pomeranz fails miserably to show that to be the case。Along the same lines， it seems unlikely that “European monarchs imitated the Chinese ritual of having the emperor plow the year’s first furrow”—I have never heard of such a custom， but to the extent it existed in Europe， it seems like a pretty obvious possible ritual for a monarch， and very unlikely to have been copied from remote China。 But gullibly ascribing such imitation gives a window into Pomeranz’s desperation to build up China at European expense。 Moreover， Pomeranz is fond of making sweeping generalizations on little evidence， as long as they favor China—such as claiming that “keeping Chinese women at home 。 。 。 kept China almost factory-less even though every other factor—available capital， technological inventiveness， and so on—made it as good a candidate for industrialization as Europe。” Pomeranz does a decent job showing some evidence for this position， but his conclusion is hardly justified （and the great weight of evidence suggests that China was very much lacking in technological inventiveness， but rather had a decent amount of scattered tinkering ability， which is very much not the same thing—Toby Huff has written extensively on this distinction， in his “The Rise of Early Modern Science”）。 Similarly， Pomeranz repeatedly claims that hundreds of years before the Industrial Revolution， China had “spinning equipment 。 。 。 very close to the machines that revolutionized English cotton spinning four hundred-plus years later，” which “differed in just one crucial detail” （which he does not specify）。 Maybe that’s true， but I can find no other evidence for it， and if it’s true， it just goes to prove the lack of Chinese technological inventiveness， suggesting those who allege Chinese cultural deficiencies in the application of technology are correct。As to the second major fault， to take just one example， on page 63， where Pomeranz is discussing Chinese iron and coal production， a crucial question because of the importance of iron and steel to industrialization， and because the efficient use of coal is highly correlated to the expansion of iron and steel production， in the course of ONE PAGE Pomeranz radically qualifies statements about Chinese data in twelve different ways: “seem to have known”; “it is unclear”; a critical study “says very little about fuel”; “leading one to suspect”; “we still know very little”; “this study suggests”; “there is still much we do not know”; “it is unclear”; “a distinct possibility”; “even if it turns out”; “if it did”; “might well have been。” Such language appears continuously throughout the book， almost exclusively in sections examining facts about China critical to Pomeranz’s entire thesis。 The simple fact seems to be that we don’t know nearly enough to support the claims Pomeranz makes about China to make comparisons， despite Pomeranz， in multiple appendixes， working to construct such data in narrow areas such as “Estimates of Manure Applied to North China and European Farms in the Late Eighteenth Century， and a Comparison of Resulting Nitrogen Fluxes。” He clearly worked very hard—but the result is not all that convincing。 Which doesn’t mean he’s wrong， but it may well mean the data is simply not available， and never will be。Pomeranz concludes Part One by claiming that “European science， technology， and philosophical inclinations alone do not seem an adequate explanation。” But this is assuming the conclusion， because he never tell us why that should be—especially because by this very statement he admits the superiority of “European science， technology， and philosophical inclinations。” It’s just a bunch of hand waving so that he can spend the rest of the book talking about coal and the New World and the real drivers of the Great Divergence。 Which is fine， but it does suggest that the premise on which he builds the rest of the book rests on fragile foundations at best。 Of course， many authors have written entire books on this topic （see， e。g。， both Huff and Gregory Clark’s “Farewell To Alms”）， so I suppose you can’t really aggressively fault Pomeranz for not wanting to get bogged down， and to instead want to turn to what he brings to the table that’s new。In Part Two， Pomeranz treats as established that China and Europe did not materially economically differ around 1800。 （He never addresses culture differences in any substantial way—as I say， this is a book about the economic/material axis of the Great Divergence。） He therefore turns to why China and Europe diverged after 1800。 He examines many varied theories， including consumption of luxury goods; firm structure; state control and expropriation; interstate violence; and so on。 Along the way he rejects the common left-wing trope that Asia was heading toward an industrial revolution until crushed by Western imperialism。 Rather， the entire world was heading for a “common ‘proto-industrial’ cul de sac，” in which the Malthusian Trap would maintain primacy， until the unique combination of coal and the New World allowed Europe to escape。This is what Pomeranz outlines in Part Three。 He admits that technological creativity was the real driver of the Industrial Revolution—but claims that coal and the New World made that creativity possible。 Every part of the world had ever-increasing constraints on growth， because without something new， diminishing returns were kicking in。 Fuel， fiber and food were all getting harder to obtain; ecological damage was becoming widespread as different areas struggled to feed growing populations; and that damage was rapidly mortgaging the future。 But the New World “abolished the land constraint” for the West， allowing manufactured goods made without much land use to be exchanged for “land-intensive food and fiber” that could not have been produced in the same way within the Old World。 And coal allowed those manufactured goods to be produced in ever-greater quantities， creating an expanding engine of growth。Pomeranz relies heavily on Denmark as a possible alternate path for Europe， the exception that proves the rule。 Denmark had no takeoff until the 20th Century， instead relying on increasingly intensive agriculture with diminishing returns， and it had very little industry。 Denmark’s path was， in fact， very similar to the path taken by China。 Pomeranz believes this shows that “the path of ecological near self-sufficiency through rural labor intensification， once adopted， was not easily abandoned，” and that this path was the alternate path that Europe as a whole might have taken， along with the rest of the world （which raises the question whether we’d all still be living in a world equivalent to 1800 otherwise）。 Maybe。 But this ignores the extremely significant cultural differences between Denmark （and all of Scandinavia， but especially Denmark） and other parts of Europe。 Denmark is well-known for the so-called “Jante Law，” which is， as Wikipedia tells us， “a pattern of group behavior towards individuals within Nordic countries that negatively portrays and criticizes individual success and achievement as unworthy and inappropriate。” It is well covered in Michael Booth’s recent “The Almost Nearly Perfect People，” and provides an extremely plausible reason for Nordic economic backwardness。 The crushing of excellence as shown by achievement necessarily leads to less， or zero， achievement。 Thus， it’s not only as between Eurasia and Europe that cultural differences matter （though as I say Pomeranz mostly ignores them）， but also in Europe。 Another similar example is Spain， which after it promptly spent its own New World gains immediately sank into economic stagnation， and stayed there。 Therefore， the existence of cultures in Europe that， like China， failed to advance might be due to coal and the “land constraint。” Or it might be due to their own internal cultural deficiencies， which Pomeranz does not address。[Review continued as first comment。] 。。。more
Nick
，
The great divergence summed up would be as follows; there is this theory on why China was different from Europe and that is why Europe become the economic powerhouse and not china， then Kenneth Pomeranz steps in and in a dozen or so pages filled with tons of data and comparative analysis or case studies points out how much assumption and how little fact based research is in this specific theory and up we go to the next theory。 It is as if the author was sick and tired of the many stereotypical a The great divergence summed up would be as follows; there is this theory on why China was different from Europe and that is why Europe become the economic powerhouse and not china， then Kenneth Pomeranz steps in and in a dozen or so pages filled with tons of data and comparative analysis or case studies points out how much assumption and how little fact based research is in this specific theory and up we go to the next theory。 It is as if the author was sick and tired of the many stereotypical assumptions on China and Japan when compared to western Europe that he decided to list all the things he heard and systematically disproved them so he could easily counter the said assumptions in debates。 "ah but your theory is flawed for I have actually studied the data and they tell me you are wrong！" I get why he chose this approach and style for his book， but I did not like it; in short if your not already deep in the subject， the book will feel as a blur afterwards with a few general impressions in stead of a few solid arguments。 Well except for; the final statement （spoiler） "rather than pretend we are seeking the differences among truly independent entities on the eve of industrialization， we must acknowledge the importance of pre existing connections in creating those differences。" This statement refers to his big counterpoint to the many theories （ which he denounces as following It makes for an awkward marriage between history and economics at least schools of economics that posit single equilibrium as the destination towards a given system trends。 a form of intellectual anarchy）。 The author is adamant that it was the existence of the new world and European colonies there， in particular those of the United Kingdom， that proved to be the defining edge and factor in allowing the possibility of mass industrialization。 For both China and west Europe， （and to a lesser extent Japan） had strong core regions with proto industries， an emerging consumer class， a changing relations with regional peripheries and a similar ecological challenge that limited the growth of aforementioned factors。 there were differences between West Europe and East Asia， only a lot of the times not as the theories assume them to be， for example it seemed China and Japan in the 18th century were closer to the Adam Smith idea of a classic market economy with companies and market oriented farmers/craftmen then most of Europe was including Great Britain and the Netherlands。 In the end it all boils down to the fact that most theories on why Europe rose above Asia， refrain from taking into account the dominance of Europe over the Atlantic trade。 the trade in silver， slaves， cloth， drugs （sugar， tabacco， coffee） and energy （ food/timber ） that allowed Europe to circumvent ecological limitations that East Asia had and could not circumvent with relatively limited expansions in the pacific， south-east asia， siberia or central Asia。 And even then still East Asia outranked Europe on a few fronts such as life expectancy， capital accumulation and while Europe was the bigger factor （war investments and research， the author makes a strong case of dismantling the seemingly obvious advantage this brought for Europe）。 With noted exception of coal， for the author there is no denying the obvious difference that europe had coal （and more importantly great Britain had coal as it did have a lot of alternative food， timber and energy foods for workers） while China had not in the 18th/19th century or limited uses for it at the time。 But as the author points out， if coal is the main factor or a huge factor， then there is little room for big theories and economic models explaining the inevitable rise of Europe and its civilization （and thus these theories tend to downplay coal）。 All in all I liked the theme and purpose of the book， but it needed a story。 As it is now it is rather boring to read if your not fully part of the discussion and now the nuances of the theories and positions。 I have a limited affinity with the subject so I could keep track but I do prefer a historical narrative over a dry comparison。 We do get a narrative but you have to piece it together。 For instance on why China and Japan had less use for coal to begin with。 China and Japan either had to grow more food for more workers or more cotton for more material but the first would mean less material and the second less workers， ergo an ecological catch 22 that limited the proto industry and thus a potential mechanized industry （to speak even less of growing sugar to a scale to help sustain a proletariat）。 While Great Britain could grow cotton in the Americas and thus grow more food and material at the same time by regional specialization on massive scale。 another example would be on how luxery interacted with the growth of a capitalist society， an interesting approach but it needed more， I did not quite get the subtle differences which would not have been the case if there had been some space for presenting societies aspects of need for luxury （ a lot of luxury guides are mentioned yet we get very little content from them）/ So we do get a narrative but it is all over the place。 I would have loved a general societal structure analysis before we dove into all the theoretical comparisons。 Still if you are into this material and tend to believe the Europe was destined to be top dog， check it out and challenge your views especially if you insists on data comparison。 。。。more
Grace
，
an interesting study sullied by stubborn anti-marxism
Ekul
，
Very important book with ideas that were groundbreaking at the time， but needlessly dense。
Zach
，
Pomeranz argues persuasively that the "core" economic areas of the old world were all pretty similar， or at least more similar than different， until just before the Industrial Revolution。 And that it was a particularly fortuitous set of circumstances， namely， the New World's coercive plantation slavery and easy access to coal， that led England to leap forward and diverge in the mid-19th century。The core argument is meticulously laid out， with as much data as we can possible have， and does a grea Pomeranz argues persuasively that the "core" economic areas of the old world were all pretty similar， or at least more similar than different， until just before the Industrial Revolution。 And that it was a particularly fortuitous set of circumstances， namely， the New World's coercive plantation slavery and easy access to coal， that led England to leap forward and diverge in the mid-19th century。The core argument is meticulously laid out， with as much data as we can possible have， and does a great job repudiating many arguments about European/Western European/British specialness compared to the core areas of China and Japan （and to a lesser extent India。）。 The New World argument is also quite persuasive， in particular， that depopulation and repopulation to great economic was possible in the New World for Europeans because of disease， something that the East and South Asians couldn't have replicated in any of their possible "colonial" regions in Southeast Asia and the island chains。The coal argument， though， fell a little flat for me， especially because the northern Chinese core area had used coal in the past。 I get that using fossil fuels for power is the critical leap， but it's not clear to me why this happened in England and not anywhere else。 The lucky placement of coal would seem to exist elsewhere as well but was not exploited。 There's still something here that needs to be accounted for。But， overall， this is a truly excellent look at the core economic areas is the old world and at least a partial look at why one part of a larger core （England， of the "English Channel" core） was able to make the leap into modernity。 。。。more
Adrian
，
A modern Wealth of NationsThe Great Divergence is by no means an easy read， however， for those who are seeking answers as to why Europe paced ahead of Asia， or more specifically， China， Kenneth Pomeranz provides answers， within a mammoth work of scholarship。The Great Divergence is clearly very well researched and sheds new light on the processing of the European Industrial Revolution， and the perceived Chinese stagnation。Pomeranz takes many factors into account， in fact almost every conceivable A modern Wealth of NationsThe Great Divergence is by no means an easy read， however， for those who are seeking answers as to why Europe paced ahead of Asia， or more specifically， China， Kenneth Pomeranz provides answers， within a mammoth work of scholarship。The Great Divergence is clearly very well researched and sheds new light on the processing of the European Industrial Revolution， and the perceived Chinese stagnation。Pomeranz takes many factors into account， in fact almost every conceivable factor， in analysing what made some areas suited for industrialization more than others， and many other issues such as diet， consumption patterns， or even the replacement of beer and gin with tea in the British daily diet， thus allowing British workers to do more demanding， dangerous work （one cannot underestimate the importance of the tea break）。A central part of Pomeranz's thesis is the discovery of the New World and with it sliver and extra space， coupled with the Chinese demand for sliver。This book is by no means easy to swallow and does not provide simple answers， but for those who want a fuller picture of why the West got ahead， this is the book。 An easy read it is not， but a scholarly work it is。 。。。more
Erica Mukherjee
，
In The Great Divergence， Kenneth Pomeranz sets himself up as a crusader for truth。 While not precisely quixotic， Pomeranz spends most of his book titling at windmills of his own construction as he attempts to demonstrate that it was just as likely for an industrial revolution to take place in the Yangzi Valley of China as it was for it to take place in northern England。 Pomeranz argues that the two regions' economies were on essentially the same path and， were it not for coal and colonies， Engla In The Great Divergence， Kenneth Pomeranz sets himself up as a crusader for truth。 While not precisely quixotic， Pomeranz spends most of his book titling at windmills of his own construction as he attempts to demonstrate that it was just as likely for an industrial revolution to take place in the Yangzi Valley of China as it was for it to take place in northern England。 Pomeranz argues that the two regions' economies were on essentially the same path and， were it not for coal and colonies， England may have never diverged from its labor-intensive proto-industrial trajectory to become the industrial powerhouse of the nineteenth century。 Pomeranz constructs his argument as a comparative economic analysis of China and England。 He takes a given that neoclassical economics are the most efficient and that a great enough accumulation of capital will lead to industrial take-off。 The maelstrom of debate surrounding these two assumptions is missing from the text， and while entering into that debate was not Pomeranz's reason for writing， a mention that he is building off of contested assumptions would have been welcome。 Because of the overall importance of the book to the field of global history， it has been both widely praised and criticized。 The intensive quantitative primary research Pomeranz conducts to support his hypothesis has not been criticized by other experts in the field。 What is questionable is the methodology by which Pomeranz uses his data to painstakingly undercut the theories of other historians。 Pomeranz spends the majority of his book laying out the findings of another researcher and then disproving them point by point。 The overall tone of the book becomes: "Pomeranz against the world"。 This is not to say that The Great Divergence isn't an important work of historical revisionism。 It tackles the question of global inequality and contributes to a growing chorus of scholars who attribute the rise of the West to a series of fortunate coincidences。 It inspired a new method of approaching imperial economic history and contributes to the ongoing debate about the origins of global poverty。 。。。more
Dan Gorman
，
January/February 2015: Truly， this is one of the toughest books we graduate historians must read。 Pomeranz's ideas are great， but the book's readability is not the best。 If you're a casual reader， this is NOT the book for you。 This book is for serious students of economics， history， and political science - and environmental science， now that I think about it。Kenneth Pomeranz argues （quite compellingly） that we must stop privileging the West as innately superior to the East。 He specifically wants January/February 2015: Truly， this is one of the toughest books we graduate historians must read。 Pomeranz's ideas are great， but the book's readability is not the best。 If you're a casual reader， this is NOT the book for you。 This book is for serious students of economics， history， and political science - and environmental science， now that I think about it。Kenneth Pomeranz argues （quite compellingly） that we must stop privileging the West as innately superior to the East。 He specifically wants to abandon ideas that Europe （especially Britain） was somehow predestined to experience the Industrial Revolution and surpass Asia technologically。 To this end， he amasses a bunch of statistical data and evaluates the state of Chinese， Japanese， Indian， British， and continental European economics in the 1700s。 Pomeranz shows that China and Japan in particular had relatively high levels of proto-industrialization， as well as impressive trade networks。 On issues like lifespan， wages， creature comfort， the competitiveness of local markets， etc。， China in particular often surpasses Great Britain！ So Pomeranz does a good job of showing that the Industrial Revolution could have happened anywhere。Why did the Revolution happen in England and not China， then？ For Pomeranz， the key is an influx of natural resources （sugar， cotton， timber， and fossil fuels） from the New World。 Supporting factors included the harnessing of coal and other fossil fuels in Britain， new tech， population growth in Britain's developed cities （as opposed to Chinese population growth in the farmlands）， and precious metals （silver） from the New World that Europeans could use trade with Asia。Critiques that have arisen for the book: Pomeranz makes the industrial divergence between East and West sound more sudden than it probably was。 Some of the data is awfully speculative and based on small datasets from China et。 al。 Some of the comparisons between Britain and provinces of China and India are pretty broad。 The last three chapters of the book are poorly organized， compared to the extremely well organized first three chapters。 Near the end of the book， the prose becomes extremely dense。 Pomeranz could have explored the role of science and fossil fuels （a most tantalizing motif he touches upon） in far greater detail。But the big takeaways: Maybe we should define modernity based on who harnessed fossil fuels first， instead of defining modernity with awkward cultural claims。 The East often was on a par or ahead of the West。 The New World's raw resources may have mattered more than actual money obtained there。Much food for thought！Update， 9/29/2016: Re-read the book。 I bumped my rating from 3 stars to 4。 A second read reveals the strength of the writing， which one doesn't notice the first time because of the dense ideas。 Pomeranz has a debt to Max Weber in thinking that capitalism appeared around the world at an early time。 Unlike Weber， Pomeranz doesn't think capitalism is the inevitable form of modern civilization。 Pomeranz draws from Thomas Malthus's idea of resource traps — civilizations are bogged down just feeding themselves， never mind using natural resources for industrialization。 Supplies from America helped Britain escape its Malthusian limits。 China， which experienced population growth in poor rural areas， had to spend more resources on feeding people; this process succeeded， but didn't leave much material left to use in industry。 。。。more
Adam
，