Philosophy

Against Method

Against Method

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  • Author：Paul Karl Feyerabend
  • ISBN：1844674428
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Summary

Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work， which sparked and continues to stimulate fierce debate， examines the deficiencies of many widespread ideas about scientific progress and the nature of knowledge。 Feyerabend argues that scientific advances can only be understood in a historical context。 He looks at the way the philosophy of science has consistently overemphasized practice over method， and considers the possibility that anarchism could replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge。

This updated edition of the classic text includes a new introduction by Ian Hacking， one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science。 Hacking reflects on both Feyerabend’s life and personality as well as the broader significance of the book for current discussions。

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Reviews

Francis Kilkenny ，

In my copy of Paul Feyerabend’s ‘Against Method’ I have many small post-it notes to indicate passages that caught my attention。 I read this book carefully， but I still feel that I missed much。 The thing is， Feyerabend is a trickster， constantly including an element of subversion into his intellectual argument。 But， he also shines a real light onto the predicament of science。 So， I’ve left myself a little map for when I go back and read it again。 And this book deserves to be read at least twice， In my copy of Paul Feyerabend’s ‘Against Method’ I have many small post-it notes to indicate passages that caught my attention。 I read this book carefully， but I still feel that I missed much。 The thing is， Feyerabend is a trickster， constantly including an element of subversion into his intellectual argument。 But， he also shines a real light onto the predicament of science。 So， I’ve left myself a little map for when I go back and read it again。 And this book deserves to be read at least twice， perhaps more。In my delvings into the philosophy of science， this is， perhaps， the most tantalizing work I’ve come across。 The question of whether it is genius， trivial or a joke remains。 But， if one were to pin me to a position， I would lean on the side that it is a work of genius， that is misunderstood and not given the credit it deserves， because it *also* a joke， especially on the serious intellectuals。 Ultimately， my take away， is that abstract notions of an underlying logic of science （the consistency and falsifiability of Popper） fail to explain science as it actually is。 That ‘science’ is a tradition like another other steeped in the fabric overlapping cultures。 The scientist doesn’t simply use better theories and data to make progress and convince others。 First， these theories and data may not even be “better” within the contemporary context （this agrees with Kuhn）。 But also， scientists are also human， and can and will use all the tricks available to promote their view， even propaganda。 Much of the first part of the book is devoted a description of Galileo’s promotion of the Copernican view， showing that he used a combination of new tools， trickery and bluster to convince others。 Some of his data were better， by contemporary judgment， but much of it was not。But， even my framing of this critique does not capture the full depth of Feyerabend’s argument。 In part， this is because Feyerabend is not just trying to replace one description of scientific logic with another， say， in the vein of Kuhn， who described a more complex and contingent logic than Popper， but that was still a “structure。” Feyerabend wants to move away from any structure in the lofty， overall sense。 His point is that any version of an abstract， essential， logic is rooted within cultural traditions that have there own， often invisible histories。 It is a kind of cultural relativism。 Of course， Feyerabend even asks you to question this framing。It reminds me a bit of finding that math is incomplete。 Sometimes， what is true cannot be proven。 。。。more

Rajiv Chopra ，

In many ways， this is quite a magnificent book。 It is not an easy read， and in the next few days I will write a more detailed review。It is not an easy book to read， and there were times when I wondered if he would ever move beyond Aristotle and Galileo。 However， once you get into the second half of the book， Paul Feyerabend started to pull all the threads together。 While he did not examine how the process has worked in the 20th century， and this is a shame， he demonstrated how scientific progres In many ways， this is quite a magnificent book。 It is not an easy read， and in the next few days I will write a more detailed review。It is not an easy book to read， and there were times when I wondered if he would ever move beyond Aristotle and Galileo。 However， once you get into the second half of the book， Paul Feyerabend started to pull all the threads together。 While he did not examine how the process has worked in the 20th century， and this is a shame， he demonstrated how scientific progress is not always as methodical as it seems to be！At the end， he spelled out some of his own beliefs， and this raised the book to a higher dimension than I had initially thought possible。 It is not a book for the faint of heart but stay with it and you will be rewarded。 。。。more

Thomas Dargent ，

Ok， I get it， you're smart。 Stopped after 100 pages， given that the author didn't want to write for anyone but his ego。He made some good points （the fact that anarchists like Bakunin wouldn't question the scientific methods， the limits of the scientific way of writing and publishing。。。） but for an "anarchist" book， it seems ignorant of the anarchist thinking。Might have to reread it when I have the patience 。。。 Ok， I get it， you're smart。 Stopped after 100 pages， given that the author didn't want to write for anyone but his ego。He made some good points （the fact that anarchists like Bakunin wouldn't question the scientific methods， the limits of the scientific way of writing and publishing。。。） but for an "anarchist" book， it seems ignorant of the anarchist thinking。Might have to reread it when I have the patience 。。。 。。。more

Dakota Murray ，

Easy-to-read philosophy advocating epistemological anarchism that effectively caused the Philosophy of Science to abandon the demarcation problem？ What more could you ask for？ Probably my favorite text in the philosophy of science。 The portions about Galielio are interesting， but a little more difficult to follow。 They however fit in well with the other arguments of the book， and the main points are well summarized。

Alex Mader ，

A very thought provoking book。 My biggest regret is that we cannot read it's sister work that was planned to be released alongside it。 A very thought provoking book。 My biggest regret is that we cannot read it's sister work that was planned to be released alongside it。 。。。more

Joshua R。 Taylor ，

I really wanted to like this book。 The second of its two stars was achieved by the thesis statement and high-level arguments of the book being really interesting。 However it ultimately proved to be a case of drowning in details， telling stories of they-said-they-said。 I have no problems with that， but it's got to be interesting and I just can't find philosophy of science interesting。 It makes me snooze in the same way that analytical philosophy does， even in this book which is about as far from I really wanted to like this book。 The second of its two stars was achieved by the thesis statement and high-level arguments of the book being really interesting。 However it ultimately proved to be a case of drowning in details， telling stories of they-said-they-said。 I have no problems with that， but it's got to be interesting and I just can't find philosophy of science interesting。 It makes me snooze in the same way that analytical philosophy does， even in this book which is about as far from the analytical approach as you can get。 I couldn't make it to the end。The thesis is this: the correct epistemological position to take is epistemological anarchism， meaning taking an 'anything goes' approach when choosing sources of truth to investigate。 This is extreme opposition to logical positivist scientism， a prevalent stance in the western world which claims that empiricism through science is the only reliable way to establish knowledge （and everything not established through science， we'll work it out eventually in a scientific way）。Science often puts itself forward as a unified body of knowledge which is consistent with itself in its various areas。 However Paul Feyerabend writes that this is rarely the case， unity in science is a myth。 This is because over various different fields， there is no consistent way to carry out the kinds of science experiments many of us learn in school; repeatable， controlled or hypothesis disproving。 Many fields just aren't practically able to do it。 So then how can we reconcile theories that were proven in vastly different ways？Another major point is how science makes lots of rules， but then often has to break them to make any meaningful changes to existing theories。 If changing a theory makes it more accurate in the long-run， then you would hope that science accommodates this。 But looking through history， most of the biggest scientific breakthroughs in history were only made possible by giving the finger to the established rules at the time。 So why even have rules？Perhaps a bizarre point: to enhance a theory's precision， accuracy or criticality， you have to enhance knowledge in all other competing theories no matter what method they are established with。 With competing theories at the same level of complexity as the one you are defending， how can it be developed further？Lastly， of the points I picked up， Feyerabend writes that science is shaped by history and politics whether we want to be or not。 This was strongly denied by Kant and Descartes， saying that it's possible to bracket all of history and politics while carrying out scientific enquiry。 However Feyerabend sees their effects to each individual as deterministic in all the thinking that individual does， including the desire to 'bracket out' history and politics。Overall a really interesting thesis that captivated me and makes me second guess logical positivism even stronger。 What I hope to do going forward is to see truth as something viewed under a lens。 Different lenses produce different truths and what really matters in the end is how critical or 'meaningful' the knowledge through that lens is in our lives。 Just accuracy is not enough， you also need to know where to aim。The rest of the book however。。。 😴 。。。more

Chase ，

Taken in context with the premises that lead to its construction， epistemic anarchism defeats the typical criticism that it leads to some kind of lawless intellectual wasteland。 Epistemic anarchism flows， in part， from stretching theorization from the world of forms and dropping part of it back into human brains。 It is an elaboration on the consequences of recognizing that theorizing is done by certain groups of people at certain points in history with certain ideas and who experience certain qu Taken in context with the premises that lead to its construction， epistemic anarchism defeats the typical criticism that it leads to some kind of lawless intellectual wasteland。 Epistemic anarchism flows， in part， from stretching theorization from the world of forms and dropping part of it back into human brains。 It is an elaboration on the consequences of recognizing that theorizing is done by certain groups of people at certain points in history with certain ideas and who experience certain quirks of perception and cognition。 Given that theorizing is occurring in the brains of people， styles of theorizing are going to be shaped by the same factors that shape their behaviors， and so most of the time theorizing is going to be done in an institutional style。 By allowing any theory， epistemic anarchism comes pre-loaded with an acknowledgement of its own contextualization， and therefore of its limitations。 Epistemic anarchists won't ever dominate the world， but they'll make it a hell of a lot more creative。 。。。more

Brian Griffith ，

Okay， so Feyerabend shows that institutionalized science gets directed to institutional ends， ignores questions that are deemed irrelevant， and sometimes presumes that its answers are final rather than preliminary。 But this sustained attack on the biases of scientific enterprise seem to invalidate self-interest in the process of problem solving。 It seems to label science as an enemy of greater understanding， the way many people label religion as an enemy of self-discovery。

horselover ，

i did not get everything someone is supposed to get out of this - i am not real scientifically learned and a lot i skimmed - but i "got it" and even really "liked" parts of it。 have a really serious argument with my scientist friend about this kind of shit once every few months that usually ends in me indirectly blaming him for hiroshima and the holocaust。started reading this feb 13， 2019， but really only started it late february （22nd？） 2021 i did not get everything someone is supposed to get out of this - i am not real scientifically learned and a lot i skimmed - but i "got it" and even really "liked" parts of it。 have a really serious argument with my scientist friend about this kind of shit once every few months that usually ends in me indirectly blaming him for hiroshima and the holocaust。started reading this feb 13， 2019， but really only started it late february （22nd？） 2021 。。。more

Ruward ，

What a trip

Gustavo Sena Mafra ，

mto bom， agora sou terraplanista

Max ，

A defense of such tools as rhetoric in Science is a pretty rare breed even today， but Feyerabend really pulls all the stops here， making an argument for Science for its own sake being unprepared to deal with reality， and a method that has functioned， in many ways to the exclusion of others， for far too long。 There's a lot to be said of Feyerabend's theories， but mostly I want to state its value as a good read for someone who is still believing in the scientific method having success outside of i A defense of such tools as rhetoric in Science is a pretty rare breed even today， but Feyerabend really pulls all the stops here， making an argument for Science for its own sake being unprepared to deal with reality， and a method that has functioned， in many ways to the exclusion of others， for far too long。 There's a lot to be said of Feyerabend's theories， but mostly I want to state its value as a good read for someone who is still believing in the scientific method having success outside of its own realm， as something to be studied and utilized everywhere。 Feyerabend's biggest weakness is that， while he meticulously cross-references philosophers and their ideas （though he rarely explains them， much to my chagrin）， he rarely if ever references the scientific claims that he is making。 A few of his scientific evidence feels a little bit like pseudo-scientific nonsense， and it's very difficult to figure out if it's A） wrong， B） right， or C） wrong， but in a way that was the scientific consensus at the time of publication。 These mistakes mess up his credibility， and my discussion group was forced to scramble to find examples of our own that might end up working。A part of this problem is that he originally meant to write this book in concert with a friend， who was writing from the opposite side of the fence， who tragically passed away before his section was written。 Feyerabend writes in several things that ultimately would have made sense in that context， he claims， as they addressed claims he knew his friend to like making， but ultimately they end up confusing without the target。 I want to give him the benefit of the doubt on this one。Anyway， should you read this？ If you're interested in science or philosophy， or you love philosophy and hate science， this is a good book to check out。 。。。more

Sebastian ，

This is a refutation of Popperian epistemology （critical rationalism） and an introduction to an alternative: epistemological anarchism。 Feyerabend is very careful to avoid calling it a "systematic treatise" [xvii] even though in my opinion he gets close。 I suppose if an anarchic epistemology could be positively defined it wouldn't be very anarchic， would it？ * Feyerabend starts by asserting that humans don't create knowledge through Popper's cycles of theorizing， data gathering， and selection of This is a refutation of Popperian epistemology （critical rationalism） and an introduction to an alternative: epistemological anarchism。 Feyerabend is very careful to avoid calling it a "systematic treatise" [xvii] even though in my opinion he gets close。 I suppose if an anarchic epistemology could be positively defined it wouldn't be very anarchic， would it？ * Feyerabend starts by asserting that humans don't create knowledge through Popper's cycles of theorizing， data gathering， and selection of theories that can't be falsified。 There are plenty of exceptions。 In fact， investigating theories that directly contradict empirical observations has historically been very important to science。 [7]That's odd， you might be thinking。 A fact is a fact。 And， thinking rationally， if a theory contradicts a fact then the theory must be wrong。Feyerabend points out the flaw in our thinking:- Consider the assertion "the table in front of me is brown"。 You can see it with your own eyes。 It's brown。 - But could it be the case that the medium between you and the table distorts the color？- What if we don't understand some aspect of light and some force is actually exerting an influence on the visible electromagnetic radiation bouncing off the table？- How reliable are your eyes and brain as a sensory apparatus？You quickly see that any "fact" supporting a specific theory relies on all kinds of assumptions。 [15] And so creative theories that disagree with "facts" should not be discarded as heretical but rather rigorously examined。 A new theory may be a stronger model of reality than the status quo and include an alternative interpretation for the offending "fact"。This isn't just a slick argument。 As alluded to earlier， Feyerabend takes care to outline a number of historical cases where science has proceeded precisely along these lines vs the Popperian model。 Galileo's proof of Copernican heliocentrism is chief among them and takes center stage for much of the book。Feyerabend claims that the Popperian rationalists would actually have been on the side of the church in Galileo's era [127]。 Heliocentrism in fact contradicted what appeared to be at the time a set of sound facts -- in other words， heliocentrism was "unscientific" [128]。 "If you're so smart Galileo，" Cardinal Bellarmine probably said， "explain this: when I drop a ball from a tall tower， it falls directly down。 But if the Earth was spinning， it would follow a curved course。 QED， believe in science， moron！" With the benefit of hindsight we can see that this fact is wholly reconcilable with a spinning Earth。 We just didn't grok frames of reference and inertia at the time。There's a lot more to the historical examples Feyerabend brings up but let's just jump to the conclusion: "is it possible to have both a science as we know it and the rules of critical rationalism？ 。。。 to this question the answer seems to be a firm and resounding NO" [157]。 "The idea of a fixed method， or a fixed theory of rationality， rests on too naive a view of man。。。 there is only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances。。。 It is the principle anything goes" [12]。 -----If you buy Feyerabend's argument， one implication is that universities are very bad for science。 Departmental organization constrains the range of theories， facts， and measurement tools you may consider to investigate a phenomenon。 As a PI you are incentivized to incrementally build on previous work in your area but no-one will be too happy if you put forward a new theory that renders everyone else's lifetime of work obsolete or discards it as flawed。Another implication is that there is no "best" way to organize scientific teams on the quest for new knowledge。 Anything Goes。 Rather than try and extract the key features from successful scientists in the past， the only thing we can say is that imposing uniformity in training， funding， and organization of scientists is bad。-----The universe appears to be fractal in its complexity。 Just when you think you've finally gotten reality figured out （"it's all quarks and color forces out there！"）， it turns out there is yet another layer of particles and forces and other weird stuff we can't even imagine beneath the surface。 And so we never really "know" anything。 We are always theorizing at levels of abstraction that obscure more complex phenomena happening underneath。And so perhaps the thing that Popper got right is a belief in fallibilism。 Back to Feyerabend: "The attitude of the American Medical Association towards lay practitioners is as rigid as the attitude of the Church towards lay interpreters -- and it has the blessing of the law。 Experts， or ignoramuses having acquired the formal insignia of expertise， always tried and often succeeded in securing for themselves exclusive rights in special domains。 Any criticism of the rigidity of the Roman Church applies also to its modern scientific and science-connected successors" （130）。 To that I say amen， and a pox on authoritarianism in all its forms。-----*I am reminded of trying to read Bakunin's God and State。 It's really eclectic and hard to follow。 It certainly doesn't provide a clear， positive definition of how government should work。 。。。more

John ，

This is a fairly technical book。 I would only recommend it to someone who has an interest in the history and philosophy of science。 Otherwise it might be a tedious slog。

Claudio ，

To me， Paul K。 Feyerabend is the quintessential ENTP personality type。As such， I absolutely enjoy his compelling arguments， lines of logical reasoning， and out-of-the-box/trans-contextual intuitions that end up bringing him （and the reader） from point A to point B， but only after a long， panoramic detour across the whole latin alphabet。As such， I am also sometimes perplexed and disoriented by his provocative stances。 Not because I dislike them （quite the contrary！）， but rather because they often To me， Paul K。 Feyerabend is the quintessential ENTP personality type。As such， I absolutely enjoy his compelling arguments， lines of logical reasoning， and out-of-the-box/trans-contextual intuitions that end up bringing him （and the reader） from point A to point B， but only after a long， panoramic detour across the whole latin alphabet。As such， I am also sometimes perplexed and disoriented by his provocative stances。 Not because I dislike them （quite the contrary！）， but rather because they often make it hard to discern where the provocation stops and the actual argument begins。 I know that boundaries here are intentionally blurry， and that tracing them can be an amusing exercise for the reader， but I also think that this exercise comes with the risk of misinterpreting the core message of this book or （even worse） dismissing all its claims as sheer provocation and nothing more， which is often a way of secretly avoiding tough confrontations。I’ll make it short and concise: “Against Method” is brilliant。 This essay is essentially a thorough critique to the whole mindset of the “scientific method”。 And it is not only talking about assumptions that were well established among neopositivists and philosophers of science of its time but， more generally， about a set of ideas that are still deeply entrenched behind the approach of the modern person of science。 Feyerabend’s critique is twofold （an abstract argument as well as a series of historical case studies）， and it is always articulated as a reductio ad absurdum。 The drastic but inevitable conclusion is that there can be no such thing as a scientific method: instead， science can only be an anarchic endeavour （“anything goes”）， and every harness we try to put on it rapidly becomes an obstacle to its course。Daring enough？ Well， buckle up fellow scientist/engineer/academic researcher， and read through all of it。 If you sincerely agree with every single claim in this book， I’ll buy you a beer （or several， I guess， as you elaborate on the why and how）。 。。。more

Manuel Antão ，

If you're into stuff like this， you can read the full review。Acting Skills: "Against Method" by Paul Karl FeyerabendOne reason for the scientists' distrust of rhetoric is Paul Feyerabend's “Epistemological Anarchism”。 Feyerabend， reportedly developed this view after discovering that his acting skills honed in his earlier life enabled him to win philosophical arguments regardless of which side he was arguing for。The trouble with that is not just that scientists aren't good at rhetoric， or aren't If you're into stuff like this， you can read the full review。Acting Skills: "Against Method" by Paul Karl FeyerabendOne reason for the scientists' distrust of rhetoric is Paul Feyerabend's “Epistemological Anarchism”。 Feyerabend， reportedly developed this view after discovering that his acting skills honed in his earlier life enabled him to win philosophical arguments regardless of which side he was arguing for。The trouble with that is not just that scientists aren't good at rhetoric， or aren't trained in it， but that we are actively encultured to believe that good rhetoric is actively immoral。When an argument is won or lost of the basis of who is the best rhetorician， then the truth is immaterial to which way the argument goes - and we couldn't have that - the wrong argument must always loose， whoever presents it and the correct one win。 。。。more

Andrew Noselli ，

Led me to studying Karl Marx's "The Poverty of Philosophy"， which I started reading today。 Led me to studying Karl Marx's "The Poverty of Philosophy"， which I started reading today。 。。。more

Oakley Merideth ，

Lord， did I pick the wrong year for worthwhile books。 I suppose it could all just be going over my head but it seems to me that Feyerabend is staking an awful lot of claims on the telescope and that somehow Galileo's trials and travails surrounding the telescope are paradigmatic of "anarchy" over "method。" First question is what does Feyerabend actually mean by anarchy in this case？ Is it merely a lack of external theoretical and ideological control （also known as brain storming）？ Nothing he use Lord， did I pick the wrong year for worthwhile books。 I suppose it could all just be going over my head but it seems to me that Feyerabend is staking an awful lot of claims on the telescope and that somehow Galileo's trials and travails surrounding the telescope are paradigmatic of "anarchy" over "method。" First question is what does Feyerabend actually mean by anarchy in this case？ Is it merely a lack of external theoretical and ideological control （also known as brain storming）？ Nothing he uses as an example appears remotely anarchic or wild-eyed。 Galileo wanted to prove Copernican conceptions of cosmology and utilized the telescope as a primary instrument to do so。 This was the case despite the fact that both Copernicus and the telescope were not （at the time） entirely keeping with established theories or some empirical observations。 The idea is that Galileo had to be distinctively "irrational" and "divergent" if not "anarchic" in his thinking to make the gains he did。 But。。。Copernicus was still an established and respected thinker。。。。and he was building off someone else's theories and observations。。。and the telescope was a Dutch invention。。。so how isn't that just the most conventional understanding of science， i。e。， standing on the shoulder of giants as it were？ Feyerabend at one point makes the claim that "Galileo made progress by changing familiar connections between words and words （he introduced new concepts）， words and impressions （he introduced new natural interpretations） by using new and unfamiliar principles。" AND？？？？ What is so unique or anarchic or anti-rational about this？ New "words" and "concepts" and "interpretations" and "principles" are come up with everyday in almost all branches of knowledge。 Some hold sway and some die on the vine。 Sometimes we go back to previous modes we thought were irrelevant。 How is this special， controversial， or even unique？ Lastly， terms in this text are often slippery。 Take that word "principle" which is treated is distinct from "concept" and "law" but is itself never really defined。 Once again， I could be missing all of it but it truly is quite tiresome。 I actually found the book far more compelling in the beginning when Feyerabend was simply imparting ideas without nailing them down repeatedly to this one （rather banal） historical episode。 There his case seemed more plausible and enlightening， noting that counterinductive thinking propels science and also making the point that no theory has a monopoly on empirical facts （that there will always be facts which necessarily conflict with the theory）。 Interesting。 But then it's just TELESCOPE TELESCOPE TELESCOPE and I really don't give a shit anymore。 Now there is a gargantuan appendix and I don't think I'll make it。 。。。more

James Millikan SJ ，

I picked up Feyerabend’s Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge on the recommendation of a Jesuit professor who has a penchant for philosophy of science。 At first I didn’t know what to make of the author’s rather eccentric style but， upon further reading， it became clear that beneath these provocative musings lies a serious and profound argument。Feyerabend exhorts a return to what you might call a “mad scientist” vision of epistemology。 No area of inquiry should be off lim I picked up Feyerabend’s Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge on the recommendation of a Jesuit professor who has a penchant for philosophy of science。 At first I didn’t know what to make of the author’s rather eccentric style but， upon further reading， it became clear that beneath these provocative musings lies a serious and profound argument。Feyerabend exhorts a return to what you might call a “mad scientist” vision of epistemology。 No area of inquiry should be off limits to the investigator; creativity should take precedence over uncritical deference to the Scientific Method; intuition should be cultivated and the imitation limited: these， the text claims， are the true springboards of discovery。 For Feyerabend， the view of knowledge as a predictable and linear march of progress is untenable。 Organic， self-directed inquiry —not unquestioning acceptance of conventional wisdom— is the true modus operandi of science。While Thomas Kuhn counterbalanced his theory of scientific revolutions with the claim that great advances do arise within static intelectual frameworks， Feyerabend insists that knowledge always advances in discontinuous jumps of unstructured imagination。 The implied message is that the scientist should be a sort of prophet， a voice crying out in the desert even in the face of ridicule by those who continue to follow narrow and formulaic methods of inquiry。 In an age that often favors conformity over originality in the STEM fields， the way forward presented in Against Method deserves our attention。 Recommended。 。。。more

宗儒 李 ，

If I could give this book a hundred billion stars I would do it

Aaron ，

I read a little of this in a class。 Difficult but interesting thesis。

Yijia Chen ，

Too high-level （as opposed to more neuroscientific books I've read） and slightly obfuscating。。。 Though I can see that the author put in a lot of effort， and some may enjoy more than others。 Too high-level （as opposed to more neuroscientific books I've read） and slightly obfuscating。。。 Though I can see that the author put in a lot of effort， and some may enjoy more than others。 。。。more

Rosie ，

Quality of the writing: 5Quality of the content/organisation/research: 5Impact on my perspective: 5Resonance: 4Rereading potential: 5 Overall score: 5The reason I read it: I've been reading the most impactful books in the field of philosophy of science。 Feyerabend follows on from Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn。 Review:To put things in the most simplistic way possible， Popper believed that scientists should proceed by using the principle of falsification: seeking wherever possible to disprove their Quality of the writing: 5Quality of the content/organisation/research: 5Impact on my perspective: 5Resonance: 4Rereading potential: 5 Overall score: 5The reason I read it: I've been reading the most impactful books in the field of philosophy of science。 Feyerabend follows on from Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn。 Review:To put things in the most simplistic way possible， Popper believed that scientists should proceed by using the principle of falsification: seeking wherever possible to disprove their own hypotheses， not to prove them right。 Any other approach constitutes pseudoscience。 Kuhn believed that science proceeds through cycles of revolutions which lead to a paradigm shift。 First， we have normal science where everyone follows the same paradigm， then an anomaly emerges， then scientists must come up with a new paradigm that incorporates it if they cannot fit it into the old one。Feyerabend， writing in Against Method disagreed with both perspectives and others like them。 In his view， science does not have a defined structure and scientists not follow uniform methods or practices。 Nor should they。 Instead， science moves forwards through epistemological anarchism。 Researchers opt for whatever structure suits their aims at the time， even if that means going against what seems like foundational requirements。 If they tried to follow a particular principle， as Popper believed， scientific progress would come to a halt。 It is not possible to predict what science might encounter in the future。 Any system of rules will close us off to significant possibilities。 As evidence for this， Feyerabend points to how a number of researchers who sparked scientific revolutions， such as Galileo and Einstein， did not adhere to what we would view as best practices。 The church didn't reject Galileo's ideas because they were unscientific， they rejected them because he was unscientific - both by the standards of the time and of today。 He didn't have the equipment to collect strong enough data and sometimes resorted to fabricating it。 Today， we view him as a genius because he ended up being right。 If we want to avoid remaining ignorant of important knowledge， we should allow ideas time to incubate， instead of rejecting them right away because they are unsupported。 If that summary sounds at all dry， the book is not。 It is an unequivocally fun， delightful， challenging， energising read。 Feyerabend infuses every page with a provocative wit that drove some mad （in particular， the vanguard epistemologists whose ideas he contradicted） but which landed him a seat at my dream dinner party。 At times， it's evident he aims to shock a little， as when he points out that how well a scientist's sex life is going impacts the theories they come up with。 Often， he puts forward ideas he doesn't himself believe， or necessarily disbelieve - he just wants to make you think about something in a new way。 Against Method is a rare book that had a measurable impact on my perspective。Interesting tidbits:- Introduction: 'This was the Woodstock of philosophy。 The book should now be read in two ways， both as a part of that era， and also a contribution to intellectual life in the long run。'- 'Science must be protected from ideologies; and societies， especially democratic societies， must be protected from science。'- 'Scientists are like architects who build buildings of different sizes and different shapes and who can be judged only after the event， i。e。 only after they have finished their structure。 It may stand up， it may fall down - nobody knows。'- ''Facts' come from negotiations between different parties and the final product - the published report - is influenced by physical events， data processors， compromises， exhaustion， lack of money， national pride and so on。'- '…the world which we want to explore is a largely unknown entity。 We must， therefore， keep our options open and we must not restrict ourselves in advance。''…there is not a single interesting theory that agrees with all the known facts in its domain。'- 'No idea is ever examined in all its ramifications and no view is ever given all the chances it deserves。'- 'Without 'chaos'， no knowledge。 Without a frequent dismissal of reason， no progress。 Ideas which today form the very basis of science exist only because there were such things as prejudice， conceit， passion; because these things opposed reason; and because they were permitted to have their way。' 。。。more

Maggie Oates ，

This was an incredibly formative book in my thinking on science & method。 I would strongly recommend this to fellow researchers， particularly those of us in fields that are married to dreams of Popper & objectivity。Some chapters are incredibly hard to read。 But I took Feyerabend's advice and skipped passages when I needed。 I definitely didn't make it through all the appendices either。 As my background isn't in physics， it's sometimes hard to follow along with all the examples， but I loved the on This was an incredibly formative book in my thinking on science & method。 I would strongly recommend this to fellow researchers， particularly those of us in fields that are married to dreams of Popper & objectivity。Some chapters are incredibly hard to read。 But I took Feyerabend's advice and skipped passages when I needed。 I definitely didn't make it through all the appendices either。 As my background isn't in physics， it's sometimes hard to follow along with all the examples， but I loved the ongoing retelling of Galileo & early empiricism。I would recommend getting a later edition of the book。 Half the fun for me was reading Feyerabend's footnotes and discussions of the reception to his ideas as they were published。 。。。more

Jon ，

Feyerabend expounds on what I see as antifoundationalism towards scientific practice。 "Antifoundational" in the sense that any methodology， epistemology， or ideology that claims to describe what science is and is not， to be universally applicable and the bedrock upon which all science rests， is both counterfactual （from a historical， contingent perspective）， so Feyerabend's argument goes， and even impedes scientific "progress" itself。With his well known proclamation， "anything goes，" embrace of Feyerabend expounds on what I see as antifoundationalism towards scientific practice。 "Antifoundational" in the sense that any methodology， epistemology， or ideology that claims to describe what science is and is not， to be universally applicable and the bedrock upon which all science rests， is both counterfactual （from a historical， contingent perspective）， so Feyerabend's argument goes， and even impedes scientific "progress" itself。With his well known proclamation， "anything goes，" embrace of what he called "ontological" relativism （as outlined in the postscript）， and support for an anarchist approach to scientific practice （though he was not a proponent of political anarchism， and later playfully changed his notion to a Dadaist approach: "I hope that having read the pamphlet [i。e。 Against Method] the reader will remember me as a flippant Dadaist and not as a serious anarchist"， and also in a footnote， "'Dada'， says Hans Richter in Dada: Art and Anti-Art， 'not only had no program， it was against all programs。' This does not exclude the skillful defense of programs to show the chimerical character of any defense， however 'rational'。" ）， many of his critics labeled Feyerabend antiscience。However， I think Feyerabend's argument is a strong one。 Philosophy of science is not the practice of science， and science has never experienced advancement under strict rationalistic methodologies （as he well portrayed）。 And I also think Feyerabend's philosophy can be taken as sort-of precursor to what was soon known as the "postmodern condition。" Not that I think that Feyerabend was himself a proponent of postmodern thought （and not least because of his constant avowal of humanism as a first principle）， but I do think his results are fuel for the fire of the theory that was starting to coalesce when the book was first published。And that is part of the quandary of postmodernism （at least as I see it）， why its "condition" is so hard to move beyond。 Such antifoundational thinking， such skepticism of the universal， or rejection of "big picture thinking，" or whatever you want to call it， is often quite justified and true （though not without the proper qualifications: certainly not always， nor in principle—which， based on this book， I posit Feyerabend would agree with）。 And I bring this up because right now， in 2020， at the heights of the "postmodern condition:" the era of Trump， alternative facts， and fake news （all mixed with the catastrophes of the pandemic， ecological collapse， and the way neoliberalism is only strengthened amid all this violence and chaos）; in the face of all this， how and when will this "condition" be moderated？ 。。。more

Artemis ，

His ideas are super similar/complimentary to those of Quine and Putnam so obviously I loved this。 “Even an ‘objective’ enterprise like science which apparently reveals Nature As She Is In Herself intervenes， eliminates， enlarged， produces and codifies the results in a severely standardized way - but again there is no guarantee that the results will conceal into a unified world。 This all we apprehend when experimenting， or interfering in less systemic ways， or simply living as part of a well-deve His ideas are super similar/complimentary to those of Quine and Putnam so obviously I loved this。 “Even an ‘objective’ enterprise like science which apparently reveals Nature As She Is In Herself intervenes， eliminates， enlarged， produces and codifies the results in a severely standardized way - but again there is no guarantee that the results will conceal into a unified world。 This all we apprehend when experimenting， or interfering in less systemic ways， or simply living as part of a well-developed culture is how what surrounds us responds to our actions （thoughts， observations， etc。）; we do not apprehended these surroundings themselves: Culture and Nature （or Being， to use a more general term） are always entangled in a fashion that can be explored only by entering into further and even more complicated entanglements。 。。。What we find when living， experimenting， dong research is therefore not a single scenario called ‘the world’ or ‘being’ or ‘reality’ but a variety of responses， each of them constituting a special （and not always well-defined） reality for those who have called it forth。 This is relativism because the type of reality encountered depends on the approach taken。 However， it differs from the philosophical doctrine by admitting failure: not every approach succeeds。 In my reply to my critics I called this form of relativism ‘cosmological’ relativism， in an article published in Iride I spoke of ‘ontological’ relativism” （284-285） In my interpretation this is the same as Putnam’s conceptual relativism， and the incommensurability of language and theories explanation is very similar。 。。。more

María ，

Sin duda uno de mis libros favoritos de filosofía。 Creo que Feyerabend es capaz de desmontar de manera muy clara （aunque con ejemplos HORRIBLEMENTE largos） una concepción que actualmente sigue en el imaginario común y demostrar que el método científico no es omnipotente y， de hecho， en las revoluciones científicas ha tenido menos peso del que parece。 No estoy segura de estar de acuerdo con el anarquismo epistemológico， porque creo que el método， aunque es limitado y no es exactamente el ideal de Sin duda uno de mis libros favoritos de filosofía。 Creo que Feyerabend es capaz de desmontar de manera muy clara （aunque con ejemplos HORRIBLEMENTE largos） una concepción que actualmente sigue en el imaginario común y demostrar que el método científico no es omnipotente y， de hecho， en las revoluciones científicas ha tenido menos peso del que parece。 No estoy segura de estar de acuerdo con el anarquismo epistemológico， porque creo que el método， aunque es limitado y no es exactamente el ideal de rigor y verdad que a veces nos han vendido， sigue siendo una característica de la ciencia que creo que le aporta seguridad y además， es uno de los motivos por el que confiamos y vamos a seguir confiando en la ciencia。 Lo que sí hay que hacer es desmontar el mito de la ciencia y darnos cuenta de que， como todo ámbito de conocimiento， es limitado y puede beber de otras fuentes （pero siempre pasando por unos mínimos de demostración y no， Feyerabend， no creo que se pueda equiparar la magia a la ciencia。 No por nada， sino porque obviamente la ciencia tiene más éxito predictivo） 。。。more

Noah ，

I am interested in philosophy in general and have Marxist and dialectical tendencies in my thinking so Paul Feyerabend’s book is one that seems well suited for me。 Added to this， before reading this book， I had already come to the belief that “scientism” and it’s various co-concepts （positivisim， other forms of naive materialism， “common-sense” realism， etc。） were wrongheaded and as stuck in dogma as the religious and “mythical” views that they set up as foils and attacked。 I came to this viewpo I am interested in philosophy in general and have Marxist and dialectical tendencies in my thinking so Paul Feyerabend’s book is one that seems well suited for me。 Added to this， before reading this book， I had already come to the belief that “scientism” and it’s various co-concepts （positivisim， other forms of naive materialism， “common-sense” realism， etc。） were wrongheaded and as stuck in dogma as the religious and “mythical” views that they set up as foils and attacked。 I came to this viewpoint through a variety of influences， but a core influence has been an implicit methodology that I was practicing: historical analyses were not just fun stories for popular science books to elaborate on; they were instead essential for understanding the concepts that claim to spring from them。 That this is also a core concept for Feyerabend locates this book into my own thinking quite nicely and follows on the heels of similar considerations from Michael Foucault in “The Order of Things” and “Discipline and Punishment”。If you are suspicious of various forms of positivism and scientism， then I recommend this book to you。 You may have to wade through some stuff you don’t understand （I certainly did not understand some of the more technical discussion about certain arguments in physics） but it’s worth it。 I cannot say I fully agree with Feyerabend but I also don’t think he was looking for agreement。 Instead he comes across as seeking provocation。 And by provocation， I mean that he wants to provoke readers to dare to change their practices and think more critically about the underlying assumptions that may characterize their theorizing and experimentation。 。。。more

Enrique ，

Había un poco de metodología en su Galileo。Bromas aparte， he sacado algunas ideas interesantes de este libro。Entre ellas， estas 3:1） Un planteamiento histórico de la ciencia。 Hay grupos de presión， intereses， afrentas， envidias y resentimientos personales， controversias y eventos del contexto histórico。。。 que determinan que unas metodologías o ideas se impongan/sobrevivan， mientras que otras se invisibilizan o desaparecen。Esto significa que una idea que no se haya impuesto con anterioridad no de Había un poco de metodología en su Galileo。Bromas aparte， he sacado algunas ideas interesantes de este libro。Entre ellas， estas 3:1） Un planteamiento histórico de la ciencia。 Hay grupos de presión， intereses， afrentas， envidias y resentimientos personales， controversias y eventos del contexto histórico。。。 que determinan que unas metodologías o ideas se impongan/sobrevivan， mientras que otras se invisibilizan o desaparecen。Esto significa que una idea que no se haya impuesto con anterioridad no debe ser automáticamente descartada。 Nuevos contextos y nuevos planteamientos pueden llevar a nuevos descubrimientos a partir de ideas que se creían obsoletas。 El cuánto y el por parte de quién influyen。2） Para determinar la calidad de algo， si algo nos parece bueno o no， tenemos que establecer primeroun elemento o marco de referencia con el que compararlo。 Entiendo que Feyerabend no utiliza la palabra bueno ni el juicio de valor， pero sí pone énfasis en la necesidad de elementos previos de comparación y que， según el elemento seleccionado， así habrá unos resultados u otros。 Lo cual tiene mucho sentido。 No es lo mismo comparar una película con John Ford que con el último producto comercial sacado de Hollywood para vender figuritas。 3） Debemos ser especialmente críticos con nuestras propias ideas。Apostar en la quiniela contra nuestro equipo， que se diría en el argot deportivo。Algunas pinceladas sobre lo que Feyerabend propone como método para ello:-Cada paso para hacer tus ideas más vulnerables siempre es bienvenido。-Es recomendable abandonar aquellas ideas que más deseamos validar y dedicarnos incesantemente a atacarlas y a buscar sus puntos débiles。-No trates de proteger tus ideas predilectas。 Tampoco busques sesgos de confirmación。 Piensa contracorriente， especialmente contra ti mismo。-Un incremento del contenido asociado a tus ideas implica un incremento de las potenciales falsaciones de dichas ideas y， por tanto， es bienvenido ese incremento de contenido。Por el contrario， ocultar contenido con el fin de evitar que tus ideas sean falsadas no lo es。-Si fracasa tu idea， pregúntate por qué ha fracasado y por qué / cómo había conseguido triunfar hasta ese momento。 Llegada esta aporía （=quedarte sin ideas para defender tus ideas）， hay que buscar una nueva teoría （yo propondría únicamente reforzar la anterior） para solventar los problemas encontrados en este proceso。Aunque hubiese disfrutado un libro más puramente metodológico como Los tónicos de la voluntad de Santiago Ramón y Cajal， estoy contento con lo que he sacado de este libro。 。。。more

Alex ，

This should be mandatory reading for science students and graduates。 My main takeaway: science is a human institution。

Reference

google book https://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&q=Against Method

hathitrust digital library https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/ls?q1=Against Method&field1=ocr&a=srchls&ft=ft&lmt=ft

The British Library https://bll01.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/search?query=any,contains,Against Method&tab=LibraryCatalog&search_scope=Not_BL_Suppress&vid=44BL_INST:BLL01&lang=en&offset=0