The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order
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- Create Date：2021-07-22 00:19:10
- Update Date：2025-09-06
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- Author：Rush Doshi
- ISBN：0197527914
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Summary
For more than a century， no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany， Imperial Japan， or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP。 China is the sole exception， and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival， if not eclipse， the United
States。 What does China want， does it have a grand strategy to achieve it， and what should the United States do about it？
In The Long Game， Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources， including decades worth of party documents， leaked materials， memoirs by party leaders， and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War。 Taking
readers behind the Party's closed doors， he uncovers Beijing's long， methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential strategies of displacement。 Beginning in the 1980s， China focused for two decades on
hiding capabilities and biding time。 After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis， it became more assertive regionally， following a policy of actively accomplishing something。 Finally， in the aftermath populist elections of 2016， China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US
hegemony， adopting the phrase great changes unseen in century。 After charting how China's long game has evolved， Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response。 Ironically， his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's
ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar， ship-for-ship， or loan-for-loan。
States。 What does China want， does it have a grand strategy to achieve it， and what should the United States do about it？
In The Long Game， Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources， including decades worth of party documents， leaked materials， memoirs by party leaders， and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War。 Taking
readers behind the Party's closed doors， he uncovers Beijing's long， methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential strategies of displacement。 Beginning in the 1980s， China focused for two decades on
hiding capabilities and biding time。 After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis， it became more assertive regionally， following a policy of actively accomplishing something。 Finally， in the aftermath populist elections of 2016， China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US
hegemony， adopting the phrase great changes unseen in century。 After charting how China's long game has evolved， Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response。 Ironically， his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's
ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar， ship-for-ship， or loan-for-loan。
Reviews
Jason
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This book is certainly an important book for readers， especially policymakers and scholars in the U。S。， to obtain more understanding of China's interaction with the U。S。 and perhaps conceive U。S。's next moves regarding China。 And it is written by a rising scholar of the new generation who may exert consequential policy impacts on the U。S。 policy toward China and shape sentiments among scholars， public opinion， and so on。 The book is certainly helpful for readers to understand many histories and This book is certainly an important book for readers， especially policymakers and scholars in the U。S。， to obtain more understanding of China's interaction with the U。S。 and perhaps conceive U。S。's next moves regarding China。 And it is written by a rising scholar of the new generation who may exert consequential policy impacts on the U。S。 policy toward China and shape sentiments among scholars， public opinion， and so on。 The book is certainly helpful for readers to understand many histories and aspects of China's international behavior at the regional， international， and dyadic levels。 However， while the information contained in the book is helpful to understand the substantive behaviors of China in the past three decades， it is hard to agree with many of the authors' arguments and claims。 This review will briefly explain some of the critiques of the book:To begin with， as the author explains in Table 2。1 Hierarchy of Primary Sources， primary sources are heavily used throughout the entire book to support Doshi's claims。 However， several major issues arise when the primary sources are heavily relied upon in the entire book such as public speech record and "Think Tank and Academic Commentary"。 This may be less so for the use of policy documents。 The first issue is that the leaders' intentions are hard to be accurately inferred from their public speeches。 In fact， leaders in authoritarian regimes often need to satisfy a very broad spectrum of domestic audiences when making a public speech。 Many of the speeches may not always work as guiding principles for leaders at lower levels and the ones that are policy-related at top levels can be undisclosed to the public。 This would make it hard to accurately extrapolate the real intentions of the Chinese leadership throughout the decades from the primary sources。 In essence， intentions， which Doshi's book is about， are hard to be highly accurately conjectured。The second issue is that this book seems to be subject to a certain degree of confirmation bias toward using the sources that are consistent with the book's argument。 Although China is a de facto authoritarian regime， the policy ideas and especially "think tank and academic commentaries" in China can still be highly diverse and pluralist。 This abundance of pluralist policy preferences and textual materials makes it extremely easy for the author to select the ones that are consistent with the book's idea。 Indeed， the book tends to quote the ones that support the author's arguments while ignoring the ones that are irrelevant or inconsistent with the argument。Meanwhile， from the acknowledgement section of the book， it seems that most reviewers and readers of the book before publishing are unable to read the original Chinese text。 It seems some translations are definitely inaccurate and misleading。 This can be a severe issue as most of the arguments in the book were deduced from the original Chinese version of the primary and secondary sources such as speech and policy documents。For instance， in Chap 7:"[A]nd on militarized territorial disputes， Hu declared that China “must more actively promote the resolution of international and regional hot-spots related to China’s core interests 。 。 。 strengthen our strategic planning， make more offensive moves [先手棋]， and actively guide the situation to develop in a favorable direction。" The term of Go in Chinese [先手棋] / forcing move （or move of intiative， first-hand move etc） is mistakenly translated by Doshi as "offensive moves" in English。This translation is misleading and largely inconsistent with China's relatively constrained behavior during Hu's era in the mid- and late-2000s。Moreover， alongside the above possible minor drawbacks of the book， one major issue with this book is that the book's title and its arguments do not seem to correspond to a large proportion of the contents of most of the chapters。 In fact， as the author tries to convey， China has been resorting to the grand strategy of "blunting"， "building"， and "expansion" from 1989 to 2017 and beyond to displace the American order。 In doing so， the book is divided into these sections based on blunting， building， and expansion。 However， the chapters within each section are heavily related to the "behaviors" of China （i。e。 what China has been doing regarding building regional/international organizations and building new weapons and etc。） rather than China's "strategies" or intentions"。 In reality， from 1989 to 2017 and until the publishing of the book in 2021， four leaders （Deng， Jiang， Hu， Xi） ruled China， they have different personalities， visions， and ambitions during their tenure and they even political conflicts with other leaders during the period。 It is hard to agree that， as Doshi tries to convey， China has a consistent and smooth grand strategy to replace the U。S。 during the three decades。 This book is certainly helpful for readers to have more comprehensive knowledge about China's behaviors on the international stage and their consequences and implications for the U。S。 given the abundant quotes Doshi uses in the book。 But based on the above critiques， it is hard for me and perhaps many other readers （especially those who have some previous knowledge of and experience in China） to agree that China has been playing a "long game" since 30 years ago， as Doshi tries to argue in the book， although a large portion of China's foreign policy may have been craftily designed and although many of its behaviors certainly challenge the U。S。 at dyadic， regional， and international levels as a result。 。。。more
Grouchy Historian
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