The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics
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- Update Date：2025-09-06
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- Author：Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
- ISBN：1541701364
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Summary
Now featuring a new chapter on the rise of illiberalism worldwide。
The essential book that lays out the real rules of politics: leaders do whatever keeps them in power， regardless of the national interest。
As featured in the viral video “Rules for Rulers，” which has been viewed over fifteen million times。
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s canonical book on political science turned conventional wisdom on its head。 They started from a single assertion: leaders do whatever keeps them in power。 They don’t care about the “national interest”—or even their subjects—unless they must。
Newly updated to reflect the global rise of authoritarianism， this clever and accessible book illustrates how leaders amass and retain power。 As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith show， democracy is essentially just a convenient fiction。 Governments do not differ in kind， but only in the number of essential supporters or backs that need scratching。 The size of this group determines almost everything about politics: what leaders can get away with， and the quality of life or misery under them。 And it is also the key to returning power to the people。
The essential book that lays out the real rules of politics: leaders do whatever keeps them in power， regardless of the national interest。
As featured in the viral video “Rules for Rulers，” which has been viewed over fifteen million times。
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s canonical book on political science turned conventional wisdom on its head。 They started from a single assertion: leaders do whatever keeps them in power。 They don’t care about the “national interest”—or even their subjects—unless they must。
Newly updated to reflect the global rise of authoritarianism， this clever and accessible book illustrates how leaders amass and retain power。 As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith show， democracy is essentially just a convenient fiction。 Governments do not differ in kind， but only in the number of essential supporters or backs that need scratching。 The size of this group determines almost everything about politics: what leaders can get away with， and the quality of life or misery under them。 And it is also the key to returning power to the people。
Reviews
Michael Hooper
，
Some uncomfortable truths in here。 Being morally correct isn’t always politically expedient。 What is better; to be a morally virtuous leader if it compromises the integrity of your state or to provide the pillars of the state with bribes in order to maintain a cohesive state？ These questions made me uncomfortable to consider， because I’m not politically minded， but I’ll definitely be considering the leaders of countries through this pragmatic lens looking forward。
Alexis Epelstein
，
Great argument in favor of Democracy。
Tyler
，
The theory that this book offers is a brilliant one， one that I saw summarized in a youtube video titled "The Rules for Rulers" by "CGP Grey"， but I couldn't get through much of the book because of its naive， childlike interpretation of the US as a highly functioning democracy。I recommend that the author acquaint himself with "Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism" by Sheldon Wolin。 The theory that this book offers is a brilliant one， one that I saw summarized in a youtube video titled "The Rules for Rulers" by "CGP Grey"， but I couldn't get through much of the book because of its naive， childlike interpretation of the US as a highly functioning democracy。I recommend that the author acquaint himself with "Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism" by Sheldon Wolin。 。。。more
Antonio Stark
，
This is the "Thinking Fast and Slow" for governance。 Where there are System 1 and 2 thinking， there are the governance of small "essential" coalitions， and large "essential" coalitions。 The book asserts the holy rule: "one strives to rule， not to rule well。" Any ruler wants two things: to be selected to rule， and to maintain that rule。 Autocrats inherently prefer short-term gains divided up among small coalition members， while democrats inherently require to serve long-term interests of the larg This is the "Thinking Fast and Slow" for governance。 Where there are System 1 and 2 thinking， there are the governance of small "essential" coalitions， and large "essential" coalitions。 The book asserts the holy rule: "one strives to rule， not to rule well。" Any ruler wants two things: to be selected to rule， and to maintain that rule。 Autocrats inherently prefer short-term gains divided up among small coalition members， while democrats inherently require to serve long-term interests of the large coalition public。 It then adds brilliant socioeconomic analyses on corporate governance， foreign aid， and the engagement （and winning） of wars。 。。。more
Nishan Gantayat
，
Great read for political science enthusiasts。 The basic logic is hammered across the different chapters and sinks in well by the end of the book。 Brilliant political anecdotes。
Valdis Reķis
，
Daudz politiskā viela ko pārdomāt: -diktatoriem svarīgākais ir saglabāt varu un personiskos ienākumus （nevis kādas nācijas vērtības vai iedzīvotāju labklājība）;-lai viņi noturētos pie varas viņiem ir labi jāatalgo sava "galma" pārstāvji， lai nedomā taisīt revolūciju;-tā kā diktatorus neievēl vēlētāji， tad viņiem iedzīvotāju labklājība ir otršķirīga （ja valstī ir lieli dabas resursu ienākumi， tad iedzīvotāji vispār diktatoriem ir nenozīmīgi， jo bez nodokļiem var iztikt）。Mani dara bažīgu rietumu p Daudz politiskā viela ko pārdomāt: -diktatoriem svarīgākais ir saglabāt varu un personiskos ienākumus （nevis kādas nācijas vērtības vai iedzīvotāju labklājība）;-lai viņi noturētos pie varas viņiem ir labi jāatalgo sava "galma" pārstāvji， lai nedomā taisīt revolūciju;-tā kā diktatorus neievēl vēlētāji， tad viņiem iedzīvotāju labklājība ir otršķirīga （ja valstī ir lieli dabas resursu ienākumi， tad iedzīvotāji vispār diktatoriem ir nenozīmīgi， jo bez nodokļiem var iztikt）。Mani dara bažīgu rietumu pasaules sliešanās autoritārisma virzienā: Tramps-ASV， Orbāns -Ungārijā （un ļoti daudz līdzjutēju Latvijā）， nemaz nerunājot par Lukašenko un Putinu。Demokrātiskās vērtības mums ir pienākums sargāt！ 。。。more
James
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Authors propose a model of political behavior in the vein of old-fashioned economics - if we assume leaders are selfish and rational， what behavior do we predict？ From this assumption， they reason through to a wide variety of important claims about power， corruption， foreign aid， war， etc。 I only have a few qualms with this book that keep it from being five stars。 The book could be much shorter than it is， since the authors spend much of the first nine chapters reiterating very similar reasoning Authors propose a model of political behavior in the vein of old-fashioned economics - if we assume leaders are selfish and rational， what behavior do we predict？ From this assumption， they reason through to a wide variety of important claims about power， corruption， foreign aid， war， etc。 I only have a few qualms with this book that keep it from being five stars。 The book could be much shorter than it is， since the authors spend much of the first nine chapters reiterating very similar reasoning。 The book spends almost all its time talking about the behavior that arises from a certain set of parameters， and very little time discussing what drives change （forced or unforced） in those parameters。 Finally， I wish there were more numbers。 The few places they use numerical examples are extremely clear。Notes:t• Key insight: no leader can rule alone。 The power of any given leader comes from their ability to direct others。 But they don't get that ability unconditionally or for freet• Breaks down political landscape into three groups of people。 Says that the （presumably relative） sizes of these three groups can be used to classify political systems and predict their behavior。tt○ The Nominal Selectorate， anyone who should de jure be able to influence who leads。 Interchangeablett○ The Real Selectorate， people who can de facto influence who leads。 Influentialtt○ The Winning Coalition， the people who （de facto） have the power to replace the leader。 Essentialt• When the coalition is small relative to selectorate， demand is low and supply is high， leader doesn't have to spend much maintaining control of coalition。 On the flip side， if coalition is large relative to selectorate， either demand is higher and/or supply is lower， so leader has to spend more resources maintaining control。t• Proposes some basic rules emerge from this power market:tt○ Leader wants to minimize size of coalition relative to nominal selectoratett○ Leader wants as much control over who gets how much money as possible， to direct where they needtt○ Leader wants to pay coalition just enough to keep them loyaltt○ Leader doesn't want to take money from the coalition to help the peoplet• Norms and blood relations and symbols of authority are actually effectual in political environments， not because they're directly sources of power but because they're signals of power that manipulate Schelling points。 If you send out a signal that everyone knows everyone else will see as a signal of power， then everyone's expectations that you will be a successful leader rise， and so does their willingness to support you。 When the whole thing is built off of socially constructed "power to rule"， it's all always Simulacrum 4t• Author's explanation for resource curse: resource value is less from labor and more from the material itself， so leaders don't have to maintain a capable labor force， which allows more autocratic misbehavior and sucht• Small coalitions concentrate rewards and distribute costs， incentivizing excessive borrowing and other net-negative behaviortt○ Leaders always want to borrow - if they don't， they're playing with a smaller pie to secure loyalty with than some competitor who is willing to borrowt• It is useful for a leader to encourage corruption among their subordinates。 Makes them grateful for the leader allowing it， and gives the leader the legal authority to persecute anyone at any timet• Author lists Deng Xiao Ping and Lee Kwan Yew as prime examples of modern benevolent（？） despots。 Both held on to power successfully in a small coalition and ruthlessly eliminated opposition。 But it seems they used the resulting discretionary power to legitimately try and improve the people's situation。t• Views foreign aid mostly as buying favors - such as the US sending money to Liberia （which ultimately ended up in government pockets） in exchange for support in international affairstt○ This can only really be done in corrupt governments。 Predicts that almost all foreign aid will go to corrupt nations。 Is that true？t• Simple economic model suggests that this quid-pro-quo foreign aid can be net negative。 Corrupt gov will accept foreign aid to deploy policies that harm their people， as long as they get enough money to make up for the portion of that harm dealt to their coalition。 The smaller the coalition， the lower the price， and the more harm can be done to the people not in the winning coalition。tt○ Bargains like this between 100%-coalition orgs would be same as between individuals - net positive。 Problem is， as coalitions shrink， the externalities grow， and net-negative trades become viablet• Marshall Plan was an exception to this model of aid because the US's goal was to build up strong allies。 Benefit to the recipient nations was actually the objective， and that's what happened。t• Argues that many global health and development NGO's do net harm， because recipient governments are very good at making any incoming money fungible。 Argues that autocrats let NGOs take on tasks that are helpful to them - food， water， electrification， etc （things that increase tax revenue）， but don't allow higher education or things that might hurt them。 They then take the money they would have spent on these tasks and keep it insteadtt○ On authors' model， why would they spend any money on these tasks in the first place？ These people are only nominal selectoratett○ How to figure out this counterfactual？ Does all marginal spending on corrupt nations really do nothing but add to the government's pockets？ How could we tell？t• Recommends a change to aid policy - do it above the table， set up rewards for un-fakeable milestones。 That way the receiving government has no incentive to "pretend to try" to keep aid from drying up once the problem is solved， and the paying government can do it more cheaply and loses nothing if the effort failst• Launching revolutions is all about finding a Schelling point or some other source of credibility - it won't work if people don't join， and people won't join unless they think it will work。t• Democratic leaders are incentivized to minimize catastrophes， because they will be voted out in response to a severe catastrophe。 Autocrats are incentivized to maximize catastrophes （as long as they're not in important political or economic centers）， because they have no voter rebuke to fear， no revolution will happen post-catastrophe， and they can collect foreign aid to stealt• Revolutions leading to democracy tend to happen in countries where natural resources cannot be relied upon for funding after the revolution。 If new leader has to rely on tax revenue， economy has to function， meaning people need rights， meaning they have to be kept happy enough to not revolt despite the ability。tt○ Democracy and autocracy can't be a function of just resource availability， can they？t• Democrats fight wars to enforce policy goals when that is cheaper than foreign aid deals。 Autocrats fight wars to secure more revenue。t• Democrats are willing to devote more funding to wars with equivalent-value goals than autocrats are - since the coalition is larger， the per-person value needed to justify the expense is lower。 If the cost of the war is held fixed， a democracy gathering break-even taxes from the coalition can raise more funds than an autocracy doing the same。tt○ Assumes that funding comes from the coalition， not the selectorate。 In an autocracy， aren't funds allocated to the coalition and selectorate both already constrained - by loyalty needs and revenue needs respectively？ I guess in that case the funding needs to come out of the leader's pocket， which only strengthens this argument。tt○ This is author's explanation for democratic peace theory。 Democracies won't fight each other because they know it will be extremely costly。 Autocracies are the only ones who fight， because they don't care as much about the costs， so they'll fight autocracies or democraciest• HOW DO PARAMETERS CHANGE？tt○ Leader wants small coalition， large selectoratett○ Selectorate wants large coalition， large selectoratett○ Coalition wants small coalition， small selectorate。 tt○ When the coalition is small， rewards are dominated by private goods， so shrinking the coalition redirects a lot of wealth to surviving coalition members。 But when coalition is large， rewards are dominated by public goods， so increasing revenue is the best way to increase rewards。tt○ In order to increase revenue， a large selectorate wants to incentivize leader to exploit the selectorate less。 Way to do that is increase coalition sizet• This leads to authors' policy suggestions: enlarge the coalition。 Less gerrymandering， more immigration and citizenship， more voting， etc。 。。。more
C
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Clear-eyed dissection of how politics really works。 Not for those who place their trust in the baseless idea that people are basically good。
Andrew Steele
，
I thought the book was pretty good。 I think that it had good information about what makes people in power tick。 The whole part about how no leader wants to do what is good for the people and that you have to set up systems in place to make them do it by enlarging the winning coalition seemed spot on。 I thought that some of their points were either too anecdotal （like their view on economics and taxes） or too "bad people are bad"。 Not all of it， probably not even half of it but I felt it detracte I thought the book was pretty good。 I think that it had good information about what makes people in power tick。 The whole part about how no leader wants to do what is good for the people and that you have to set up systems in place to make them do it by enlarging the winning coalition seemed spot on。 I thought that some of their points were either too anecdotal （like their view on economics and taxes） or too "bad people are bad"。 Not all of it， probably not even half of it but I felt it detracted from the book。The largest detraction is that the book is repetitive over and over and over again with the same stories。 Literally the same examples keep being brought up。 If you are interested in reading it I would probably recommend that you just watch CPG Grey's video "Rules For Rulers" that is based on the book。The book is fine and does a good job explaining the problem， not a great job with solutions but that is to be expected。 It's too long and sometimes I feel like it misses some nuance， but on an overview its good enough。 。。。more
amy
，
i think the best nonfiction ive ever read （bc its the only one ive ever enjoyed）- 4。5 stars rounded up bc i feel like i need to diversify my taste and be kinder to nonfiction books 😍 also v cynical which is like perfect for me！！
IJ
，
Based on the assumption of rational choice by the rules of the game， survival is paramount， and the benefit-cost analysis is very powerful in explaining an immature regime of authority。 The argument for the "real" is thoroughly realistic and is a player's guide to survival。 Having answered the question of what， there is still the why and how to think about。I can't help but occasionally mourn the cruelty of the "creator"。Democracy is not bad for everyone unless the privileged。 Politics is the bes Based on the assumption of rational choice by the rules of the game， survival is paramount， and the benefit-cost analysis is very powerful in explaining an immature regime of authority。 The argument for the "real" is thoroughly realistic and is a player's guide to survival。 Having answered the question of what， there is still the why and how to think about。I can't help but occasionally mourn the cruelty of the "creator"。Democracy is not bad for everyone unless the privileged。 Politics is the best way to escape the state of nature。"The best we can hope for is the happiness and success of those who risk their lives in the company of dictators。"Academic edition: The Logic of Political Survival in 2003 with MIT Press。 。。。more
Dale
，
An especially relevant book as we watch Putin invade Ukraine。 The book isn't only relevant to dictators but also speaks of the bad behavior incentives embedded even in a democracy。 The book also has a great analysis of the perils of foreign aid。 An especially relevant book as we watch Putin invade Ukraine。 The book isn't only relevant to dictators but also speaks of the bad behavior incentives embedded even in a democracy。 The book also has a great analysis of the perils of foreign aid。 。。。more
blaz
，
Domestic realpolitik。 Very convincingly argues for a power-based conception of politics: politicians are first and foremost concerned with their own political survival， and this imperative supersedes all other considerations。 How is power gained and maintained？ Finding a group of politically relevant people （as small as possible） to support you and establishing a patronage relationship with them。 Who controls the budget controls the system。 Leaders need to identify whose support is absolutely ne Domestic realpolitik。 Very convincingly argues for a power-based conception of politics: politicians are first and foremost concerned with their own political survival， and this imperative supersedes all other considerations。 How is power gained and maintained？ Finding a group of politically relevant people （as small as possible） to support you and establishing a patronage relationship with them。 Who controls the budget controls the system。 Leaders need to identify whose support is absolutely necessary for power and who can be swapped out if need be， and with these two groups form their winning coalition。 Make sure money and other rewards flow to them at a reasonable rate: enough that they still support you， but not so much that they become independently powerful。 The book is great， but is hamstrung by a number of naive assumptions trotted out by the authors that fly in the face of the theory they developed。 The part where they try to argue that small shareholders in corporations can counter the power and influence of large shareholders by making Facebook groups （？？？） comes to mind。 Anyways， well worth a read if you’re into politics but you haven’t been power-pilled yet。 。。。more
Callum
，
Eye opening and comforting at the same time。 I had a lot of similar ideas in my head about aid and corruption like this but the data provided and explanations really helped to tweak them and provide clarity。 Although there were a couple of slightly dubious points， I was amazed at the data provided （such as countries with more natural resources tend to have lower economic growth）。 I think everyone should read this！
Svoorhie
，
Fascinating！
Fab
，
A very good book， well-documented and with practical examples。 It has a couple good ideas and it basically develop those throughout the book。 Could've been shorter。 A very good book， well-documented and with practical examples。 It has a couple good ideas and it basically develop those throughout the book。 Could've been shorter。 。。。more
Nicolas Martorell
，
La verdad es que es interesante y las ideas que trae están buenas y son útiles para entender por qué un gobierno actúa como actúa。 Acuerdo con el mensaje general de "la culpa no es de las personas sino del sistema"， cada cual hace lo que le conviene。 Es bastante cínico （para bien） en rechazar el mensaje de que el altruismo debería salvar al mundo， y en cambio analiza cómo cambiar las instituciones y las acciones políticas que tomamos para que todes vivamos un poco mejor。 Lástima que se pone bast La verdad es que es interesante y las ideas que trae están buenas y son útiles para entender por qué un gobierno actúa como actúa。 Acuerdo con el mensaje general de "la culpa no es de las personas sino del sistema"， cada cual hace lo que le conviene。 Es bastante cínico （para bien） en rechazar el mensaje de que el altruismo debería salvar al mundo， y en cambio analiza cómo cambiar las instituciones y las acciones políticas que tomamos para que todes vivamos un poco mejor。 Lástima que se pone bastante repetitivo， por eso me costó terminarlo， pero en general vale la pena leerlo。 。。。more
Damian Penny
，
https://damianpenny。substack。com/p/wh。。。 https://damianpenny。substack。com/p/wh。。。 。。。more
Logan Streondj
，
Like an updated Machiavellianism based on the latest research， it explains why democracies and autocracies are similar and only differ in coalition sizes。The basic idea being that government leaders function to steal from the majority to enrich the coalition that keeps them in office。Democracies have larger coalitions wheras autocracies have smaller ones。 Generally the longer a group of people stay in power the more they tend towards an autocracy。Governments also attempt to maximize the number o Like an updated Machiavellianism based on the latest research， it explains why democracies and autocracies are similar and only differ in coalition sizes。The basic idea being that government leaders function to steal from the majority to enrich the coalition that keeps them in office。Democracies have larger coalitions wheras autocracies have smaller ones。 Generally the longer a group of people stay in power the more they tend towards an autocracy。Governments also attempt to maximize the number of interchangeables， or people who are lower down the command chain， to make it easy to fire them and switch them for someone else if they don't do as they are told。The coalition usually consists of some of the people closest to the leaders， and to an extent includes the police and the military。If a leader fails to pay their coalition they are typically overthrown。Definitely worth archiving for future generations as a warning to why big government is always abusive。 。。。more
Geo Paul
，
A little slow at the beginning but it redeems itself spectacularly in the second half。Quotes I liked:1。Alexander Kerensky formed Russia’s short-lived democratic government after toppling the czar’s regime。 But he couldn’t hang on to power for long。 His mistake was operating a democratic government， which necessitated a large coalition， and implementing an unpopular policy—continuing the czar’s war—thereby alienating his coalition right from the start。 Lenin and the Bolsheviks made no such mistak A little slow at the beginning but it redeems itself spectacularly in the second half。Quotes I liked:1。Alexander Kerensky formed Russia’s short-lived democratic government after toppling the czar’s regime。 But he couldn’t hang on to power for long。 His mistake was operating a democratic government， which necessitated a large coalition， and implementing an unpopular policy—continuing the czar’s war—thereby alienating his coalition right from the start。 Lenin and the Bolsheviks made no such mistakes。2。The czar fell once there was no one to stop the revolution。 Louis XVI suffered much the same fate in the French Revolution。 Successful leaders must learn the lesson of these examples and put raising revenue and paying supporters above all else。 Consider Robert Mugabe’s success in staying on as Zimbabwe’s president。 The economy has collapsed in Zimbabwe thanks to Mugabe’s terrible policies。 Starvation is common and epidemics of cholera regularly sweep the country。 Mugabe “succeeds” because he understands that it does not matter what happens to the people provided that he makes sure to pay the army。 And despite regular media speculation， so far he has always managed to do so and to keep himself in office well into his eighties。 He has reduced a once thriving agricultural exporting nation into one that depends on foreign aid。 Mugabe is certainly horrible for what he’s done to the people he rules， but he is a master of the rules to rule by。 Where policy matters most， when it comes to paying off cronies， he has delivered。 That is why no one has deposed him。3。Silence， as Ben Bella learned far too late， truly is golden。 There is never a point in showing your hand before you have to; that is just a way to ensure giving the game away。4。Sometimes， of course， having competent advisers is unavoidable。 Byzantine， Mughal， Chinese， Caliphate， and other emperors devised a creative solution that guaranteed that these advisers didn’t become rivals: They all relied on eunuchs at various times。 In the Byzantine Empire in the ninth and tenth centuries， the three most senior posts below emperor were held almost exclusively by eunuchs。 The most senior position of Grand Administrator had evolved from the position of Prefect of the Sacred Bedchamber and included the duties of posting eunuch guards and watching over the sleeping emperor。 Michael III made an exception and gave this position to his favorite， Basil， rather than a eunuch。 This decision cost him his life。 When Basil perceived that Michael was starting to favor another courtier， he murdered the emperor and seized the throne。9Even in modern times the principle of choosing close advisers who cannot rise to the top spot remains good advice。 It is surely no coincidence that Saddam Hussein as president of Islamic Iraq had a Christian， Tariq Aziz， as his number two。5。Corruption is a private good of choice for exactly the reasons captured by the Dymovsky Affair。 It provides the means to ensure regime loyalty without having to pay good salaries， and it guarantees the prosecutorial means to ferret out any beneficiaries who fail to remain loyal。 What could be better from a leader’s perspective？6。Deng and Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew are surely among the contemporary world’s two greatest icons of the authoritarian’s hall of fame。 They did not sock fortunes away in secret bank accounts （to the best of our knowledge）。 They did not live the lavish lifestyles of Mobutu Sese Seko or Saddam Hussein。 They used their discretionary power over revenue to institute successful， market-oriented economic reforms that made Singaporeans among the world’s wealthiest people and lifted millions of Chinese out of abject poverty。 Nothing about their actions contradicts the rules of successful， long-lasting governance。 They were brutal when that served their interest in staying in power， Deng with murderous violence and Lee Kwan Yew through the power of the courts to drive his opponents into bankruptcy。 Lee’s approach was vastly more civilized than Deng’s， but nevertheless it was the arbitrary and tough use of power dictated by the logic of political survival。 And that， in the end， is what politics is all about。7。We cannot simply condemn the aid enterprise just because nations that received aid performed so poorly。 To understand why， consider the following provocative statement: hospitals kill！ There is plenty of evidence to support this claim。 The likelihood of dying is much higher for a person in a hospital than for a person who is not。 Of course， most of us instantly see the error in the evidence。 The people in hospitals are sick。 Healthy people are not to be found staying in hospitals。 But this kind of error from looking at statistics without thinking about where they come from is all too common。8。Comparative advantage lies at the heart of economics。 Everyone should specialize in what they are relatively good at and then trade their goods and services。 This way everyone ends up with more than if everyone tried to do a little of everything by themselves。9。Almost every US president has argued that he wants to foster democracy in the world。 However， the same US presidents have had no problem undermining democratic， or democratizing， regimes when the people of those nations elect leaders to implement policies US voters don’t like。10。Democrats deliver what the people want。 Because they have to stand for election and reelection， democrats are impatient。 They have a short time horizon。 For them， the long run is the next election， not their country’s performance over the next twenty years。 However， as long as we the people want cheap gasoline and an abundance of markets in which to dump agricultural products， and we want that more than we want to see genuine development in poor countries， then our leaders are going to carry out our wishes。 If they don’t， why they’ll be replaced with someone who will。 That’s what democracy is all about—government of， by， and for the people at home。11。As a classroom experience， Bruce likes to ask his students how many of them want to help remove poverty in Nigeria or Mali。 This idea produces universal support。 And virtually everyone wants the government to provide aid to make it happen。 Yet when push comes to shove， enthusiasm fades。 For instance， he asks how many students are willing to give up their mobile phone service and have the funds sent to help Nigeria。 Hardly a hand goes up。 And when he asks about reducing their low-interest government loans that help pay tuition if the money goes to the world’s poor， even fewer hands go up even though he reminds them that they are the world’s incredibly rich “poor” and that they profess to want to help the world’s truly poor。 Not at their own expense！12。Aid is a tool for buying influence and policy。 Unless we the people really value development and are willing to make meaningful sacrifices towards those ends then aid will continue to fail in its stated goals。 Democrats are not thuggish brutes。 They just want to keep their jobs， and to do so they need to deliver the policies their people want。 Despite the idealistic expressions of some， all too many of us prefer cheap oil to real change in West Africa or the Middle East。 So we really should not complain too much when our leaders try to deliver what we want。 That， after all， is what democracy is about。13。Noble words from both Mao Zedong and Jomo Kenyatta。 Neither fulfilled his promises of equality， democracy， and liberty for the average Chinese or the average Kenyan。 Nor did either leader eliminate corruption and special opportunities for their party faithful。 Once most revolutionaries come to power， their inclination—if they can get away with it—is to be petty dictators。 After all， the democratic institutions that engender the policies the people want also make it hard for leaders to survive in office。 Leaders won’t acquiesce to the people’s wants unless the people can compel them。 And when can the people compel an old dictator， seemingly set in his ways， or a recently victorious revolutionary， newly ensconced in power， to look out for them instead of for himself？ The answer to that question is the answer to when regimes choose the road to democracy rather than to sustained autocracy。14。Many revolutions end up simply replacing one autocracy with another。 On some occasions the successor regime can actually be worse than its predecessor。 This might well have been the case with Sergeant Doe’s deposition of Liberia’s True Whig government or Mao’s success against Chiang Kai Shek’s Kuomintang government in China。 But the hope of the people when they participate is that they will improve their lot， either by enlarging the winning coalition through democratization or at least by becoming part of the new coalition。15。A prudent dictator nips rebellion in the bud。 That is why we have reiterated the claim that only people willing to engage in really nasty behavior should contemplate becoming dictators。 The softhearted will find themselves ousted in the blink of an eye。16。We must repeat what we have indicated earlier。 Financial crises， from an autocratic leader’s perspective， are political crises。 The leader hasn’t cared a whit about destroying his country’s economy by stealing from the public。 Now that money is in such short supply that he can’t maintain his coalition’s loyalty there is a moment of opportunity for political change。 Forgive the debts and the leader will just start borrowing again to pay his cronies and keep himself in power。 Nicolas Van de Walle compares the fates of regimes in Benin and Zambia with Cameroon and Ivory Coast during crises。19 In the former cases， international financial institutions withdrew support and the nations democratized。 In the latter cases， France stepped in with financial support and no reform occurred。17。The difference in expenditures per soldier is greater even than the numbers alone indicate。 The Israeli military， like the military of democracies in general， spends a lot of its money on buying equipment that is heavily armored to protect soldiers。 Better training and equipment enable democracies to leverage the impact of each soldier so they can achieve the same military output while at the same time putting few soldiers at risk。5 The Egyptian military’s tanks， troop transports， and other equipment were lightly and cheaply armored。 They preferred to spend money on private rewards with which to ensure the loyalty of the generals and colonels。18。Gamal Abdul Nasser， Egypt’s president at the time， was not elected by the people; he was sustained in office by a small coterie of generals whose own welfare depended on the survival of his regime。 For that reason， he was not beholden to the wives and mothers who scream about the avoidable deaths of their loved ones。 Israeli prime ministers are elected by those mothers and wives， and this is reflected in the superior equipment， armor， and training given to Israeli soldiers。 Give our troops the best， is a democratic refrain。 This was why there was such a stink about US soldiers having insufficient body armor in Iraq and Afghanistan， and why the United States rushed to fix this deficiency， even if in some cases the extra armor made some vehicles so heavy that they became close to inoperable。19。Why did the Arabs lose the 1967 war？ A lot has been said on that subject。 You could hear that Israel won because Jews are brave and Arabs are cowards。 Jews are intelligent， and Arabs are primitive。 The Jews have better weapons， and the Arabs worse。 All of it untrue！ The Arabs are also intelligent and brave and they have good weapons。 The difference lay elsewhere—in the approach to war， in varying theories of war。 In Israel， everybody takes part in war， but in the Arab countries—only the army。 When war breaks out， everyone in Israel goes to the front and civilian life dies out。 While in Syria， many people did not find out about the 1967 war until it was over。 And yet Syria lost its most important strategic area， the Golan Heights， in that war。 Syria was losing the Golan Heights and at the same time， that same day， that same hour， in Damascus—twenty kilometres from the Golan Heights—the cafes were full of people， and others were walking around， worrying about whether they would find a free table。 Syria lost fewer than 100 soldiers in the 1967 war。 A year earlier， 200 people had died in Damascus during a palace coup。 Twice as many people die because of a political quarrel as because of a war in which the country loses its most important territory and the enemy approaches within shooting distance of the capital。620。Sun Tzu’s advice to his king predicts the behavior of autocrats in World War I: they didn’t make an extraordinary effort to win。 The effort by the democratic powers in that same war equally foreshadowed what Caspar Weinberger and so many other American advisers have said to their president: if at first you don’t succeed， try， try again。21。When it comes to fighting wars， institutions matter at least as much as the balance of power。 The willingness of democracies to try harder goes a long way to explaining why seemingly weaker democracies often overcome seemingly stronger autocracies。 The United States was once a weak nation。 And yet， in the Mexican-American War （1846–1848） it defeated the much larger， better-trained， and highly favored Mexican army。 The miniscule Republic of Venice survived for over a thousand years until it was finally defeated by Napoleon in 1797。 Despite its small size and limited resources it fought above its weight class throughout the Middle Ages。 It played a crucial role in the Fourth Crusade that led to the sacking of Constantinople， in which Venice captured the lion’s share of the Byzantine Empire’s wealth。 The smaller， but more democratic government of Bismarck’s Prussia defeated the larger—widely favored—Austrian monarchy in the Seven Weeks War in 1866。 Prussia then went on to defeat Louis Napoleon’s monarchical France in the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War。 And as we have seen， tiny Israel has repeatedly beaten its larger neighbors。 History is full of democratic Davids beating autocratic Goliaths。22。Naturally the common people don’t want war。 。 。 。 But， after all， it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy， and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along， whether it is a democracy， or a fascist dictatorship， or a parliament or a communist dictatorship。。。。 All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked， and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger。 It works the same way in any country。1323。While it is true that democracies generally don’t fight each other， we have also noted that they do have lopsided conflicts， and those conflicts often end with the weaker side capitulating。 If a democratic Egypt mobilizes and arms itself， tiny Israel would have little hope of resisting unless the United States or NATO were prepared to make a large effort to defend it。 Anyone who thinks a democratic Egypt attacking Israel is too fanciful a scenario might ask democratic Native American tribes from the American plains about their dealings with the expanding United States in the 1800s。 Democratization sounds good in principle only。24。The big problem with democratizing overseas continues to lie with we， the people。 In most cases we seem to prefer that foreign nations do what we want， not what they want。 However， if our interests align then successful democratization is more likely。 This is particularly so if there is a rival power that wishes to influence policy。 The postwar success stories fit this category well。 Generally， the people of West Germany and Japan preferred what the United States wanted to the vision expounded by the Soviet Union。 Creating powerful states that wanted to resist communism and would try hard was in the US interest。 As occupying powers， the United States， Britain， and France might have set Germany on a course to democracy but they did so only because it was advantageous for them。 This confluence of interests is rare， and so is externally imposed democratization。25。Sun Tzu exerted a lasting influence on the study of war precisely because his recommendations are the right recommendations for leaders， like monarchs and autocrats， who rule based on a small coalition。 The Weinberger Doctrine—like its more recent replacement， the Powell Doctrine—exerts influence over American security policy precisely because it recommends the most appropriate actions for leaders who are beholden to a large coalition。26。From the beginning we said we would focus on what is rather than what ought to be。 Now we need to talk a bit about what ought to be。 In doing so， we want to lay down the ground rules。 First among these is that we should never let the quest for perfection block the way to lesser improvement。 Utopian dreams of a perfect world are just that: utopian。 Pursuing the perfect world for everyone is a waste of time and an excuse for not doing the hard work of making the world better for many。27。It is impossible to make the world great for everyone。 Everyone doesn’t want the same thing。 Think about what is good for interchangeables， influentials， and essentials， the three dimensions of political life: hardly ever is it true that what is good for leaders and their essential backers is good for everyone else。 If they all had the same wants there wouldn’t be misery in the world。 So， even as we are trying to change the world for the better， we are tied to the dictates of political reality。 A fix is not a fix unless it can actually be done！ What can be done must satisfy the needs of everyone required to implement change。 Wishful thinking is not a fix and a perfect solution is not our goal and should not be any well-intentioned person’s goal。 Even minor improvements in governance can result in significant improvements in the welfare of potentially millions of people or shareholders。28， 29， and 30 hosted below。https://imgur。com/a/Yw5ZDZY 。。。more
Katie Deal
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Phenomenal start， neoliberal end。 But a fun read！
Cat
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The parts they stole from Machiavelli were alright
Majdy
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Insightful and Offer a new way to look at thingsI have never read about political subjects， but this book grabbed my attention and I am glad that I have read it。 Taught me a lot about how our world is really run and gave me a new perspective on many global issues
Paulius Pikelis
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It's like a school paper where you have one idea and you must write 300 pages paraphrasing the same thing over and over again。。 terrible to read。 To summarize:1） Money rules the world - either you pay less to larger amount of people in democracies or you pay up smaller circle in authoritarian countries。2） Timing matters when you launch your bid - people change sides if the leader has no resourses to pay up。 It's like a school paper where you have one idea and you must write 300 pages paraphrasing the same thing over and over again。。 terrible to read。 To summarize:1） Money rules the world - either you pay less to larger amount of people in democracies or you pay up smaller circle in authoritarian countries。2） Timing matters when you launch your bid - people change sides if the leader has no resourses to pay up。 。。。more
Diana
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Не маю нічого проти англійської мови。 Читаю в оригіналі багато книг， проте у випадку нон-фікшену вона мене просто вибішує。 Чи то так є насправді， чи у мене вже починається загострення самонавіювання ніхто уже не знатиме。 Але впевнена， що саме в українському перекладі мені б ця книга була під смак。 🔸Гарно структурована？ Yeah🔸Наведені прикладі з реального життя？ Of course 🔸Невже й щось про Україну згадали？ Obviously！ Як це не згадати про наших любимих Кучму та Яника？ Якщо у вас в планах， просто пр Не маю нічого проти англійської мови。 Читаю в оригіналі багато книг， проте у випадку нон-фікшену вона мене просто вибішує。 Чи то так є насправді， чи у мене вже починається загострення самонавіювання ніхто уже не знатиме。 Але впевнена， що саме в українському перекладі мені б ця книга була під смак。 🔸Гарно структурована？ Yeah🔸Наведені прикладі з реального життя？ Of course 🔸Невже й щось про Україну згадали？ Obviously！ Як це не згадати про наших любимих Кучму та Яника？ Якщо у вас в планах， просто припустимо， стати диктатором， чи， просто припустимо， утриматися при владі у статусі диктатора， то це саме то， що вам треба。 Але якщо просто для саморозвитку， то гай ладно， теж підійде。 Одне прохання - не показуйте цю книгу нашим депутатам。 。。。more
Ambria Adams
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This book delves into the ways that politicians work to gain and maintain their power。 It was intriguing to hear about the many reasons behind so many political decisions that we don't see as the governed。 This book delves into the ways that politicians work to gain and maintain their power。 It was intriguing to hear about the many reasons behind so many political decisions that we don't see as the governed。 。。。more
Luis
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This book served as an introduction to Selectorate theory and it really got me thinking a lot about how the world works。 Although I don't believe there's such a thing as an absolute truth， the book introduces a new perspective I hadn't considered in the political scene。It's a great read to get into the world of political science and it got me hooked on the subject。 This is a 5 star book from me。 This book served as an introduction to Selectorate theory and it really got me thinking a lot about how the world works。 Although I don't believe there's such a thing as an absolute truth， the book introduces a new perspective I hadn't considered in the political scene。It's a great read to get into the world of political science and it got me hooked on the subject。 This is a 5 star book from me。 。。。more
Stephen
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If you're a cynic like me， you'll enjoy this book。 If you're a cynic like me， you'll enjoy this book。 。。。more
Weatherly
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Loved this one a lot， it was so engaging and really well laid out/accessible。 The basic argument was that the smaller the coalition of essential supporters （ppl whose support you *require* to keep power， the easier it is for absolute power to take hold。 Which is… a yeah duh but also very interesting to see it applied over and over。Rly enjoyed this， love the pop politics books
Tegan
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