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The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War

The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War

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  • Create Date：2021-09-10 11:21:03
  • Update Date：2025-09-06
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  • Author：Craig Whitlock
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Summary

The groundbreaking investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about the longest war in American history by Washington Post reporter Craig Whitlock， a three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist。

Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq， the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support。 At first， the goals were straightforward and clear: to defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11。 Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power， the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives。

Distracted by the war in Iraq， the US military became mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand。 But no president wanted to admit failure， especially in a war that began as a just cause。 Instead， the Bush， Obama， and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress， even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory。

Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam， The Afghanistan Papers contains startling revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war， from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines。 In unvarnished language， they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess， that the nation-building project was a colossal failure， and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government。 All told， the account is based on interviews with more than 1，000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted， and sometimes entirely fabricated， version of the facts on the ground。

Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to make time to meet with him。 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are。” His successor， Robert Gates， said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda。”

The Afghanistan Papers is a shocking account that will supercharge a long overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered。

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Reviews

Tristan ，

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Jon ，

If you like reading about the gross inefficiencies of the US government， this is your book。

Tori Hoeschler ，

🤯My mind is blown and my judgment on the evacuation of Afghanistan is irrevocably altered。 No one， and I mean， NO ONE （presidentS with an S， allies， NATO， high ranking members of the military/intelligence/state dept， etc etc） come out of this looking good。 Incredible read。

Jane Marquardt ，

Very well written - compelling read on the folly of U。S。 policy over the past 20 years in Afgh。

Thomas ，

Excellent book to explain some of the current events that are happening now

Steve ，

This is what winning looks like。 -- Feb。 2013， General John Allen， Commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan。I chose the above quote somewhat randomly。 Variations of the same hollow rhetoric， from virtually every major American military figure associated with Afghanistan， appear every couple of pages in Craig Whitlock's devastating account of the history of the war in Afghanistan。 And it isn't just the military， since both Republican and Democratic administrations also employed political happy tal This is what winning looks like。 -- Feb。 2013， General John Allen， Commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan。I chose the above quote somewhat randomly。 Variations of the same hollow rhetoric， from virtually every major American military figure associated with Afghanistan， appear every couple of pages in Craig Whitlock's devastating account of the history of the war in Afghanistan。 And it isn't just the military， since both Republican and Democratic administrations also employed political happy talk when it came to discussing the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan。 From nearly the very beginning， with the U。S。 invasion back in 2001， no one really knew what to do with the country after it fell。 Bush insisted that they were not there to nation build， but that's exactly what we were doing， but with little understanding of the country and its people。 Obama continued many of the same policies， but also pumped oceans of money into the county， but with no real meaningful plan or plans for real change。 It did raise the levels of corruption to unbelievable levels in a country struggling to establish a fragile and probably already doomed democracy。 （In some respects， in comparison， Vietnam was a real run enterprise。） One irony that jumps out at you from the beginning is that a chief source for Whitlock's book was a project by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction （SIGAR） titled （unbelievably） "Lessons Learned。" The purpose of the project was to interview numerous （military， political， etc。） figures associated with the war to identify mistakes made。 If you know anything at all about the Vietnam conflict， it is as if we didn't learn a single thing thing from that earlier war。 If anything， we do things more stupidly now。 Interestingly， at the very end of the book， one political figure who had grown skeptical of the war back in 2009， Joe Biden， was finally in a position to something about it。 And did。 。。。more

Rusty ，

Ok and …This was really just a chronicle of mistakes。 I was hoping， naively perhaps， for a more direct accountability or causation for these strategic shortcomings。 At the end of the day， it was a well researched but poorly run AAR。

Mike ，

And， once again the hoary shadow of American Exceptionalism rears it's ugly head。 "We don't have to try to understand their excuse for a culture。 They just want to be like us。 You know， same as the Vietnamese and the Iraqis！" This is an even-handed （43， 44 and 45 all screwed it up） description of a "war" that America certainly should have ended with the death of Bin Ladin but just kept on keeping on。 The descriptions of the rampant theft and corruption are just mind-numbing and the lies， everybo And， once again the hoary shadow of American Exceptionalism rears it's ugly head。 "We don't have to try to understand their excuse for a culture。 They just want to be like us。 You know， same as the Vietnamese and the Iraqis！" This is an even-handed （43， 44 and 45 all screwed it up） description of a "war" that America certainly should have ended with the death of Bin Ladin but just kept on keeping on。 The descriptions of the rampant theft and corruption are just mind-numbing and the lies， everybody lying all the time。 This is not a pleasant read but a necessary one。 。。。more

Nick ，

A must read。 Especially for all the arm chair logistic experts who had opinions about our Afghanistan withdrawal。

Dan Davis ，

So it's sounding like it didn't go well。 So it's sounding like it didn't go well。 。。。more

Chris Barsanti ，

A searing look at not just how cultural arrogance， military mistakes， and strategic stupidities doomed the American military adventure in Afghanistan， but how the leadership spent two decades ignoring everything they were being told。My full review is at PopMatters。 A searing look at not just how cultural arrogance， military mistakes， and strategic stupidities doomed the American military adventure in Afghanistan， but how the leadership spent two decades ignoring everything they were being told。My full review is at PopMatters。 。。。more

Craig Amason ，

If even half of what Whitlock reveals in this eye-opening overview of the U。S。 involvement in the Afghanistan War is accurate， then this will have to be one of the most painful chapters in the history of American foreign policy。 From the overwhelming cultural illiteracy of the government and military leaders about Afghanistan to the complete lack of strategy and clear objectives for our country's engagement， this twenty-year conflict was a colossal waste of lives， money， and resources。 As was th If even half of what Whitlock reveals in this eye-opening overview of the U。S。 involvement in the Afghanistan War is accurate， then this will have to be one of the most painful chapters in the history of American foreign policy。 From the overwhelming cultural illiteracy of the government and military leaders about Afghanistan to the complete lack of strategy and clear objectives for our country's engagement， this twenty-year conflict was a colossal waste of lives， money， and resources。 As was the case with the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam， American intervention failed on almost every imaginable level， resulting in tragic loss of life for so many members of our military and Afghan soldiers and civilians。 If I never hear the term "nation building" again， that will be fine with me。 America has been trying to export representative government around the world since 1945。 It doesn't work， and it never will。The true authenticity of Whitlock's book derives from its heavy reliance on oral history interviews with military personnel， from foot soldiers up to brass。 Of course， one could argue that inherent biases from subjects being too close to the action is a fair criticism， but I believe Whitlock's own research and documentation help round out the picture。 Speaking of objectivity， no administration comes out unscathed under the broad light Whitlock casts here， from Bush's invasion to Biden's commitment to finally and completely withdraw （the book was released before the actual airlifts began）。Some of the more astounding revelations include: *How isolated and uneducated many of the Afghan soldiers were。 *How difficult it was to train Afghan soldiers to fight efficiently and strategically。 *How fractured both the Taliban and the Afghan leadership was in the region。 *How corrupt the existing Afghan leadership was， even when supported by the U。S。 *How easy it was for American officials to be deceived and even manipulated by tribal leaders。 *How little State Department officials and military leaders understood about the culture。 *How America's attempt to eradicate the poppy industry in Afghanistan was so misguided。 *How often U。S。 government and military leaders disseminated false information to the American public to save face or garner support。Many books have been published about the war in Afghanistan over the last 20 years， and there will be many more written with the added advantage of hindsight， unclassified documents， and more candid testimony from some of the key players。 Whitlock's book is an overview from the perspective of America's exit from the country。 The subsequent studies that explore the legacy of this failed mission will be even more painful to read， but we need to read them and face the truth about these two dark decades。 With any luck， perhaps future administrations will learn from the mistakes and avoid the quagmire of yet another endless war。 。。。more

SweetPea ，

A lot of information to digest but ultimately the book’s message is that troops should have left Afghanistan shortly after the war started。 According to the records used to support the book， defeat was inevitable once the goal was changed to nation building。 5 stars。

Brad ，

Evocative of David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan。

Beth ，

Finally， the truth about this war。 It is difficult to learn the details as to what really has been going in Afghanistan。 So many snares and lies just to save someone's ego， power， money， or reputation。 Shameful。 The military and govt leaders should be ashamed of their deception。 Trust will need to be earned to get back our respect or support。 Finally， the truth about this war。 It is difficult to learn the details as to what really has been going in Afghanistan。 So many snares and lies just to save someone's ego， power， money， or reputation。 Shameful。 The military and govt leaders should be ashamed of their deception。 Trust will need to be earned to get back our respect or support。 。。。more

John Suddath ，

A history of American ColonialismIn contrast with European countries in the 19th Century， the US chose not only militarily to occupy two Middle East nations，but also to pour billions into them。 The Europeans not only extracted natural resources， but also income generated from colonial enterprises。 The Americans not only were arrogant and ignorant of the situations， they also forgot all of the lessons of Vietnam。 Lies and damn lies delivered over 2 decades without challenge。

James Murray ，

I highly recommend this non-fiction book for understanding what has happened in Afghanistan， both historically and in regard to the recent withdrawal of US forces from there。 It's logically presented and reads well for a clear understanding of the country， its culture and its politics。 I highly recommend this non-fiction book for understanding what has happened in Afghanistan， both historically and in regard to the recent withdrawal of US forces from there。 It's logically presented and reads well for a clear understanding of the country， its culture and its politics。 。。。more

Christine Barth ，

Whitlock makes botched bureaucracy into a digestible read and makes a compelling case that 4 presidents lied about Afghanistan and failed to develop a clear strategy。 It's a pretty depressing read overall， but interesting。 Whitlock makes botched bureaucracy into a digestible read and makes a compelling case that 4 presidents lied about Afghanistan and failed to develop a clear strategy。 It's a pretty depressing read overall， but interesting。 。。。more

Ryan ，

Excellent overview of the strategic and policy aspects of US involvement in Afghanistan。 Doesn't fall into the trap of focusing on one specific unit， policy， or commander， but overs the entire 20 year war with the same level of analysis。 Nothing in this was particularly surprising to me （I was in Afghanistan for a couple years， and have compulsively read almost everything I can find about the conflict。。。）， but it's an excellent presentation and seems to my experience to be accurate。The only erro Excellent overview of the strategic and policy aspects of US involvement in Afghanistan。 Doesn't fall into the trap of focusing on one specific unit， policy， or commander， but overs the entire 20 year war with the same level of analysis。 Nothing in this was particularly surprising to me （I was in Afghanistan for a couple years， and have compulsively read almost everything I can find about the conflict。。。）， but it's an excellent presentation and seems to my experience to be accurate。The only errors were maybe not applying enough tactical detail in specific areas （the CIA/SF 2001 operations， best covered by First In， and the imperial scale of Bagram and KAF， which I've not seen covered anywhere， and the insane wastefulness of contractor/military operations in building stuff）， but there are other books for those details -- for the broad overview， this is probably the best book on the US-Afghanistan war yet written， and probably will be the definitive version for history。 。。。more

Michael Kelley ，

This is an amazing book。 If half of it is true （and based on the sources it is all true）， we have been deceived by our military and political leaders for decades。 Unfortunately， we do not hold them accountable。

Martha ，

own it， hard back

Scott ，

This is a collection of snapshots based on first-hand accounts of the US involvement in Afghanistan from 2001 through 2020。 There are many interesting examples/stories/accounts which illustrate the general overall narrative/chronology of the period。 It's a tragic story of incompetence， corruption， dysfunction， and mismanagement on all sides。 This is a collection of snapshots based on first-hand accounts of the US involvement in Afghanistan from 2001 through 2020。 There are many interesting examples/stories/accounts which illustrate the general overall narrative/chronology of the period。 It's a tragic story of incompetence， corruption， dysfunction， and mismanagement on all sides。 。。。more

Joseph ，

I’m so thankful that Biden had the strength of will to finally get us out of Afghanistan。 The lack of a strategy and the non-stop lies from the generals reminds me of Vietnam。 An important book。

Betty ，

A shocking accounting of what went wrong in Afghanistan and why the American people didn’t know。 The author dove into numerous candid oral history interviews with White House officials and military members。 He read through Lessons Learned documentation to discover the extent of the deception within the political community。Having worked within the US Government for 36 years， I am aware of how you are never to report bad news to your superiors。 Gloss it over however you want， but it must be positi A shocking accounting of what went wrong in Afghanistan and why the American people didn’t know。 The author dove into numerous candid oral history interviews with White House officials and military members。 He read through Lessons Learned documentation to discover the extent of the deception within the political community。Having worked within the US Government for 36 years， I am aware of how you are never to report bad news to your superiors。 Gloss it over however you want， but it must be positive。 I knew there was a lot of cover up but not to the extent revealed in this book。This was a war that had the public’s approval。 Go in and find those responsible for 9/11。 So， we did - and then we stayed and stayed and stayed。 The author writes of the usual mistakes the US makes when going into war – mission overreach and no exit strategy。 The author also writes of the billions of dollars that were wasted there in needless nation building efforts。As I read the book it made me angry that politicians wasted taxpayers’ money for twenty years。 American military members gave their life for nothing。 I wondered when/how do we recognize what can’t be fixed and then leave it alone？ I was frustrated that we went into a country within stopping to first understand their culture。The Taliban waited us out， and now they have won。 I wasn’t sure how I felt about our recent withdrawal from Afghanistan until I read this book。 Now I am thankful that of the past four Presidents Biden had the courage to say enough。 No more American service members dying there。 No more taxpayer money wasted。 I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in foreign policy or military history。 。。。more

David ，

I've long wondered why we didn't establish military bases in key Afghan cities， similar to what we've done in Korea， Japan， NATO， etc。 We could have trained Afghan security forces， deterred terrorists， abandoned our costly attempt at nation building， and paid for the bases by closing a few European and/or US bases。 However， after reading this， I question whether that more modest strategy would have worked in light of the cultural and economic challenges we faced。 Given the lack of economic oppor I've long wondered why we didn't establish military bases in key Afghan cities， similar to what we've done in Korea， Japan， NATO， etc。 We could have trained Afghan security forces， deterred terrorists， abandoned our costly attempt at nation building， and paid for the bases by closing a few European and/or US bases。 However， after reading this， I question whether that more modest strategy would have worked in light of the cultural and economic challenges we faced。 Given the lack of economic opportunity in Afghanistan， it may be decades before it ceases to be a haven for terrorists。 It took the WAPO three years and two lawsuits to obtain access to the oral histories that are the basis of the book。 I'd say it was worth it。 This is a remarkable document of foreign policy and hegemonic hubris run amuck。 。。。more

BlackOxford ，

The Curse of American IdealismCraig Whitlock is an outstanding journalist。 He has done something remarkable in this book by bringing together first person reports from soldiers， administrators， and politicians about US involvement in Afghanistan since 2001。 The material he has gathered from a number of little known archives describes 20 years of error， misconception， and deceit throughout the military， the government， and in communication to the public and the world。 The most disturbing aspect o The Curse of American IdealismCraig Whitlock is an outstanding journalist。 He has done something remarkable in this book by bringing together first person reports from soldiers， administrators， and politicians about US involvement in Afghanistan since 2001。 The material he has gathered from a number of little known archives describes 20 years of error， misconception， and deceit throughout the military， the government， and in communication to the public and the world。 The most disturbing aspect of Whitlock’s reporting， however， is that the American experience in Afghanistan appears virtually identical to its experience in VietNam and to the previous Russian experience in Afghanistan which the Americans had sworn to avoid。* But like a good journalist， Whitlock sticks to the facts - who screwed up， who was responsible for collecting and disseminating false information， and the slow slide into strategic and tactical confusion as lives and money flowed into the country never to return。 For me， Whitlock’s tale begs a question: why do Americans do this？ And so consistently？ Is there a flaw in the American system of government that allows such egregious error and apparent incompetence to dominate their actions？ Or does a possible flaw lie elsewhere， in national culture or character perhaps？ And if the latter， why isn’t the flaw - governmental or cultural - something they debate seriously rather than merely using these kinds of gross failures in partisan point scoring？I would like to extend Whitlock’s journalistic narrative beyond what he is able to report professionally， therefore。 Here are some ideas about the source of what are really global disasters imposed by the United States on the rest of the world:There’s little doubt about it: Americans are indeed idealists。 But this is in no way a virtue。 Idealists do very stupid and destructive things。 And when those things become to much to bear or pay for， they move on to other ideals in order to repeat the cycle。 They never realise that the problem they have is not the execution of this or that ideal， but the idea of the ideal itself。 Eventually all ideals trap and control the idealist。Idealists believe that the key to realising success is the precise and complete articulation of the state of affairs that should be achieved。 As a matter of principle idealists are taught to ignore the details of the current situation as these interfere with a vision for the future。 Impediments to the realisation of the ideal are dealt with as they arise of course。 But it would be inefficient to consider these in advance。 Ignorance of other cultures， possible constraints on action， and persistence in the face of resistance are idealists virtues。 Besides， mere articulation and presentation of what are considered self-evident ideals to them should enrol all sincere people into its realisation。 The rest can be subdued by power。Idealists love power。 After all the power necessary to achieve an ideal is implied by the ideal itself。 Therefore idealists will use increasing amounts of power - military， economic， political - until resources are entirely depleted or until the ideal is reconsidered as ill-advised （a rare occurrence）。 American idealists seem constitutionally unable to admit that any particular ideal was badly formulated。 However， upon achieving any ideal， they progress to further idealisation as a mark of success。 Idealism is the foundation for terrorism in all its manifestations。 This suggest some inability to learn from experience。Idealists are， indeed， constitutionally unable to learn。 Commitment to an ideal implies that those involved must be prepared to hold to it steadfastly while it is being pursued。 But when ideals prove inadequate for the situation， they provide no guidance for future ideals since ideals by their nature are irrational （or perhaps extra-rational） phenomena。 They exist not as a matter of necessity or appropriateness but of pure will。 Consequently any failure of idealistic effort requires a replacement of the failed ideal with no impact at all on the commitment to idealism。 Failed ideals may also be resurrected when their failure is no longer noted in popular culture （that is to say， among the electorate）Idealists lie and believe themselves justified in doing so。 Whether in government or Silicon Valley， Americans lie as part of the programme to promote a particular ideal and consider lying toward this end virtuous。 Since any serious ideals are rarely achieved easily， lying is essential to maintain the commitment of those enrolled in the ideal。 Progress is exaggerated; setbacks minimised， and， if ideals are subtly modified， changes are simply hidden。 It helps， of course， if the original ideals were only vaguely formulated in order to allow rather free interpretation and wiggle-room for change without discussion （known in military circles as mission creep）。Idealists， in fact， hate the political process of discussion and compromise。 Consequently they tend to rather conceptually define their ideals - freedom， for example， or democratic government， or women’s rights - and then exclude many other possible ideals as interference and irrelevant to the cause - like honesty， integrity， and solidarity say。 How dare anyone suggest that there should be compromise of an ideal once accepted！ This is heresy among Americans。 In fact， there are an infinite number of extraneous ideals that are necessarily excluded from idealist thinking。 These excluded ideals are not even considered as constraints but are ignored entirely。 It is usually these ignored ideals that are diagnosed as the cause of failure。 But idealism prevails despite repeated failures， not just in war but in domestic politics in which idealism has become a rampant disease paralysing the body politic at all levels。 This shouldn’t be surprising， I suppose， in a country founded on ideals， and whose children are educated that pragmatic idealism is an obviously superior philosophy to any other， and whose adult population engages continually in idealist promotion from a vast number of pulpits， advertisements， and sources of political propaganda。 Whether on the Left or Right， among the Believers or the Atheists， idealism is the name of the game in America。 Perhaps that’s where the problem that Whitlock documents， yet again， actually lies。 * Just two of the many books which tell the story of American involvement in VietNam that could read just as fluidly and accurately if Afghanistan replaced that country’s name: https://www。goodreads。com/review/show。。。 https://www。goodreads。com/review/show。。。 。。。more

Bryan Mcquirk ，

Where to begin。 This book is as close to the Pentagon Papers as we will ever see and it is unfortunate。 This is a scathing and thorough rebuke and repudiation of every lie， half-truth， and piece of propaganda that we force fed to the American public for 20 years。This is a complete and utter failure of every administration and their military chain of command。 It is almost criminal in its ineptitude。Such a total and complete waste of time， resources， and lives。 The best part of this book is it val Where to begin。 This book is as close to the Pentagon Papers as we will ever see and it is unfortunate。 This is a scathing and thorough rebuke and repudiation of every lie， half-truth， and piece of propaganda that we force fed to the American public for 20 years。This is a complete and utter failure of every administration and their military chain of command。 It is almost criminal in its ineptitude。Such a total and complete waste of time， resources， and lives。 The best part of this book is it validates the stories of greed and corruption that those of us who served in Afghanistan brought home to our families and friends。 Reading the author describe the Afghan National Police robbing people in broad daylight brought back memories of what we witnessed and we're powerless to stop。 。。。more

Stephen Morrissey ，

What would victory have looked like in Afghanistan？ The reason that question is so hard to answer amidst the evacuation of American troops， civilians and Afghani compatriots in 2021 is that victory was never clearly defined in any year of the war since 2001。 President Bush and Obama both declared victory， but in a pure political messaging ploy， while US soldiers fought， bled and died for nation-building activities。If the Second World War is the United States' most well-managed conflict - keen fo What would victory have looked like in Afghanistan？ The reason that question is so hard to answer amidst the evacuation of American troops， civilians and Afghani compatriots in 2021 is that victory was never clearly defined in any year of the war since 2001。 President Bush and Obama both declared victory， but in a pure political messaging ploy， while US soldiers fought， bled and died for nation-building activities。If the Second World War is the United States' most well-managed conflict - keen focus on strategy; limitless material resources; clear tactical objectives - the Afghanistan War must rank as one of the worst-managed。 At the beginning， the Bush administration failed to put enough boots on the ground to corner and capture Osama bin laden in the hilly terrain of Tora Bora。 In addition， Bush， Rumsfeld and Tommy Franks became enamored with democratizing another Middle East country: Iraq。 While Iraq sucked away money and troops， the Taliban reconstituted itself as a potent enemy and popular movement among the majority-Pashtun Afghani population。The war seemed to fare no better under Obama。 Despite a troop surge at the beginning of his first term， Obama， like Bush， failed to set clear strategic objectives。 What the men and women on the ground report is that there were， at best， tactical missions and objectives， but no overall strategy。 Were we nation-building Afghanistan？ Did we want a flourishing democracy， or merely a safer harbor from terrorists designing attacks on the US homeland？ Obama brought good tactics， but utterly failed to deliver anything remotely close to good strategy。Craig Whitlock unlocks this and so much more in his investigative reporting， reviewing thousands of pages of documents where generals， soldiers， aid workers， and Afghanis clandestinely criticize the US war， all while politicians and pundits proclaim that we have "turned the corner。" One of the more potent symbols of the war described in the book is a US-built police station in one of Afghanistan's rural provinces。 The structure is beautiful， gleaming glass and new amenities that would fit in any suburban American town。 One problem arose， though: the locals could not figure out how to use the door handles。 No one had apparently asked for Afghani input on the design， structure and fixtures， a small encapsulation of how woefully inept the US war and reconstruction effort was。Vietnam and Afghanistan will remain intertwined as not only lost war efforts， but watersheds in the disillusionment of American citizens in how their leaders misled， deceived， and lied their way to election victories at home， all while consigning American troops and Afghanis to a woeful war effort that could never succeed。 。。。more

Kyle Anderson ，

The war in Afghanistan ended on the same day as the release of this book。 It is intended as a definitive capstone to the war， not necessarily an account of the heroism， the hopes， or idealism that could be talked about but an explanation into why it happened the way it did。 This book reveals a treasure trove of internal pentagon， state department， military and other interviews conducted over the last twenty years。 Much of this information conflicts with the public posture of officials during the The war in Afghanistan ended on the same day as the release of this book。 It is intended as a definitive capstone to the war， not necessarily an account of the heroism， the hopes， or idealism that could be talked about but an explanation into why it happened the way it did。 This book reveals a treasure trove of internal pentagon， state department， military and other interviews conducted over the last twenty years。 Much of this information conflicts with the public posture of officials during the war。 However， the simple message is clear: policy makers could not clearly define what they wanted to achieve in Afghanistan and operational level leaders received either insufficient resources or too many resources and therefore struggled to allocate them in accordance with an unclear national strategy。 。。。more

Nadia ，

Probably needs to be read by all - and specifically by future and current military， policy makers， foreign politics students， and diplomats… so this never happens again。 The general US citizen also needs to read it so we understand why are votes really matter - the vote we make can cause a war that will be hard to ever end and when it does end， it will never be able to end cleanly because it didn’t start with a clear plan and so it cant end with a clear plan

Reference

google book https://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&q=The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War

hathitrust digital library https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/ls?q1=The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War&field1=ocr&a=srchls&ft=ft&lmt=ft

The British Library https://bll01.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/search?query=any,contains,The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War&tab=LibraryCatalog&search_scope=Not_BL_Suppress&vid=44BL_INST:BLL01&lang=en&offset=0